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
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Lee, Henry, Jr.

THE MILITIA

OF THE

UNITED STATES.

WHAT IT HAS BEEN.

WHAT IT SHOULD BE.

By Henry Lee Jr.

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NOTE.

Washington declared, that "The devising and establishing of a well regulated Militia, would be a genuine source of legislative honor, and a perfect title to public gratitude." A few opinions of Washington, and of others intrusted with civil and military power by the people of the United States,—as to the absolute necessity of an uniform and efficient Militia; as to the defects of our system, and the remedies to be adopted;—are herein printed, with the hope, that the perusal of them may assist those who are endeavoring to establish what Washington deemed one of the four great institutions of a Republic.

A portion of this pamphlet appeared in the columns of the Daily Advertiser, but the subject could not be treated fully in a public journal, and was therefore discontinued.

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CALIFORNIA

THE MILITIA.

The Governor of this State has sent a message to the Senate, accompanied by a Report of an informal Commission on the Military Instruction and Training of the People of Massachusetts, and has strongly urged upon the General Court the importance of establishing a permanent system.

Of the Report I do not propose to speak now, but going behind that, to ask whether, this great rebellion being once put down,—

1. We want a Military Force.
2. If so, shall it be a Standing Army or Militia, or both.
3. If we need Militia, is our system at present satisfactory.
4. If not, what improvement is practicable.

As these subjects have been debated over and over again from the foundation of our Federal Government, it may assist us in our investigations, to quote the opinions of a few of our statesmen and generals.

In Washington's speech to Congress, 1790, is the following:—

"Among the many interesting objects, which will engage your attention, that of providing for the common defense will merit particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."

Again in 1793 he says:—

"I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of *our* duties to the rest of the world, without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing yourselves in a condition of complete defense, and of exacting from *them* the fulfillment of *their* duties towards *us*. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion, that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms, with which the history of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost,

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by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known, that we are at all times ready for war."

These are the exhortations of the Father of his Country.

The ardent patriot, John Adams, who had studied our character and our institutions thoroughly, in writing to a friend in 1815, thus expresses himself:—

"National defense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman. On this head I recollect nothing with which to reproach myself. The subject has always been near my heart. The delightful imaginations of universal and perpetual peace have often amused, but have never been credited by me."

Jefferson says:—

"None but an armed nation can dispense with a standing army; to keep ours armed and disciplined is therefore at all times important."

The reluctance of our British kinsmen to make any preparation for war equals ours, and some warnings given them in 1850, by Lieutenant-General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Inspector-General of Fortifications, and Engineer-in-Chief at the siege of Sebastopol, are applicable to us. He is writing on the military condition of Great Britain, and the consequences of an invasion:—

"A common reply to any question of an invasion is, 'Let them come; I should like to see them!' without a particle of reason for this bravado. I, on the contrary, would say emphatically, 'I should be very sorry to see them!' . . .

"It is not sufficient to make a showing of the *improbability* of war, but proof is required of its *impossibility*. . . .

"The proposition to submit national differences to arbitration is very pretty in theory, but can never be enforced. When parties are tired of their disputes, and both wish to effect a reconciliation, without compromising their dignity, they have been accustomed to adopt a mediation, and will continue to do so; but this they never have done, nor ever will do, when both or either are much animated in the issue. . . .

"The propriety of a due degree of preparation may be argued even on the principle of economy, for it will greatly tend to avert war, by removing from foreign powers a temptation to molest us. . . .

"What are the remedies to be applied? The first impression will be, large military forces, maintained during peace of whatever duration, on a basis adequate for the protection of the country,

and of its possessions, in war. This is unnecessary and would be very wasteful. The problem to be solved, is a reasonable peace establishment; and, in addition, the groundwork in military local organization of forces, in stores of ammunition, arms, and military equipments, and in fortifications,—that would enable the country, in a case of emergency, to call out its means and energies, so as to be placed in a state of defense as rapidly as the occasion could possibly require.

"There are two fallacies, connected with the capability of this country for defense against a powerful invasion, that are very prevalent, and that tend to lead us to a false sense of security."

The two fallacies to which Sir John Burgoyne alludes, are:—

"1. That, if any attempt at invasion were made, we have hundreds of thousands of brave spirits, who would rush to arms, pour down on the rash intruders, and drive them into the sea.

"2. That our great financial means would afford us such advantages on the occurrence of a war, that it is the best policy to husband and allow to accumulate for that very event, amounts that are now demanded for a more constant state of preparation.

"These fallacies are the more dangerous, because they are based on undeniable facts, from which, however, the most erroneous conclusions are deduced.

"No one can doubt the courageous and excited feeling that would animate our countrymen in *numbers* adequate for every purpose that could be required; but what could such feelings effect, opposed to a thoroughly well equipped, organized, and disciplined army in the field?

"You might as well present a great cotton spinner with some tons of iron, of however superior quality, and tell him that there is his steam engine to enable him to compete with the foreign manufacturer, as bring masses of men in this state, to oppose a regular army.

"There is no instance on record of a populace, however superior in numbers, successfully opposing an organized army, except by a very prolonged desultory warfare; and every year the advantages of disciplined against untrained forces are increased in proportion to the improvements made in military science.

"How could their movements be regulated?—what confidence could they have in each other's proceedings?—how would they be provided with ammunition and other necessaries?—how fed? They would devastate the country without producing any injury to their enemy, for they would fly like sheep before the smallest combined bodies of an organized army; nor is it any disparagement to our countrymen to say so, because they are the very same materials that make, to say the least of it, as gallant and good soldiers and sailors as any in the world.

"It is worthy of observation, that those who have seen most actual service against French armies, are those who have least confidence in our measures for national defense, while those who attach so much importance to the resistance to be offered in the case of invasion, by a small body of troops, or a large mass of armed populace, are persons who have never seen a shot fired; who, indeed, are totally ignorant of military matters, or of the arrangement and movement of large bodies of men in any kind of order.

"We form many speculations, which, in the abstract, appear as matters of course; but looked into more closely they are soon found to be full of difficulties. Let us then put this to such a test.

"We will suppose that there are twenty thousand men on the Dover or Hastings road, some fifty or sixty miles from London, toiling along that road and covering a space of at least five or six miles in length, when a few horsemen, who have been in front, gallop back with the news that the French troops are approaching, and about three miles distant; and soon after, small dispersed bodies are discovered coming towards them, while, from a height presenting a good view, may be seen large, black-looking compact bodies moving in the same direction.

"At this period what would our heroes do, admitting them to be full of gallantry and animation? Would those in front hasten onward to meet their detested foes, calling and sending to those in rear to close up as rapidly as possible; or would they spread out right and left of the road to form a front?

"We will suppose a Gough, a Hardinge, or a Wellington to be present, and we will propose to them as a problem what to do on this occasion; and if they had the smallest body of regulars in company, we would ask whether they would not *prefer*, nay, decidedly prefer, to be altogether without this armed population.

"There is one other resource suggested by persons of a romantic turn of mind; which is, that every man should seek for means to kill one of the enemy, which would speedily lead to their entire destruction: this is not new, it has been urged as a system in other countries on similar emergencies; a few hundred stragglers have been made away with in this manner, but with no perceptible effect on the strength of the armies; and with a certainty of entailing cruel measures of retribution on the inhabitants generally.

"The second subject for undue confidence is any absolute reliance on our great financial resources;—these are indisputable, and nothing is more true than the saying of some great general, that there were three essentials to carry on war with success—the first was money!—the second, money!!—and the third, money!!! But you must have time to convert your money into arms, ammunition, men of war, armies and fortifications. If a French army could be conquered, like Danaë, by a shower of gold, instead of volleys of

shot and shells, we should be always prepared for them ; but men of war, fortifications, arms, guns and carriages, notoriously require time to be prepared. It takes at least a twelve-month to make tolerable infantry soldiers, even when collected by degrees, surrounded by veterans, and under numerous experienced officers and non-commissioned officers ; they are not thoroughly good till after two or three years' service—really efficient artillerymen take longer. This, added to the time for recruiting, will explain why national defenses cannot be raised in a day, by any amount of wealth."

Have we not suffered from a like overweening confidence and a like reluctance to turn away from our daily pursuits to inquire into our real condition, boasting that no nation would dare to attack us, and if they did they would rue the day ?

This war has revealed to us that our navy upon which we counted, had to be created ; that our army was so small that it has disappeared ; that our Militia had dwindled, under contemptuous and discouraging legislation, down to a few brigades of volunteers, who went forth promptly, but who had not been allowed time to acquire the drill and discipline needed to fit them for immediate service in the field ; that only a few of our principal harbors were protected by forts, scarcely one of these completed, none of them fully armed, none fully garrisoned ;—in short, that we were utterly defenseless.

Æsop tells of a roe who kept its blind eye to the water side, expecting a land attack. But the hunters came in a boat and shot the poor dappled fool. Louis Philippe the crafty, built a cordon of forts around Paris, but he left the enemy within.

We have been more blind than Æsop's roe, less wary than the King of the French, for we were unprepared for an enemy from without or within.

We have now created a navy which will be our best protection from invasion, we have some new forts in process of erection, we are finishing the old ones, nearly all are garrisoned, some are armed, and we hope, before we die, that all will be. But our great army of volunteers, now hardened into veterans, serve only for this war, and our frontiers and our forts will then be garrisoned and guarded by 25,000 regulars only.

I have endeavored in what has been said above, to demonstrate the fallacy of relying upon the efforts of brave but unorganized

citizens, even for self-protection; of expecting to transform in an instant, money into armies, armaments, equipments, and fortifications. I have quoted John Adams, the father of the Revolution, Washington, the father of his Country, and Jefferson, the father of American Democracy, to show that they considered an adequate preparation for war essential to establish our rank among nations, or even to secure our existence.

I am aware that the graphic description of the helplessness of the British, surprised by an invasion, and the estimates of the time needed to convert stolid peasants into efficient soldiers, would not apply entirely to our own more lively and more educated people. What John Bull could achieve in a year, we, with our talent for organization and habit of voluntary combination, would accomplish in three months. Still it illustrates sufficiently my position, that an organized armed force of some sort is necessary.

I am aware too that the remoteness of our country from Europe, our wise policy of avoiding entangling alliances, and of abstaining from interference in the affairs of foreign nations, renders war less probable; but notwithstanding these favorable circumstances, we have been at war or in imminent danger of such a calamity at least ten times since the termination of our revolutionary contest; that is, within the space of eighty years.

In 1799 with France, in 1812 with England, in 1830 with South Carolina, in 1836 with France, in 1838 with the Indians in Florida, in 1839 with England, in 1841 with England and the Canadas, in 1842 with England, in 1846 with Mexico, in 1846 with England, to say nothing of occasional outbreaks of the Indians, Mormons, &c. Three times we have been at war, seven times we have most mercifully escaped; but whoever will turn back the pages of our history and learn how narrow those escapes, how utterly unprepared we were on all these occasions, and when war did ensue, at what a sacrifice of time and life and treasure we stumbled through it, will be convinced that even on the argument of probability we ought to make timely and reasonable provision.

In the introduction to General Knox's Report on the Militia, revised by Washington, is the following :—

"While the human character remains unchanged, and society and governments of considerable extent are formed, a principle ever ready to execute the laws and defend the States must constantly exist. Without this vital principle the government would

be invaded or overturned, and trampled upon by the bold and ambitious. No community can be long held together, unless its arrangements are adequate to its probable exigencies."

Washington, with a prophet's eye, foresaw that our very prosperity begotten of peace, would render us oblivious of the only condition upon which peace could be honorably maintained; and he who had just toiled through a seven years' war,—losing opportunity after opportunity, for want of all that constitutes a powerful army,—recurred again and again to this subject because he felt so deeply its vital importance, and because he knew how grudgingly his own modest requests were granted, how often refused by Congress, ignorant of military affairs and jealous of military power.

It is gratifying to remember that Massachusetts, which had shown its loyalty to Washington during the Revolution, heeded his advice when President. In a letter to the Governor and Council of our State, written after his visit in 1789, he writes:—

"I have observed, too, with singular satisfaction, so becoming an attention to the Militia of the State, as presents the fairest prospect of support to the invaluable objects of National safety and peace."

And it is gratifying to reflect that when this foul rebellion burst forth, we were again prepared to send what few troops we had, so promptly and so perfectly equipped.

May we always preserve our motto as it is, and while we seek peace, recollect that it must be maintained honorably by the sword.

At the close of this war, we shall have left an army of about 25,000 regulars, to guard our frontiers, to garrison our forts, and to protect us from enemies within and without. Three years ago this force would have been considered quite adequate to any emergency, but we have since learned the proportions of war in this vast country. We have constantly congratulated ourselves upon our geographical and political position as insuring us against war, and have contented ourselves with this security; not glancing at the equally momentous but less agreeable fact that when war did come, the arena was a continent. Will this army, almost invisible in time of war, be increased, will it remain as at present, or will it be reduced, that the Scripture may be fulfilled, "from him that hath not shall be taken even that which he hath"?

After the Revolution, our army was virtually disbanded ; all, save "twenty-five privates to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point and other mazagines, with an appropriate number of officers ; no officer to remain in service above the rank of captain, and those privates to be retained who were enlisted on the best terms." This was done in spite of the warnings of prudence and patriotism. After the war of 1812, the army was reduced from 35,000 to 6,000 men. The emptiness of the Treasury, the comparative poverty of the country whose industry has been interrupted and at the same time heavily taxed, impel to economy which sometimes degenerates to parsimony ; and the languor and apathy which succeed anxiety and agitation, determine the direction of the retrenchment. But beyond the influence of temporary pecuniary distress and natural revulsion of feeling, the maintenance of a considerable standing army in peace, would be contrary to the principles and practice of our country and our race. Our ancestors brought from the mother country a fear and jealousy of a standing army, and to this day the Queen of Great Britain awaits the votes of Parliament to reëstablish her army for the ensuing year.

This distinction between the Army and Navy is based upon the idea that a land force may be misused to subvert the liberties of the people. Macaulay, referring to the Militia, says, "the enemies of the liberties of England looked with aversion on a force which could not, without extreme risk, be employed against those liberties ;" and again "the very name of standing army was hateful to the whole nation." The practical philosopher, Franklin, being asked by the Abbe Morellet, "whether the United States could, after their independence was established, get along without regular troops ?" replied, "Yes." "Whether they would do better to have only national Militia ?" "Certainly." "Will the Militia cost less to the nation, for where every citizen must be drilled in the exercise of arms, there is, in loss of time, in expense of arming, of clothing, of assembling the troops at a certain season of the year, &c.,—an expense really greater than needed to keep on foot a small number of troops ?" "Supposing a general Militia to be equally expensive with a body of regular troops, yet the Militia is preferable, because the whole being especially disciplined, has nothing

to fear from a part." "Mr. Franklin, therefore, thinks, that to avoid not only the expense, but the danger of keeping up a body of regular troops in time of peace, none of the States separately will do it, nor the Congress for the whole."

When the subject was brought before the Federal Convention, Elbridge Gerry said, "that as to maintaining an army the people were jealous." "He thought an army dangerous in time of peace, and could never consent to a power to keep up an indefinite number." His idea was that the blank should be filled with 2,000 or 3,000.

Madison said,—"as the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to prevent them by an effectual provision for a good Militia."

Colonel Mason proposed inserting in the Militia clause, before "to provide for organizing, &c.," the words, "and that the liberties of the people might be better secured against the danger of standing armies in time of peace."

Randolph and Madison favored this proposition, "as it is well to discountenance standing armies by the Constitution as far as will consist with essential powers of Government."

General Knox, one of the most soldier-like of all our Generals, in the introduction to his Militia bill, discusses the influence of a Militia and a standing army very fairly; and as it seems to me, reluctantly recommends the former to the Republic:—

"The modern practice of Europe with respect to the employment of standing armies, has created such a mass of opinion in their favor, that even philosophers and the advocates for liberty have frequently confessed their use and necessity in certain cases."

"But whoever candidly and seriously estimates the power of discipline, and the tendency of military habits, will be constrained to confess, that, whatever may be the efficacy of a standing army in war, it cannot in peace be considered as friendly to the rights of human nature."

One of the charges brought against John Adams's administration and the Federal party, was, that they maintained a standing army. Jefferson, in his inaugural address, 1801, adverting to this subject, announces that—

"A statement has been framed by the Secretary of War, on mature consideration, of all the posts and stations where garrisons will be expedient, and of the number of men requisite for

each garrison. The whole amount is considerably short of the present military establishment. For the surplus no particular use can be pointed out. For defense against invasion, their number is as nothing; nor is it conceived needful or safe that a standing army should be kept up in time of peace for that purpose."

This standing army of the Federalists, consisted, as Hamilton says,—

"Of four small regiments of infantry insufficient for the service of guards in the numerous posts of our immense frontiers, &c., and two regiments of artillery which occupy the numerous fortifications along our widely extended coast."

Wendell Phillips in a late speech, expresses a fear lest the military spirit and the money spirit may destroy our Republic. He says:

"You are never to see the old Republic into which you were born. No one of you is ever to see the peaceful, farming, steady, reading, quiet, homely Republic, that we loved to think of, associated with seventy years of successful existence. You are to see a first rate military power; our resources developed; our strength manifested; the poison of military ambition infused into our views; our leading influences thirsty for war; half ruined young men, the privates of large armies, longing for the camp—that is to be the next thirty years. Side by side with that, you are to see a debt of from two to four thousand million dollars, &c."

I oppose to this gloomy picture of *what may be*, a cheerful account of *what has been*, to similar men under similar circumstances;—the soldiers of the army of the Long Parliament. Macaulay thus describes them: "These persons, sober, moral, diligent, and accustomed to reflect, had been induced to take up arms, not by the pressure of want, not by the love of novelty and license, not by the arts of recruiting officers, but by religious and political zeal, mingled with the desire of distinction and promotion." How did they behave when disbanded? "The troops were now to be disbanded. Fifty thousand men, accustomed to the profession of arms, were at once thrown on the world; and experience seemed to warrant the belief that this change would produce much misery and crime. But no such result followed. In a few months there remained not a trace indicating that the most formidable army in the world had just

been absorbed into the mass of the community." Of course there will be some half-ruined young men, and some restless spirits, but the vast majority of our volunteers will resume their old places at home; or, attracted by a mild climate and a grateful soil, emigrate to some of their old campaigning grounds; laying down with pleasure the arms they took up from a sense of duty not from inclination.

If by military power, Mr. Phillips means latent military power, we shall have that; but if he means we shall keep up great military establishments, I do not believe it. The *money power* will neutralize the *military power;* a great army, and a heavy debt, can hardly co-exist in a country where thrift is a cardinal virtue.

Louis Blanc in his 'Dix Ans,' says: "The fall of Napoleon was then a natural and necessary result of the growth of the bourgeoisie. Can a nation be at the same time essentially commercial and essentially martial?"

Assuming then, at the close of this war, the dissolution of the volunteer army and no increase of the regular, what is to be our reliance?

It appears by Franklin's letter to the Abbé Morellet, already quoted, that he thought we should rely exclusively on Militia.

John Adams, in a letter to another French Abbé who desired materials for a history of the American Revolution, writes:

"That there are four institutions which must be thoroughly studied and fully examined by any one who would write understandingly upon the subject; for these institutions have had a decided effect, not only in the first determination of debates in the public councils, and the earliest resolutions for forcible resistance, but also in the influence they had upon the other Colonies in furnishing an example for the adoption, more or less, of the same institutions and similar measures." "These four institutions are,—First, the Towns. Second, the Churches. Third, the Schools. Fourth, the Militia." "Here, Sir, you have a slight sketch of that wisdom and council, and that skill and military bravery, which have produced the American Revolution; and which I hope will be sacredly preserved as the foundation of the liberty, happiness and prosperity of the people."

In another letter, Adams writes: "I wish every man upon the Continent was a soldier, and obliged, upon occasion, to fight."

When Washington handed in his resignation at the close of the war, 1783, he addressed a solemn letter to the Governor of every State, in which enumerating the four things essential to the well being and even to the existence of the United States as an independent power, he specifies :—

"Third. The adoption of a proper peace establishment; in which care should be taken to place the Militia throughout the Union on a regular, uniform and efficient footing." "The Militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security and our first effectual resort in case of hostility."

In a message to Congress, relative to Indian hostilities, 1789, is this passage :—

"Along with this object, (the appointment of a Commission,) I am induced to suggest another, with the national importance and necessity of which I am deeply impressed; I mean some uniform and effective system for the Militia of the United States. It is unnecessary to offer arguments in recommendation of a measure, on which the honor, safety, and well-being of our country so evidently and so essentially depend."

Recurring to the subject at the opening of the session, 1793, he declares :—

"They (the Militia,) may be trained to a degree of energy, equal to every exigency of the United States." Again, in 1794, "The devising and establishing of a well-regulated Militia, would be a genuine source of legislative honor, and a perfect title to public gratitude."

Once more, in 1795, in a voice of warning :—

"With the review of our army establishment is naturally connected that of the Militia. It will merit inquiry what imperfections in the existing plan further experience may have unfolded. The subject is of so much moment in my estimation, as to excite a constant solicitude, that the consideration of it may be renewed, till the greatest attainable perfection shall be accomplished. Time is wearing away some advantages for forwarding the object, while none better deserves the persevering attention of the public councils."

Finally, in 1796, as if almost without hope :

"My solicitude to see the Militia of the United States placed on an efficient establishment has been so often and so ardently

expressed, that I shall but barely recall the subject to your view on the present session."

Jefferson, in his inaugural address, 1801, after recommending the reduction of the Regular Army, speaks thus of the Militia:

"The only force which can be ready at every point and competent to oppose them (the invader,) is the body of neighboring citizens as formed into Militia. On these, collected from the parts most convenient, in numbers proportioned to the invading foe, it is best to rely, not only to meet the first attack, but, if it threatens to be permanent, to maintain the defense until regulars may be engaged to relieve them. These considerations render it important that we should at every session, continue to amend the defects which from time to time, show themselves in the laws for regulating the Militia, until they are sufficiently perfect. Nor should we now or at any time separate, until we can say we have done every thing for the Militia which we could do were an enemy at our door."

In 1803, he urges the "importance and indispensable necessity of vigorous exertions, on the part of State Governments, to carry into effect the Militia system adopted by the National Legislature—in a manner best calculated to insure such a degree of military discipline and knowledge of tactics, as will under the auspices of a benign Providence, render the Militia a sure and permanent bulwark of national defenses." "None but an armed nation can dispense with a standing army; to keep ours armed and disciplined is therefore at all times important." In 1808, he affirms: "For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well organized and armed Militia is their best security."

Madison adds his testimony to that of his predecessors:—

"As auxiliary to a regular force, and a substitute for a large one in time of peace, a disciplined Militia forms an essential part of a republican system, it being certain that liberty cannot be safe with powerful standing armies, nor in danger without them, and that without an effective Militia, the danger of such armies cannot be precluded."

Statesmen like Franklin, Adams, Jefferson and Madison might deceive themselves as to the sufficiency of Militia, being more sensible of the political than the military consequences of substituting them for Regulars; but Washington's twofold experience, as soldier and statesman, qualified him to compre-

hend the subject in all its bearings. What that experience had been, his letters reveal.

"To place any dependence upon Militia, is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill, (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms,) are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control, cannot brook the restraint, which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of any army; without which, licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year.

"Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire to return to their homes, that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit into others.

"These, Sir, Congress may be assured, are but a small part of the inconveniences which might be enumerated, and attributed to Militia; but there is one, that merits particular attention, and that is the expense. Certain I am, that it would be cheaper to keep 50 or 100,000 men in constant pay, than to depend upon half that number and supply the other half with Militia. The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress, they must be furnished with or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea, and destroy every kind of regularity and economy.

"The jealousy of a standing army, and the evils to be apprehended from one, are remote, and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For if I was called upon to declare upon oath, whether the Militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter." "In a word, we have brought a cause, which might have been terminated happily years ago by the adoption of proper measures, to the verge of ruin by temporary enlistments and a reliance on Militia."

How can we reconcile these and other letters of Washington utterly condemning Militia and deprecating any dependence upon them, with his subsequent earnest expression of their indispensableness and possible efficiency? A distinguished writer, sketching the history of our Militia, thus defines Washington's position.

"Finding that there was an almost universal opposition on the part of the people to maintaining in time of peace, a regular army, growing out of the ancient hue and cry against such establishments in England, where it was believed that the military were embodied to oppose the people in their just claims to certain privileges, and where, perhaps, such really was the case; General Washington took repeated occasion to impress upon Congress the necessity of organizing the Militia as early as possible.

"Although General Washington was very anxious to establish, thus early, a system for the Militia, knowing the repugnance of the people at large to a regular army, as before observed, and that, therefore, no other means of defense could be obtained with the consent of the people, under the impressions which then existed; it was by no means his opinion that that species of force was either the most economical or the least dangerous to the liberties of the citizens: for, in this country, the soldier, enlisted with his own free will and consent, could be regarded in no other light than a volunteer in the cause of his country,—still, he believed it was better to have some description of force, in reality or in name, rather than that the new Government should appear in the eyes of the world without any means of defense at its command. Besides, General Washington was desirous that the information, discipline, and experience, which was still existing among the remaining Revolutionary officers and soldiers, should not be suffered to die away, but be introduced under the sanction of a law, among the people, who should be enrolled in the Militia; fearing, that should the opportunity pass away unimproved, such an advantage would not again occur, unless, unfortunately, the United States should be again involved in a long and arduous war."

In the first place, Washington never asserted that Militia were as cheap or as efficient as Regular Troops, but he did solemnly aver, after all his sad experience, "that they *may be trained* to a degree of energy equal to any exigency of the Republic." Then it did not follow that because half organized bodies of men amenable only to State authority, coming tardily to the field,

enlisted for two or three months, without previous drill or discipline, their officers uninstructed and without means of obtaining instruction beforehand ;—sickened, misbehaved and deserted ;—it did not necessarily follow that Militia, properly organized, trained by officers of experience, (who abounded after the war,) and compelled to serve for a longer term under Federal control, would not be equal to any exigency.

For the Federal Convention had, after prolonged debates, and in spite of strong opposition from Sherman, Gerry and others, who were jealous of Federal power ;—resolved, "that Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions,—to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States ; reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress,"—so that the Militia were now to a limited extent under Federal authority.

Washington's system of defense, adopted virtually by his successors ;—included a line of fortified posts along our frontier ; of fortifications along the sea coast ; arsenals, foundries, and magazines for the manufacture and storage of arms, equipments and ammunition ; a Federal army large enough in time of peace to guard the frontier, the forts, and the military depots ; finally, a Military Academy to furnish engineers and artillerists.

The necessity of instruction to officers of Militia as well as of the Army, he felt strongly, and adverts to it in the address in which he expresses his belief in their possible efficiency. He says :

"But it is an inquiry which cannot be too solemnly pursued, whether a material feature, in an improvement of it, (Militia) ought not to be, to afford an opportunity for the study of those branches of the Military Art, *which can scarcely ever be* attained by practice alone."

The idea entertained by Franklin, of employing Militia solely, was found impracticable ; as some of the posts to be guarded were outside of the States,—the fortifications had to be planned with relation to each other,—provisions made for their defense on the same principles,—it was important to maintain a corps of artillerists and engineers, as they could not be improvised,

and the small infantry force requisite to garrison the frontier posts would furnish the skeleton of a war establishment. Moreover, from local circumstances, particular States, if left to take care of their own defense, would be in possession of the chief part of the standing forces, and of the principal fortified places of the Union,—which would entail a disproportionate burthen and confer upon them an undue degree of power.

Neither Federalists nor Democrats proposed to maintain a large standing army. Hamilton, the incarnation of Federalism, says: "One great engine to effect this (abridgment of power of the people), would be a large standing army, maintained out of our own pockets." Both parties in their turn had recourse to provisional armies; when war seemed *imminent, both trusted* chiefly to the Militia. We shall see how the State and Federal Legislatures heeded the solemn exhortations of the founders of our Government, and the lesson of our seven years' war.

In accordance with the power granted by the Constitution, Congress, in 1792, passed an act enrolling all able-bodied white male citizens, from eighteen to forty-five years, (with certain exceptions,) and organizing them; all the enrolled to provide themselves with arms and equipments. In 1794, the Secretary of War, General Knox, having reported that a further provision was needed to secure obedience to the call of the Federal Executive, and that the Militia, when in service, should be bound by the military code of the United States,—Congress, in 1795, authorized the President to call out the Militia in prospect of invasion, insurrection, or to enforce the laws; the Militia when called out to be subject to the rules and articles of war, and to serve only three months in any twelve. This last clause exhibits the jealousy of Congress; for this brief term of service had, by the testimony of Washington and other officers, rendered futile any attempt to drill and discipline the Militia, and its consequent inefficiency had prolonged our Revolutionary contest, and well nigh lost us our liberties.

In 1794, the Secretary of War reported that of 450,000 Militia, not 100,000 were properly armed, and that as in the existing state of affairs arms could not be imported, we must manufacture them. This report having been confirmed by a Congressional Committee the same year, and corroborated by

another Committee in 1806; Congress, in 1808, appropriated $200,000 annually for the purpose of providing arms and equipments for the Militia. These three Acts exhausted the responsibility and authority of Congress; it remained for the States, to whom the right of officering and training the Militia had been reserved, to exercise that right and to carry into execution the laws of Congress by supplementary legislation. Some of the States co-operated with zeal, but others failing to do so, in 1794 a Committee of Congress reported that there was need of a more energetic system, but that Congress was prohibited by the Constitution from making any alteration, and that the States could, if they would, establish an uniform and efficient Militia. In 1803, another Committee reported that the President should urge the Executive of each State to carry into effect the Militia System of 1792; and again, in 1810, that the power of the Federal Government was qualified, and that the States must make the Militia more efficient;—and so on from time to time, the States were exhorted, but to little purpose.

As to the injunction that Militia-men should provide themselves with arms and equipments, the Secretary of War reported, in 1794, that only five States, of which Massachusetts was one, had enforced it by suitable penalties; and indeed, it was only in the oldest, richest and most populous States that arms enough could be procured by individuals or by the Government.

The annual appropriation by Congress was so inadequate, that in 1818, sixteen years after the establishment of arsenals, only 62,606 arms had been distributed to the Militia, and in 1826, a board of officers reported that if the Militia remained stationary, it would take *seventy-five years* to arm them at the rate of Government supply.

The want of a simple system of tactics and of books to disseminate the knowledge of it, prevented uniformity where the men were trained, and in some parts of the country precluded the possibility of any training.

The numerous exemptions granted by the State Governments, and the insignificant fines imposed upon delinquents, combined to absolve from personal service the most educated and wealthy citizens, and those holding the highest offices, leaving in the ranks only those whose pecuniary inability made

service compulsory,—the very portion of the community who could least afford the loss of time,—a most anti-republican inversion of justice, which naturally excited righteous resentment. Again, the most spirited young men who could afford the outlay of time and money, withdrew into volunteer corps, whose shining equipments, glittering uniforms, and more precise movements, contrasted violently with the ill armed, half equipped, motley clad, shuffling Militia. These circumstances disheartened and degraded the Militia; men of influence were not to be found in the ranks, nor would they accept commissions except for a short time, perhaps to escape from all further service, and thus offices of responsibility fell into the hands of ambitious men, who used them as stepping stones, or vain men, who thus borrowed titles they could not earn.

This failure of the Militia was owing, partly to the distaste of our people for military training,—from the restraint imposed, the interruption to business, and a religious horror of war;—partly to the aversion natural after a long war;—but chiefly to the conviction that nothing could be accomplished under the prevailing system.

The Militia, which in 1794 had numbered 450,000, reached 1,100,000 in 1825, and this return did not include South Carolina, Maryland, Mississippi and Delaware. To call this immense army from their labors for the number of days requisite to make them efficient soldiers, was impossible. To compensate them, would exhaust the treasury; to subject them to the expense and the loss of time without compensation, would impose an intolerable burden on the people. The trainings held each year were too few and too far between to effect the slightest purpose, while inefficient as they were, they cost the country much, the Militia-men more, and while, as one writer observes, "they could not make a man a soldier, they made many a one a drunkard."

The radical defect of our Militia system, and the primary cause of its failure, was the excess of numbers.

Washington probably never contemplated an universal Militia, as a Committee of the Congress of the Confederacy with Hamilton at its head, had reported, as early as 1783, in favor of a classified Militia; and this plan had undoubtedly

been submitted to him before its presentation to Congress. If not, the report of General Knox, Secretary of War, 1790, had been revised by Washington, and this provided for a classification. Again, in 1794, after stating the impossibility of arming the whole, and the hardship of requiring their service, as operating injuriously to the industry of the community, Secretary Knox inquires whether a limited but select and efficient corps of Militia formed on the principle of rotation or otherwise, would not be better?

This question of rendering the Militia more efficient by classifying it, was presented to Congress again by President Madison in 1810, and by Committees and Secretaries of War, 1816, 1817, and 1818. But these various plans were rejected.

1. Because, as urged in the debates in the Federal Convention, a select Militia would cause a ruinous decline in the rest.

2. Because of its doubtful constitutionality; the right to train the Militia having been reserved to the States.

3. Because in some parts of the country thinly settled, the extension of the military district would increase unreasonably the fatigue and expense of attending trainings.

4. The reports were usually made when war threatened, and when, consequently, attention was directed to the defensive ability of the country, and change deprecated for want of time to establish a new system.

In 1819, a Committee of Congress, General Harrison being chairman, recommended instructing officers and non-commissioned officers only; and argued that in this way the Militia might, when called into service, be quickly rendered efficient, and at a less expense than was imposed by the Militia trainings. In 1826, a Board of Officers under General Scott, repeated this recommendation, but no measure was taken to carry it into effect.

As a select Militia was, for reasons stated, considered inexpedient, and as the universal Militia were found inefficient, the only resource besides the standing army was the Volunteer Militia, corps of whom had been formed of the youngest and most spirited members of the Militia who could give the requisite time and money. In the cities and towns of the most populous States, these corps were numerous; and, compared with the regular Militia, were well drilled and disciplined.

Their prompt response to the calls of the Government, from the war of 1812, down to the rebellion of 1861, and their soldierlike conduct, have done honor to themselves and to the country, but does not justify reliance upon them exclusively.

1. Because the volunteer system is too precarious, the numbers and efficiency of the force fluctuating with the popularity of its officers or the feeling of the hour, so that they may happen to be in a decline at the very moment of the country's need.

2. Because the right of the State to exact service being waived, many of those best able to respond, selfishly hold back, leaving the whole burden to be borne by the more patriotic and generous.

3. Because one of the greatest obstacles here, and probably in other States, to recruiting or maintaining an efficient and sufficient body of volunteers, is the refusal of employers to allow apprentices to join it.

To accept as a favor what one can claim as a right, is, in private life, inconsistent with self-respect; and it is improper that the State should stand in that supplicatory position. If a Militia is indispensable, service should be required from a sufficient number of citizens, and should not be accepted from volunteers, with the exception only of corps of Cavalry and Light Artillery,—branches of the service entailing greater expense, and involving greater sacrifice of time, and which may therefore be composed of volunteers, conforming of course to general regulations of the Militia.

I append quotations from officers of experience in the Army and the Militia, Governors of States and others who have had opportunity to observe the working of our Militia system;—to confirm and illustrate my views as to the character of the Volunteer Militia and the Universal Militia, and the defects in both systems.

1. NEED OF CO-OPERATION OF THE STATES.

Brig. Gen. J. G. Swift, Chief Engineer, U. S. Army.

So far as I have had occasion to observe the organization of Militia, in South and North Carolina, New Jersey and New York, during my service with them in the late war; the evils of malformation, disproportion in the various "arms," and imperfect instruction, were in

a degree attributable to apathy and neglect. It has generally been the case that but few members of our Legislative body have given the subject of the Militia a careful examination; a general desire has been evinced, the rather to make the statute conform to the habit of avoiding Militia trainings than to give the citizen a just view of his duties, and to enforce their observance by law. The evils mentioned are not only consequent on neglect and imperfect laws, but also on erroneous and degrading estimates of the use and value of a Militia, and, from the relative locality of the population, they can only be remedied by a patient examination of the subject, and by the application of a proper system of instruction.

Adjutant Gen. Sumner, Mass.

The embarrassment, then, which exists to making a perfectly national Militia, arises under the power reserved to the States by the Constitution to provide for officering and training the Militia; while that for organizing, arming, and equipping it, and establishing the system of its discipline, is granted to the National Government. This simple enumeration shows these to be dependent powers, and it sufficiently exposes the necessity of the joint co-operation of both Governments for the advancement of the system in practice to the point intended at the time of its adoption. For it is at once apparent that the power of Congress to organize, arm, and equip, the Militia, and establish its system of discipline, is of no use, unless the officers to command it are provided by the States, and the troops are disciplined according to the system prescribed. The States who made the grant to the Federal Government of their Militia powers, did it with an implied obligation of co-operation on their own part with the co-ordinate powers they reserved. The object in view warrants the belief that, but for such an understanding, the grant would not even have been accepted.

2. WANT OF INSTRUCTED OFFICERS.

Adjutant Gen. Sumner, Mass.

One of the greatest difficulties under which the Militia suffers is a deficiency of intelligence among its officers. This arises not from an indisposition to learn, but from the want of the means of instruction and opportunities for practice. The People of this country are too high minded to be dragged about the streets under the authority of those who are ignorant of their duty.

Brig. Gen. John H. Cocke, Va.

It may be assumed as a military axiom, that "there can be no efficient army without skillful officers." The experience of the late war has removed all doubt, (if there was ever any,) that the Militia, as soldiers, were, beyond all comparison, superior to their commanders as officers. The former did, indeed, vindicate the truth of the assertion, that the yeomanry of a free People are the worthiest defenders of their country. But, while their willing obedience to authority, their patriotic zeal, and their dexterity in the essential use of fire arms, proved them worthy of all confidence, it served to place in stronger

light the deplorable deficiencies of their officers. And I venture the assertion without the fear of a dissentient among the commanders of Militia corps, during the late war, that the great obstacle to success in the organization and discipline of their respective commands, arose from the want of properly instructed and properly qualified subaltern officers.

3. WANT OF A SYSTEM OF TACTICS AND ITS DISSEMINATION.

Report of a Board of Officers, Gen. Scott, President.

In respect to instruction, another material defect may be noticed. Systems of a convenient size and form, for the instruction of cavalry, artillery and infantry, each bearing the express sanction of the Government are much wanted by the Militia.

Amicus Patriæ, Kentucky.

Believed to be Col. Richard M. Johnson.

There were four or five systems of tactics in use, at the same time, among our troops in the last war, and the consequence must have been inevitably the creation of much perplexity, if two corps using different systems had been under the necessity of manœuvering together. Great attention ought to be paid in the formation of a system. Great pains should be used to give it general dissemination, and no changes should be afterwards made, unless to correct some obvious defect, or to introduce some obvious improvement.

Major Gen. Macomb, U. S. Army.

The system of tactics ought to be uniform throughout, and that for the several arms ought, as far as possible, to conform to each other. It ought to be simple and easy of comprehension, avoiding all unnecessary manœuvres and complicated movements, which are never used in real service, and which only tend to embarrass new troops, and to render the system difficult for the Militia, without producing any beneficial results; unless, indeed, it were to render the military profession so complicated that it could be acquired only by long or regular course of instruction, and thus obliging the Government to resort to regular troops for any efficient service.

Adjutant Gen. Sumner, Mass.

It (the Federal Government) can provide and distribute books of instruction to the officers, and thus secure an uniformity in the words of command, of exercise, and manœuvres, throughout the Union; and, as the power of Congress to compel the attendance of Militia officers at drills, for instruction, is not generally admitted, if it will furnish instructors to such of the States as choose to avail themselves of the advantage furnished, it need not be questioned that the opportunity will be embraced to the extent of the provision.

The system of Infantry Tactics prescribed for the Army, is not generally adopted by the Militia, and solely for the want of books of instruction, which it has for a long time been supposed would be furnished by the National Government. No measure, much more than the distribution of books of instruction to the Militia officers of

all the States, would tend to the establishment of an uniform Militia throughout the Union. It would drive out of circulation thousands of volumes of spurious editions of the national work, in which such alterations are made as are totally destructive of that uniformity of practice, which it was the object of the National Legislature to establish when they required its adoption by the Militia.

4. CHARACTER OF MILITIA OFFICERS.

Gov. Cole, Illinois.

The Militia, as it is now organized, is a mere school of titles, where honors are conferred more from a momentary impulse of personal kindness, than from a sense of the qualification of the individuals.

Brig. Gen. John M. M' Calla, Kentucky.

All pride is lost, and we can seldom procure a respectable man who will take command of a company of regular Militia. In several regiments, as fast as the companies would lose their officers, they were dissolved and added to the adjoining companies, because they could not procure officers.

Gen. Cadwallader, Penn.

The carriage of the common soldiers is said, and with truth, to be in the touch of the elbow, and confidence in their officers—the Militia man quickly loses the one support, and is seldom sustained by the other.

John G. Watmough, Penn.

Let not commissions be bestowed by a few idle, worthless individuals, but make it obligatory, if that appointing power must remain with the People, upon a clear majority of the whole, to decide as to the qualifications of those, to whom such important trusts are to be confided: for it must appear most evident, that no permanent improvement can be effected in the Militia system, so long as the majority of its officers continue to be composed of men, possessed of neither energy nor intellect sufficient to meet any emergency in which they may be thrown.

Brigade Inspector Henry Mankin, Md.

From the laxity of the Militia system of this State, there are, with some most honorable exceptions, few officers of talent and spirit attached to the regular Militia. The consequence is, a great deficiency of practical knowledge.

5. NUMEROUS EXEMPTIONS AND LOW FINES.

John H. Hall, U. S. Army.

During the last war I had frequent occasion to remark the ill effect produced on the minds and feelings of our Militia, by the operation of the *partial enrolment*, permitted by the existing United States' Militia laws; the effect of which is to throw the burthen of Militia defenses, in time of war, as well as at all other times, principally on the poorer

classes of the community. By the existing laws of the United States, certain classes of persons are designated as being exempted from enrolment, and the performance of military duty; and it is permitted that the Legislatures of the respective States may make such additions to the list of exemptions as they may conceive proper. In consequence of this permission, the exemptions, in some of the States, have become very numerous, and consist, principally, of a very large portion of the more polished and wealthy part of society; these exemptions not only deteriorate our Militia, by withholding from it the most respectable members of the community, but are productive of great injustice, by throwing the severest part of the burthen of the Militia defense on the poorer classes, who are alone compelled to furnish recruits for the service, as substitutes for themselves, or their sons, or apprentices, when drafted in time of war, in consequence of the exemptions of the other classes from enrolment. Having associated much with our Militia during the late war, I know that the moral effect of this state of things is very injurious to it, and that it tends greatly to diminish that cordiality of feeling, in relation to the common defense, which is so necessary to success.

Adj. Gen. Dearborn, Mass.

To make it efficient, only two things are wanting: first, there must be no exempts for any cause other than moral imbecility, as lunacy and idiotism; for all physical defects should only excuse the person from personal service by paying a fixed equivalent: second, those who did not come under either of the above causes, should personally do duty, and, as a compulsatory measure, such heavy fines should be imposed for neglect, that few would be *able*, and the *richest* unwilling to pay them, and thus the ranks would be filled with citizens from all classes in society. This would give an impetus to the Militia greater than any other measure that has been devised; besides, it is but just and right that all should be obliged to be prepared to defend the Republic, which is founded for the benefit of all. By the present low fines, the rich are enabled to avoid appearing on parade, and those who are not so affluent, feel debased and mortified in consequence of this apparent favor to the few. Besides, the Militia is thus by the long lists of exempts, deprived of the best educated and best qualified for officers.

Judge Advocate Sewall, Me.

Suffer not exemptions from military duty to be so easily obtained as they now are, in many of the States, but enforce the regulations by penalties or punishments which shall effect their observance. It may, I think, be stated, that in Maine, not more than one half of the free, able-bodied, white male citizens, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, are borne on the rolls of the Militia. The fines for non-appearance are so low, exemptions are so easily obtained, by the various provisions of the law, and so lax is the state of discipline, that at the musters of very many of our regiments, one would almost invariably look without the line for the free able-bodied yeomanry of the country, than upon the skeleton of a regiment within.

6. WEAKNESS OF MILITARY PENAL CODE.

Report of Brig. Gen. De Peyster, New York, 1851.

To His Excellency Gov. Hunt, on the organizations of National Guards, and Municipal Military Systems of Europe, examined by him.

* * * The weakness of our military penal code, in consequence of which the superior cannot enforce obedience, or maintain that respect due to his rank.

Without discipline firmly administered, and regulations founded on a just appreciation of the difficulties and ends of a soldier's life, a Militia organization only tends to give a false idea of the duties of a soldier, and is totally useless for the purposes of war or police. Would that the writer's pen could make apparent the chief cause besides the elective principle, of our Militia's decadence and present inefficiency! It is almost entirely owing to the absence of stern and impartial discipline. Without *discipline*, "an army is worse than a mob; impotent for good, potent for evil."—Nothing but actual experience will ever bring our Militia officers to realize the necessity of that strict discipline in details, which, although apparently small in themselves, involve the integrity of the *morale*, health and subsistence of our army.

Army and Navy Journal.

There is a great difference between drill and discipline, between brandishing a weapon through the manual of arms, and the habit of prompt and thorough obedience to orders.

7. WANT OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENTS.

Brig. Gen. Swift, U. S. Army.

The subject of organization has something to do with arms and equipments. That these are not in conformity with the United States' laws, is well known, the fancy of volunteers being a common guide to their choice, while the use of muskets and fowling pieces of various lengths and calibres promote the usual disposition in the ordinary Militia to pass muster with as little of either uniformity or of service as possible. On the subject of uniformity of arms, it cannot be effected until an efficient mode of supply be adopted; it would require nearly a century to arm the present Militia, by the existing means, at the expiration of which period the increase of population would fourfold the number of the Militia.

Adjutant Gen. Sumner, Mass.

But, under the existing laws, those who perform Militia duty are obliged to arm and equip themselves, and also to provide a certain quantity of ammunition at their own expense. In this the poor man sustains an oppressive burden. Not only so, but he is subject to pecuniary penalties for a non-compliance with the exactions of legal provisions, which, by accident or occupation, he may be obliged to forfeit. He must, also, support himself while attending the company and battalion trainings, and defray the incidental and necessary expenses of travel and attendance at the public reviews.

8. EXCESS OF NUMBERS.

I quote here and elsewhere the opinions of the Hon. Timothy Pickering, because as Colonel of a Regiment in active service, as Adjutant General, Quarter Master General and member of the Board of War during the Revolutionary War, and as Secretary of War and Secretary of State under Washington and Adams, he had occasion to observe the Militia ;—and because before the Revolution he had taken so much interest in military instruction and discipline as to write essays on the subject and had published in 1776, "An Easy Plan of Discipline for a Militia," which was by order of the Legislature used by the Militia of Massachusetts.

Hon. Timothy Pickering.

The opinion that a well organized and a well disciplined Militia is the natural defense of a free people, "is entitled to the character given to it by the Secretary"—that of a "maxim," but surely the "experience" of the people of the United States will not authorize the conclusion, because a "well disciplined Militia," comprehending the entire mass of able bodied men, never had, and I do not hesitate to say, never will have, an existence in our country.

Hon. J. R. Ingersoll, Penn.

Indeed it would be impossible to muster the whole class of citizens, who are adapted by their age to military duty, sufficiently often to teach them the simplest elements of military knowledge, without calling them from their usual occupations more frequently than the object would justify. There is no such extreme necessity for hostile preparation as will compensate the country for a sensible diminution of its productive industry in every department of labor. The emergency of war is always contingent, and generally remote. Manufactures, public improvements, and the cultivation of the soil, are objects which claim perpetual encouragement, and must enjoy an uninterrupted supply of artizans and laborers, or they will languish, and injury to the general prosperity of the country will ensue. The ordinary trainings of the Militia, (as they are called,) are certainly not so conducted as to prepare the individuals who partake of them, either for the patient self-denial of camp discipline, or the more active employment of the field of battle. Still less probability is there that these individuals, whose only experience and knowledge are derived from the merry meetings of a few muster days, will become instructors of others who must fill the ranks when actual service is required, and will look to the example and precept of their comparatively better taught comrades, for lessons of duty. Strong objections to these large meetings are stated with the force of reason and authority in the twenty-ninth number of the Federalist.

Gen. Scott's Report.

The primary defect of the Militia system, at this time, it is believed will be found in the excess of numbers, which the law proposes to hold to service; an objection that did not apply to the period of 1792, the

date of the still existing law on this subject. In 1792, it might well have been supposed necessary to enrol, and organize into corps of Militia, all the able bodied white male citizens of the United States, (certain classes and persons excepted,) between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years; but in the thirty-four years which have since elapsed, our general population, and consequently the male citizens between those ages, have been trebled.

9. ABSURDITY OF MILITIA TRAININGS.

Amicus Patriæ.

My opinion is, clearly, that any attempts to discipline the Militia under the present system, are wholly nugatory and unavailing; that they are worse, indeed, than attempting nothing; and that, unless the system is entirely and radically changed, it would be sound and saving policy to abandon it altogether, and to limit military instruction to the officers alone, and, to do that, under rules and regulations of a much more energetic and improving character than are now in force. I speak upon this subject from considerable experience and from much observation, and I say, most unhesitatingly, that, unless the system is much amended and improved, that it would be a saving of time, of money, and of morals, to abolish it entirely. The law requires the citizen to perform military service from the age of eighteen to forty-five. What service does he perform? He attends *muster* four times in each year. What does he learn? Nothing. Who are his instructors? Men, very commonly, who know nothing more than himself. He drags heavily through some absurd and preposterous movements, of which he understands nothing when he commences them, and nothing when he gets through them. We have about seventy thousand Militia in this State, and an exemption from Militia service would save to the Government, or rather to the people, on a moderate estimate, from sixty to seventy thousand dollars: for a day is lost to every man each time he attends muster, although a very small fraction of it is devoted to military instruction. I have seen Militia troops, many of which had been disciplined, *secundum artem*, for twenty or thirty years, and, after entering into service, they have been obliged, in all cases, not only to imbibe new ideas of tactics, but to eradicate from their minds, their old, crude and unintelligible notions; and I appeal to the officers composing the Board convened by you under the law of Congress, if they have not, in the course of their service, ascertained, from the most perplexing experience, that an old Militia-man, who perhaps has *mustered* regularly five or six times a year thirty years of his life, is the most ignorant, the most conceited and intractable of all the elements of war, that have ever fallen in their way.

Col. Pickering.

Of the utter inefficiency of two, three, or four days' training, in a year, every observer, possessing any military knowledge, is competent to pronounce. For myself, and I speak also from my experience in the Militia in early life, I can pronounce with confidence. I then took much pains, with such means as were within my reach, to acquire the

requisite knowledge for training the Militia, and imparted the same to the officers of the companies in Salem. We then attempted to instruct the Militia, who were assembled four days in the year, but our labor turned to very little account. I have ever since considered the whole, as I do the present Militia musters, as a waste of time for those who actually assemble; while thousands, who will in no event become soldiers, are heavily taxed by fines for non-appearance, and vexed in their collection.

Hon. J. R. Ingersoll, Penn.

A large number of men, may, without much effort, be occasionally collected for Militia muster in the way that such assemblies are usually got together. The idle and dissipated are induced to accept the summons from one motive, and those who are not able or not willing to pay the penalty of absence, from another. But assemblies of the idle and dissipated thus convened do no good, and the neglect of work by the industrious poor does much harm.

10. CHARACTER OF THE MILITIA.

Review of a Memoir by Gen. Macomb.

It is true, however, that many who had the command of the Militia, from motives of policy, and for the purpose of impressing on the enemy a belief that the Militia were exceedingly powerful, and that much reliance was placed on their exertions, did publish, in general orders, flattering accounts of their prowess, both to deceive the enemy and to encourage the Militia to come forth in defense of their country.

While this species of deception may be warranted as a *ruse de guerre*, and have its effect in war, it has nevertheless produced great mischief, by giving a reputation to the Militia, for efficiency, which they never merited, and thus that description of force has been too much relied on, as sufficient for all the purposes of defense—a reliance of a most dangerous tendency. The organization and system under which they could be employed, were exceedingly defective. They were, when called into public service, a moth on the treasury. They cost twice as much as regular soldiers, and rendered hardly any service whatever. They were without discipline, discontented, badly officered, and miserably provided with every thing which was essential to their utility.

Amicus Patriæ.

But it cannot be denied that our Militia, as soldiers (in times of peace) are most happily and most gloriously destitute of every trace of that sentiment which occasioned the fall of Lucifer and his expulsion from Heaven.

But where lies the fault? In the men or in the system? New Orleans, and the river Raisin will proclaim it not to be in the former; and all observation, all common sense, and all experience, will pronounce it, without hesitation, to be in the latter. What military knowledge or what military emulation can we expect to find among men who are called from home three or four times each year, to

perform some absurd and zigzag movements, ridiculously misnomered military evolutions ?

The following doggerel, describing the English Militia, is applicable to ours before their dissolution.

> " The country rings with loud alarms,
> And raw in fields, the rude Militia swarms ;
> Mouths without hands, maintained at vast expense,
> In peace a charge, in war a weak defense.
> Stout once a month they march, a blustering band,
> And ever, but in time of need, at hand."

By 1832, the Militia was defunct in many of the States. Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana had all memorialized Congress to establish a more efficient system. As no action was taken by Congress, the States were left either without any organized armed force, or else relied upon volunteers.

11. SHORT TERM OF SERVICE.

The Militia not only remained uninstructed in time of peace, but the limit of their service to three months in time of war kept them ignorant and inefficient.

Gen. Scott's Report.

The twelfth and thirteenth questions of the Circular Letter have elicited a very general and decided expression of opinion, in the replies, against tours of militia service of three months only. The majority of these letters recommend extending the period to a year, and in this the Board concurs.

Brig. Gen. Cocke.

In the short tour of three months, fully one half of the time will be consumed, even with the best officers and utmost assiduity, in preparing raw Militia for any degree of efficient duty ; so that, under the most favorable circumstances, the three month's tour will be rendering, in effect, but six weeks' service. To depend upon an army which, in its organization, contains the principle of its own annihilation quarterly, and whose efficiency, at best, cannot be counted upon for more than half the term of its nominal existence, to oppose a force, constituted as is customary in modern war, is too manifestly idle to require argument ; and if the evil consisted merely of the inefficiency of this part of our system, this branch of the subject might be dismissed ; but it is also the most wasteful of life, as well as destructive of treasure, the sinews of war.

One of the most important duties to be learned by a soldier, is to take care of his health, and provide for his comfort. Universal experience has shown, that a three or six months' tour is too short to enforce this essential branch of discipline. This was proven beyond controversy by the relative degrees of mortality in the Militia, and the regular army, everywhere, during the late war.

12. VOLUNTEERS.

Wolfe Tone.

The only part of our Militia, whose services can be relied on at present, are those volunteer companies, who arm, equip, and train themselves, and over whose organization, regulations, and instruction, the Government has little control and no inspection. We believe that the mass of its artillery and cavalry now consists of such companies, and however meritorious their zeal, it is highly desirable that they should be organized on a more permanent and regular footing, so as to give to the Executive, at all times, some certain information of the means of defense really existing in the country, a greater dependence on their support, and the means of organizing them when required. Nevertheless, as long as our Militia remains in its present state, they form all its forces, and we must do the best we can with them. But if the General and State Governments can agree on a uniform system for organizing it, under their more immediate control and inspection, we have no doubt that a much more efficient and equally national force might be created, and the formation of volunteer companies should then be only allowed on their agreeing to be incorporated in its ranks, and submitting to its regulations.

Whilst on this subject, we are not prepared to deny, that, with some modifications, the system of volunteer companies may not be continued with respect to the artillery and cavalry companies of the active Militia, as these ought to be composed of the most respectable citizens and farmers who can afford to arm, equip, and mount themselves at their own expense, and give more of their time to training, than the rest of the people. But they should be bound to conform to the general regulations, and submit to the same control and inspections as the rest of the Militia.

Beverly Daniels, Adjutant General, North Carolina.

Volunteer companies in this State, without the towns, are upon the whole injurious to the regular Militia. They are generally of short duration, raised in a moment of excitement, by the zeal and exertions of a single individual, on whom the command of the company usually devolves. Equipments, corresponding with the high feeling of the moment, are adopted; they flourish till the excitement is over, which generally subsides with the abatement of the ardor of the commander, or with a change in the command; vacancies which then occur in the ranks are not easily filled; the heavy expense of equipments, and a scattered population out of which the company was formed, and has to be supported, are difficulties found operating with effect, and in a short time the company becomes deranged, and the elements which composed it being dissipated, it is often years before they are again collected, into the body of the regular Militia.

Brig. Gen. Cocke.

Volunteer Corps should be encouraged where the denseness of the population would admit of mustering often enough to train and discipline them thoroughly, and for other reasons might be chiefly confined to the towns, where I should think it advisable for the whole body of the Militia to be put upon the establishment of regular trained bands.

Report of Brigadier De Peyster.

The fact that depending upon the volunteer system, portions of the State are left without any military force whatever for the protection of person or property, in districts destitute of military spirit.

Brig. Gen. Swift, U. S. Army.

In reference to your third query, there cannot be a doubt, that, while the gratification of novelty has its influence, the volunteer corps will be better armed, equipped, and more frequently trained than the ordinary Militia; and if this initial spirit could be kept in activity under one system of instruction, aided by a desire to improve, that will here and there be found in every corps, volunteers would be the best means of assembling and training the citizens of the country. But I have observed volunteers gradually to deteriorate to a grade of worth certainly not superior to ordinary Militia, and if a choice between volunteer, and no service at all, were permitted, our Militia would soon cease to exist.

There are youth in all populous communities who are desirous of forming volunteer corps—some induced by an aspiration to become useful, others by privileges and exemptions from fines, &c. The chief evil, where a desire to form such corps exists, is an erroneous estimate of the true object of such associations. There are also many who wish total exemption, arising from indifference and a want of respectability and admitted usefulness in Militia trainings—a fundamental error, and one which has its root in lack of proper instruction in boyhood, and in a vicious and traditionary habit of drawing contemptuous comparisons between Militia and regular troops.

Amicus Patriæ.

"Are the regular or volunteer Militia more efficient?"

We have no troops in this State to which the term "volunteer" may be properly applied. There are *uniform* or independent corps of infantry, riflemen, artillery, and cavalry; but they are not more devoted to voluntary service than the "*regular*" Militia. They are doubtless more efficient. They are generally furnished with arms, and their discipline is in many cases much superior to that of the ordinary Militia. But I am not inclined to think that they add much to the military strength of the country. They have not that permanency that would render them of any very decided utility. In many cases they preserve their organization but a few years, and are merged again into the general mass. In event of a war, they stand precisely in the same attitude with the other troops, and are not under any kind of obligation to make a voluntary tender of their services.

Gov. Daniel Elmer, New Jersey.

The principal advantage resulting from the organization of the Militia, seems to be to furnish the means, in case of necessity, to raise an army by *compulsory measures.* It will not be safe to depend altogether upon the voluntary offer of the services of the people; nor should it be so; there should be some way at command to compel *every person* to bear his proportional part of the burthen in time of war.

Before proceeding to present the remedies proposed from time to time by those who considered the Militia system impracticable, and the Volunteer system unreliable, I recur again to the absolute need of an organized force, remembering the words of De Tocqueville, who studied our institutions and our character carefully, and wrote upon them philosophically,—that "A proposition must be plain to be adopted by the understanding of a people."

It seems a mockery to affirm in feeble words truths which the prodigious sufferings of the past three years have impressed on our very hearts, but the lessons of the past are soon effaced from the memories of a people so busy and so hopeful as ours. Moreover, in a Republican community, where almost every man is dependent on his devotion to business of some sort, there is an instinctive combination against any intrusive demand of the State which will interrupt the daily avocations. De Tocqueville alludes to this neglect of the past and this restiveness of the people.

"It is this distinct perception of the future, founded upon a sound judgment and an enlightened experience, which is most frequently wanting in democracies.—The people which is surrounded by flatterers, has great difficulty in surmounting its inclinations; and whenever it is solicited to undergo a privation or any kind of inconvenience, even to attain an end which is sanctioned by its own rational conviction, it almost always refuses to comply at first.—It may therefore be supposed that an offensive law, which should not be acknowledged to be one of immediate utility, would either not be enacted or would not be obeyed."

Judging from the past, there is reason to fear that our people would choose to run the risk of being again caught unprepared rather than subject themselves to the irksomeness of efficient preparation. Too much pains, then, cannot be taken to prove that we must have an organized force, and that this force should and must consist chiefly of citizen soldiers; in short, that an efficient Militia is *inevitable*. I venture, therefore, to cite a few more authorities, in support of these propositions.

As to the economical necessity of some preparation, Major General Gaines, in a Report addressed to Major General Brown, 1826, records this opinion.

"To the statesman who may view the expense as an insuperable objection, let me submit an inquiry, to which the public records at Washington must render a conclusive solution. What was the actual expense of the late war, (1812,) on land, prior to 1st May, 1814? What part of this expense is justly attributed to our want of preparation and instruction? A moiety, at least, of that expense, must, I apprehend, be the melancholy answer."

Mr. Calhoun, when Secretary of War, in a Report on our Military Peace Establishment, thus presents the false economy of too great reductions and the possible peril to liberty.

"When taught by sad experience, we would be compelled to make redoubled efforts, with exhausted means, to regain those very advantages which were lost for the want of experience and skill. In addition to the immense expenditure which would then be necessary, exceeding manifold what would have been sufficient to put our peace establishment on a respectable footing, a crisis would then be brought on of a most dangerous character. If our liberty should ever be endangered by the military power gaining the ascendency, it will be from the necessity of making those mighty and irregular efforts to retrieve our affairs, after a series of disasters, caused by the want of adequate military knowledge.

"Economy is certainly a very high political virtue,—intimately connected with the power and the public virtue of the community. In military operations,—which, under the best management, are so expensive, it is of the utmost importance; but by no propriety of language, can that arrangement be called economical, which, in order that our military establishment in peace should be rather less expensive, would, regardless of the purposes for which it ought to be maintained, render it unfit to meet the dangers incident to a state of war."

It is not only inconsistent with economy, it is also incompatible with our dignity and our safety to postpone preparation, trusting to our geographical and political isolation to insure us perpetual peace. Archbishop Whately a sound logician, in a note to Lord Bacon's Essay on Seditions,—gives this warning.

"Men underrate the danger of any evil that has been escaped. An evil is not necessarily unreal, because it has been often feared without just cause. The wolf does sometimes enter in, and make havoc of the flock, though there have been many false alarms. The consequence of feeling too secure, and not being prepared, may be most disastrous when the emergency does arise. The existence of the power to meet the emergency is not the less important because the occasions for the exercise of it may be very few. If any one should be so wearied with the monotonous 'all's well' of the nightly guardians of a camp, hour after hour, and night after night, as to conclude that their service was superfluous, and, accordingly, to dismiss them, how much real danger, and how much unnecessary apprehension, would be the result."

De Tocqueville says,—

"It profits a people but little to be affluent and free, if it is perpetually exposed to be pillaged or subjugated." "Physical strength is therefore one of the first conditions of the happiness and even of the existence of nations." "The only safeguard which the American Union possesses against the dissolution which would be produced by a great war, lies in its probable exemption from that calamity."

"War is nevertheless an occurrence to which all nations are subject, democratic nations as well as others. Whatever taste they may have for peace, they must hold themselves in readiness to repel aggression, or in other words they must have an army."

In another Report, 1830, of General Gaines, who writes almost as vigorously as General Sherman, is the following :

"The time has probably passed by when any respectable statesman can seriously calculate on a rich, commercial and manufacturing nation like ours maintaining peace or independence, or of preserving the respect of her neighbors, without a naval and military force sufficient to *command* that respect, or in other words, sufficient to punish the author of any outrage upon her peace or commerce. When all nations become Quakers, it will be different; we may then gladly destroy our military and naval weapons, and gladly embrace the glorious millennium; but until then we must, if we hope for peace, hold ourselves ready for war."

Quarter Master General Jesup, in his Report of same date, takes the same view.

"The nature of our political system, with the advantages derived from our geographical position, enables us to dispense with large standing armies in time of peace; but the obligation to be at all times prepared for war, imposed upon us by a prudent regard to our own security, is not thereby lessened; on the contrary, it is a solemn duty which we owe to ourselves and to the cause of free government, to be able to call into action the whole physical energies of our country whenever circumstances may require it."

"It is not the policy of the country to retain, in time of peace, a large military establishment, particularly a numerous soldiery; but it is of the utmost importance to educate and retain a body of officers sufficient for all the labors preparatory to war, and capable of forming soldiers, of supplying them, and putting them in motion in the event of war."

"The body of the army should be so formed as to admit of the greatest extension on the approach of war, and the staff should be so constituted as to be attached to either the regular force or the Militia; this latter is the more necsssary, as the Militia must, in the event of war, form the greater part of our defensive force."

"There are those, I am aware, who, in opposition to the facts of history and the convictions of experience, deny the necessity of previous instruction and of practical military knowledge to the military commander. With such gentlemen it would be useless to reason; but it is proper to remark of them, that their own practice, in the most ordinary concerns of life, is in direct opposition to the principles they profess and the opinions they hold; for whilst they declaim against the necessity of professional knowledge and experience in those to whom the important duty of defending the country is confided, they require both even in the laborers and domestics whom they employ. Not one of them would engage a carpenter to make his coat, or a tailor to build his house; and he would think the man insane who would ask

a lawyer to set a broken limb, or a physician to conduct a suit at law; and yet there would be as much propriety in either, as to expect a farmer, a merchant, a lawyer, or any other citizen, without previous study, careful preparation, and experience in the practice of science, to become an able and accomplished officer."

"Without referring to other countries, we have only to turn over the pages of our own history to be satisfied of the deplorable consequences resulting from a want of timely preparation, as well in the *personnel* as the *materiel* of our army."

"In the late war we presented the singular spectacle of a powerful nation, with more than a million of men capable of bearing arms, with resources vastly exceeding those of any other nation of equal population, with two hundred thousand men actually under arms, invaded and defeated at all points, several of our ports captured and held by the enemy, our capital taken, our credit destroyed; and all this effected, too, by a petty province, aided at no time by more than twenty-five thousand men from the mother country, including the whole force that assailed us on every frontier. This is a picture, it must be acknowledged, by no means flattering to our national pride; but it is a true picture, and the time and the occasion require that the truth be told."

I quote some conclusive remarks from a Report of L. Ward Smith, Adjutant General, New York, 1853.

"Every honest, intelligent, patriotic citizen who neglects, discourages, or opposes our Militia system will only do so because he disapproves either its *objects* or the *mode* adopted to effect and secure them. The Constitution of the United States declares those objects to be, *to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.* Is any one so bold as to assert that no possibility, no danger exists of the violation of those laws, of insurrections, of invasions? or that, should they occur, the civil power is entirely competent to meet the exigency?

"But the Militia system has another object, not more important, perhaps more palpable. With the increase of wealth and population the *Laws of New York*, local and general, are more frequently liable to violation. In cities and large towns, in our public works, and wherever large bodies of men are assembled, the danger is apparent. Often has the civil power been forced to summon the military arm to sustain it, and often again will it seek its powerful aid.

"But some, acknowledging their importance, condemn the *mode* of effecting these *objects*. Let those who honestly continue to urge its defects, assist its friends in removing them. Unfortunately there are those who desire *no* military organization. But the Constitution of the United States has wisely rendered such organizations *inevitable.* Regarding war as an inevitable evil, they are useful, necessary, cheap and safe. There are but three alternatives; *anarchy*, a *standing army*, or a *Militia system.*"

These are the alternatives, and if we would avoid the first, we must either maintain an immense standing army, or we must devise and resolutely support an efficient Militia system.

Brigadier General Gratiot, spoken of "as the distinguished officer at the head of the national board of engineers," 1831, thus defines the duty devolving on Militia in our system of National defense.

"Without the institution of Militia, our maritime frontiers could not be defended, except by increasing the regular army to an extent incompatible with our free institutions; and without the Militia, the system of permanent defensive works now constructing for the security of our coast, will neither afford the results which they are designed to secure, nor justify the cost of their construction.

"If we suppose for a moment the Militia not to exist, the system falls to the ground. An invader may then disembark wherever he pleases, turn the permanent defenses with impunity, and strike successively and without resistance the various points that he would assail. It follows as a natural consequence that the Militia is of the first importance in the defense of our maritime frontier, and that without them it would be impossible to foresee the extent of the calamities that an enterprising invader might shower upon our coast, or the immense expenditure of public treasure that would ensue. A Militia is no less indispensable to repel the invasion of our inland frontiers than to defend us from debarkations upon our coasts."

Major General McClellan, in the preface to his Report on the Military Systems of Europe, says:

"Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be large enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defense of the frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase."

This has been the theory of our Government from the beginning, and it will continue to be so. But would not a standing army be more efficient and economical than a possible Militia? Very likely, and so would a standing President, Secretaries, Legislatures, Selectmen, and so down to the village Road Surveyor. But we have decided to waive the administrative and economical advantages of a despotism, for the political advantages of a democracy.

"Admitting, (says De Tocqueville,) for the sake of argument, that the country would be more secure, and the resources of society better employed if the whole administration centred in a single arm, still, the *political* advantages which the Americans derive from their system, would induce me to prefer it to the contrary plan.—I am suspicious of a benefit which is united to so many evils, and I am not averse to an evil which is compensated by so many benefits.—In the American States power has been disseminated with admirable skill, for the purpose of interesting the greatest possible number of persons in the common weal.—For it is believed there, and with truth, that patriotism is a kind of devotion which is strengthened by ritual observance. In

this manner the activity of the township it continually perceptible; it is daily manifested in the fulfillment of a duty, or the exercise of a right,—The native of New England is attached to his township because it is independent and free; his co-operation in its affairs insures his attachment to its interest; the well-being it affords him secures his affection; and its welfare is the aim of his ambition and of his future exertions; he takes a part in every occurrence in the place; he practices the art of government in the small sphere within his reach."

As De Tocqueville shrewdly perceived, it is this practice of the art of government by citizens enlightened by the instruction of the schools, and guided by the teachings of the church, that makes our Republic successful, and just so far as each citizen participates in founding, improving and using these three institutions, the town, the school, and the church, does he insure the life of our Government.

The fulfillment of one more duty to the State,—that of her defense,—would develop our manhood, keep alive our patriotism, and still further counteract the effect of a too egotistic devotion to our private interests.

An Application of the Massachusetts Officers of Militia, 1831, that an efficient and uniform system be adopted for the Militia of the United States, contains these extracts.

"The Militia system is strongly identified with our national history, and in the opinion of an eminent jurist, (Justice Story,) whose commentaries on constitutional law entitle his observations to great weight, 'has materially contributed to form and elevate our national character.' 'If we take enlarged views of the past and future,' he observes, 'we shall conclude that the liberties of the people, and the just residuary powers of the States, rest essentially on the preservation of that institution.' The state into which this bulwark of republican liberty appeared to be falling, excited in the breast of the learned civilian, whose defense of the American institutions evinced the extent of his knowledge of the human character, the most alarming apprehensions.

"He considered 'the Militia as the most essential foundation of national defense; the most plentiful nursery of armies and navies, to which the American States had owed their existence for more than two hundred years;' and in his opinion, 'neither schools, nor colleges, nor town meetings, had been more essential to the formation and character of the nation than the Militia. Whenever the Militia comes to an end,' said he, 'or is despised and neglected, I shall consider this Union dissolved, and the liberties of North America lost forever.' A late Governor of this Commonwealth, who had been a soldier of the Revolution, and for many years a Major General in the Militia, (Gov. Brooks,) observed, 'that it comported with his own observations to remark, that few if any of our public institutions tend to direct men to more elevated modes of thinking, or conduce more strongly to form a high sense of character, so indispensable to habits of virtue, than a well organized Militia.'" His successor in the chair of state and com-

patriot of the Revolution, (Gov. Eustis) in his speech to the Legislature, remarked: "There are two objects which have always appeared to me to merit the constant care and first attention of the legislature—our primary schools and the Militia. Without the former a knowledge of our civil rights would not have pervaded the great body of the people; the principles of civil liberty would neither have been understood nor rightly appreciated; and without the latter we could not have engaged in the contest which eventually established them."

As the Army and Navy Journal insists:—

"We need a system which shall bring home to every citizen the duty of military service as directly and as imperatively as the duty of paying taxes and the demand for jury service. As nothing can be more imperative than the necessities of the public defense, so no duty can be more universal or more sacred in its demands than that which has this for its object."

We quote again from General Gaines's Report—

"That the Militia form the basis of the *defensive* and *protecting power* of the Republic, the history of our independence, and of two successive and triumphant wars, with one of the strongest powers of Europe, affords the most irrefragable evidence. Our consequent unexampled growth and prosperity proves the inestimable value of the power, and the means of enhancing it."

"Such an organization I cannot but consider to be one among the first important measures necessary to enable us 'to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.' Every measure that can be devised in regard to the Militia, as well as to other branches of the national defense, to be perfect, or in the highest degree useful and efficient, must be based upon the supposition that war between the United States and some two or more of the strong powers of Europe, is possibly not far distant."

The Reverend Dr. Stearns, in a most admirable Sermon delivered before the Governor and Legislature of Massachusetts, January, 1864, thus adverts to the mistaken views of the community, especially the most religious portion of the community, on this vital subject, and to the lesson taught by the fact of this formidable rebellion, and the waste of life incurred in its suppression.

"We must take higher views than heretofore of the office and importance of military organizations in sustaining free governments, and that not only during the present war but in coming years. We have made great mistakes both in theory and practice on this subject. Our custom of business, our peace-loving dispositions, our geographical position at a distance from the warlike nations, our sentiment and habit of protest against military ambition and despotic violence, our

philanthropy, our Christianity wrongly interpreted, all helped to lead us astray. Force, constraint, punishment were put at discount. The idea of justice went down before that of a mistaken benevolence. The soldier belonged to history or to foreign tyrannies, or to some national gala-day, or vanity fair. Love, persuasion, moral influences were the motive powers to lift society. I have no word against peace. I believe in peace. I believe in the apostolic exhortation, 'If it be possible, as much as lieth in you live peaceably with all men.' Infinitely beautiful is the sentiment of mercy. But the attribute of justice, if it should seem less amiable to any, is no less to be reverenced. Justice is at the foundation of the moral order of the universe. Practical truth is often the resultant of extreme, conflicting theoretical principles. It is found, in this case, not in justice alone, nor in mercy alone, but where 'mercy and truth meet together, and righteousness and peace embrace each other.'

"Let us applaud the disposition for peace. Persuasion is admirable, but the moral universe is not constructed on that principle alone. As in nature, so it is in revelation. He who wept over Jerusalem, denounced desolation upon it; and the gospel which records, 'Blessed are the peacemakers,' commends civil government 'as the terror of evil doers.'

"So far had our peace principles carried us, that when the war broke out we were almost as defenseless as children. And even now, I suppose, that out of our great cities, there is scarcely a community in Massachusetts which could protect itself from an insurrection. God forbid that any necessity should make of us a military, much more, a war-loving nation. But we must have a different practice and a different teaching on the questions of self-defense. Innocence is not sufficient for protection. Imbecility invites aggression. Christians must be men, citizens must be soldiers, magistrates must bear the sword, and bear it not in vain. Let the schools, let the churches teach justice, then, as well as benevolence,—nay, teach justice as the highest form of benevolence. Let the young men be taught, let the Government arm and train them, to uphold justice. Law, order must be sustained. Rebellion, anarchy, violence put down. Let the soldier look upon himself not as his country's mercenary; not as the mere circumstance and ornament of authority; not, most of all, as a great public murderer; but as an officer of justice called by God and his country to the high duty of sustaining government, and by his own strong heart and hand protecting the welfare of the people—his mission that of a destroying angel, who, though destroying, is an angel still."

One pithy sentence in General Gaines's Report conveys the essential truth to be received and acknowledged.

"I should endeavor to convince every citizen that the great privilege of *self government* cannot be preserved without our cherishing with equal pride and pleasure the kindred privilege and exalted duty of *self defense*, and that these kindred privileges and duties should be regarded as the most vitally important to the cause of human liberty that can possibly engage the attention of man."

The following extracts comprise the most important suggestions made for the improvement of the Militia; their careful perusal may help to determine the principles of an efficient system. I commence with an extract from General Knox's Report, of 1790, showing the principles on which a plan should be based.

"If it should be decided to reject a standing army for the military branch of the Government of the United States, as possessing too fierce an aspect, and being hostile to the principles of liberty, it will follow that a well-constituted Militia ought to be established.

"A consideration of the subject will show the impracticability of disciplining at once the mass of the people. All discussions on the subject of a powerful Militia will result in one or other of the following principles:—

"1. Either efficient institutions must be established for the military education of the youth, and that the knowledge acquired therein shall be diffused throughout the community by the means of rotation; or

"2. That the Militia must be formed of substitutes, after the manner of the Militia of Great Britain.

"If the United States possess the vigor of mind to establish the first institution, it may reasonably be expected to produce the most unequivocal advantages. A glorious national spirit will be introduced, with its extensive train of political consequences. The youth will imbibe a love of their country; reverence and obedience to its laws; courage and elevation of mind; openness and liberality of character, accompanied by a just spirit of honor; in addition to which their bodies will acquire a robustness greatly conducive to their personal happiness, as well as the defense of their country; while habit, with its silent but efficacious operations, will durably cement the system.

"Habit, that powerful and universal law, incessantly acting on the human race, well deserves the attention of legislators. Formed at first in individuals, by separate and almost imperceptible impulses, until at length it acquires a force which controls with irresistible sway,—the effects of salutary or pernicious habits operating on a whole nation are immense, and decide its rank and character in the world.

"Hence, the science of legislation teaches to scrutinize every national institution; as it may introduce proper or improper habits, to adopt with religious zeal the former, and reject with horror the latter.

"A republic, constructed on the principles herein stated, would be uninjured by events sufficient to overturn a government supported solely by the uncertain power of a standing army.

"The well informed members of the community, actuated by the highest motives of self-love, would form the real defense of the country. Rebellions would be prevented, or suppressed with ease. Invasions of such a government would be undertaken only by madmen, and the virtues and knowledge of the people would effectually oppose the introduction of tyranny.

"But the second principle, (a Militia of substitutes,) is pregnant, in a degree, with the mischief of a standing army, as it is highly probable the substitutes, from time to time, will be nearly the same men, and

the most idle and worthless part of the community. Wealthy families, proud of distinctions which riches may confer, will prevent their sons from serving in the Militia of substitutes; the plan will degenerate into habitual contempt; a standing army will be introduced, and the liberties of the people subjected to all the contingencies of events.

"The expense attending an energetic establishment of Militia may be strongly urged as an objection to the institution. But it is to be remembered that this objection is levelled at both systems, whether by rotation or by substitutes; for if the numbers are equal, the expense will also be equal. The estimate of the expense will show its unimportance when compared with the magnitude and beneficial effects of the institution.

"But the people of the United States will cheerfully consent to the expenses of a measure calculated to serve as a perpetual barrier to their liberties; especially as they well know that the disbursements will be made among the members of the same community, and therefore cannot be injurious.

"Every intelligent mind would rejoice in the establishment of an institution, under whose auspices the youth and vigor of the constitution would be renewed with each successive generation, and which would appear to secure the great principles of freedom and happiness against the injuries of time and events.

"The following plan is formed on these general principles:—

"1. That it is the indispensable duty of every nation to establish all necessary institutions for its own perfection and defense.

"2. That it is capital security to a free State, for the great body of the people to possess a competent knowledge of the military art.

"3. That this knowledge cannot be attained in the present state of society, but by establishing adequate institutions for the military education of youth; and that the knowledge acquired therein should be diffused throughout the community by the principles of rotation.

"4. That every man of the proper age and ability of body is firmly bound by the social compact, to perform personally his proportion of military duty for the defense of the State.

"5. That all men of the legal military age, should be armed, enrolled, and held responsible for different degrees of military service.

"And 6. That, agreeably to the Constitution, the United States are to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

Hamilton, in the Federalist, explains the necessity of confiding the regulation of the Militia to the direction of the Federal Government, and the futility of attempting to drill and discipline the whole number enrolled. He remarks:

The power of regulating the Militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy.

It requires no skill in the science of war to discern, that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the Militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert—an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions, which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished, by confiding the regulation of the Militia to the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower the Union "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, *reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.*"

Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to this plan, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well regulated Militia be the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation, and at the disposal of that body, which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the Militia, in the same body, ought, as far as possible to take away the inducement and the pretext, to such unfriendly institutions. If the Federal Government can command the aid of the Militia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.

In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked, that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for requiring the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty; whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons, who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the Federal Government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all laws *necessary and proper* to execute its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws; as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes, would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the

alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident, that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the Federal Government over the Militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of the motives, which could induce men of sense to reason in this extraordinary manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction?

By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the Militia itself, in the hands of the Federal Government. It is observed, that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and the ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the Militia may be pursued by the national Government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature on the subject of a Militia establishment, I should hold to him in substance the following discourse:

"The project of disciplining all the Militia of the United States, is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements, is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, nor a week, nor even a month, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated Militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount, which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of a million of pounds. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.

"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance, that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the Militia. The attention of the Government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate size, upon such principles as will really fit it for service in cases of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained Militia, ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for military establish-

ments; but if circumstances should at any time oblige the Government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people, while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights, and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army; and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."

Gen. Scott's Report.

The full age of twenty-one years has been assumed by the Board, as the best period for the commencement of service in the ranks of the Militia.

It will be perceived that the scheme of enrollment proposed, rendered any other limitation, as to age, than that just stated, unnecessary; it being probable that the minimum quota would be obtained in any State, without going higher than the ages of thirty, or twenty-nine, and in some of the States not higher than twenty-six, or twenty-five, even with the present population. Between the minimum and maximum numbers of the scheme, (410,000—595,000,) the difference is nearly fifty per centum on the former.

This difference it was thought advisable to leave to each State to add, by further enrollments, in the ascending scale of age, or not, according to its wishes, or according to physical or moral circumcumstances, in its own condition; although, in the opinion of the Board, a well regulated, armed and instructed Militia, of 400,000 men, for the whole Union, would be sufficient for all the purposes stated in the Constitution.

Under the Act of Congress, May 8, 1792, section 2d, it appears, by the correspondence before the Board, that exemptions from Militia service, granted by many States, are so numerous as to operate very injuriously on the whole establishment. In some instances, the number of exemptions is reported to be equal to the number of enrolled men.

Not again to recur to this supposed defect in the Act of 1792, the Board will here observe, that it would greatly promote uniformity in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of a well regulated Militia, among the respective States, if no exemptions were allowed beyond the cases which might be enumerated in some new provision, made by Congress on this head.

The Board, in the plan of organization, proposes an Adjutant General, without rank, for the whole Militia of the United States. The importance of such an officer, attached to the War Department, it is believed, could not be too highly estimated. Among his various duties might be the following: to correspond with the Adjutant Generals of the respective States, on the subject of the Militia in general; to furnish blank forms of the different returns required from the States, with the necessary explanations; to make abstracts of all returns received, for the information of the President, and of Congress; to ascertain, by correspondence, the boundaries of divisions, brigades and regiments, in the respective States, with a view to the force that might be brought to the defense of exposed points in a given time, &c. &c.

At such periods as the respective States may appoint, it is recommended that all the officers of each division ; or in a State that has no division, all the officers of the Brigade, surgeons and assistant surgeons in both cases excepted, be assembled at the camp appointed as above, and there be held assembled and encamped ten successive days in each year, under the immediate command of the senior officer actually present, of the division or brigade. The military instruction, both theoretical and practical, to be conducted, at each camp, by a competent instructor, under the superintendence and direction of the commanding officer of the camp—the practical part at a rate of not less than six hours a day, for the ten days' encampment; and, in order the better to introduce uniformity of practice under the systems of instruction which may have been established by Congress for the different arms, as cavalry, artillery, and infantry, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War, on applications made by the Executives of the several States, to provide competent instructors, and, as far as practicable, by selections from the officers of the Army or graduates of the United States Military Academy: provided that the number of instructors so detailed, or employed by the Secretary of War, shall not exceed one for each camp of instruction, as above.

The camps of instruction, it will be observed, are recommended by the Board, for officers exclusively. Considerations of public economy, chiefly, induced this limitation. The benefits of the system of instruction, by means of camps, would not, however, be confined in their effects to the officers. The tactical experience acquired by them in the school of the camps, would be naturally imparted to the ranks at such trainings or musters as the States may respectively prescribe ; and, in case of active service, the officers would be enabled, in a reasonable time, to render their corps equal to all the emergencies of a campaign. The maxim, that *good officers make good soldiers*, has the support of universal experience, and on this the Board has founded the recommendation above.

Major General Gaines.

Were I called upon to suggest the necessary measures to put the Militia and the nation in a posture of defense, preparatory to war, I should proceed upon the principles embraced in the following propositions, which the test of time and experience prove to be self-evident truths.

1. Preparation for war, while powerful neighboring nations stand ready for aggression, is an inherent right and a solemn duty to which the governments of independent nations should promptly attend.

2. Preparation for war is necessary to prevent war, or if it must come, to lessen its attendant evils.

3. In peace, is the proper time to prepare for war.

4. Every military principle, and every measure of preparation in peace, should be strictly applicable to a state of war.

5. Every measure of military preparation in peace, not strictly applicable to a state of war, should be held as radically wrong, useless, or mischievous.

6. Good order and subordination, so useful in all places, are nowhere so essential as in an army. The Government ought precisely

to determine the functions, duties, and rights of all military men—soldiers, officers, chiefs of corps, generals.

Organization.—This to be in the highest degree convenient and useful, should be the same in the Militia throughout the United States, as in the regular army. But here it should first be simplified and rendered uniform as to the rank of officers for each branch of the general staff, and the number and rank for each regiment. The Adjutant General, Ordnance General, Engineer General, Quarter Master General, Paymaster General, Inspector General, and Surgeon General to have equal rank, and equal pay and emoluments as general officers; and each one to have a senior assistant for Militia service, to be stationed at the seat of government, with one senior assistant for each division, together with one junior assistant for each brigade in the service of the United States, whether of regular troops or Militia, to be attached to and serve at the headquarters of such divisions and brigades respectively.

It is believed that the late war had continued more than a year before the Government of the United States obtained anything like correct returns of the Militia of more than two-thirds of the States; and it is certain that neither the general staff of the army, nor any other public functionary at Washington, could obtain accurate detailed information as to the military resources of the different sections of the United States most immediately applicable to the various exposed points upon the national frontier, other than such as could be picked up from unauthentic and erroneous sources, such as from individuals reporting from casual observation and imperfect memory. Aud thus it was that millions of the public money were uselessly squandered for want of some precautionary measures of instruction and preparation such as I propose, and *such as would not, probably, in one hundred years cost the United States as much money as was wasted during the late war in less than three years*, to say nothing of the consequent loss of national character and military reputation, with the sacrifice of private and public property.

If the chief of any one branch of the general staff does his duty honestly and faithfully, his time will be wholly occupied with the duties assigned him; the duties to be assigned to the officer for Militia service for each branch of the general staff will be as numerous and as complicated as those assigned to any one subordinate officer of any of the great departments of the Government.

The first senior assistant Adjutant General will promptly transmit to the Adjutant General of each State and Territory all regulations and general orders for the government of the army and Militia when in the actual service of the United States, and consequently necessary for their information when not in actual service, to prepare them for the same. He will receive and keep a record of all returns and reports of the organized Militia of each State and Territory, and report the same from time to time to the Department of War; he will keep a roster and furnish details for service, and he will correspond with the general staff and other officers of the Militia of the United States upon all subjects connected with their duties, rights, and interests, in relation to the service of the United States.

With respect to the other departments of the general staff, I will,

for the present, omit the details, which I hold myself prepared to furnish whenever required, and to show that an officer may be usefully employed in each department on Militia service even during a period of peace; and that on the approach of war the proposed organization will be attended with the most salutary effects, and that without such an organization of the general staff many of the most deplorable losses of money and reputation, such as were experienced in the late war, may be expected on the return of another.

Let men of every profession and occupation, men of every grade of talent, from the divine to the day laborer, and from the politician to the printer's devil, participate in the national defense; then will the invidious distinctions and qualms of conscience that may possibly exist for or against the unavoidable *business of war*, and the *necessary evil of an army* be removed.

After proposing a classification of the Militia into *local* and *disposable*, so as to reduce the numbers, General Gaines proceeds:

The officers and men embracing the first class of the Junior section, or such part thereof as may be required by law, should be formed into companies and regiments, and required to assemble at such military posts, arsenals, or other places as may be designated in their respective States, for not less than three, nor (in time of peace) more than four months in the space of two years, for the purpose of instruction, during which time they should be encamped, supplied with camp equipage, medical and hospital stores, rations and pay, with one suit of clothing, and be governed and instructed with the same scrupulous exactness as if a powerful enemy was known to be near at hand, and a battle daily expected.

The number to be instructed might be limited to one tenth part of the disposable force of the United States in every two years. This would occasion an expense of about *three millions of dollars per annum*, beyond the expense of arms, &c., which would be better preserved in the camp of instruction when in use, and in the adjacent arsenals at all other times, than they generally are under existing circumstances. Enormous as this sum appears to be, it is very doubtful whether it amounts to as much as is annually expended by the Militia of the United States under the present defective system, taking into view the value of their time lost and expenses incurred, expenses which are, for the most part, incurred without the attainment of any useful knowledge in return, but often with the loss of health and morals, which would not fail to be improved by the rigid and systematic course of instruction recommended.

The proposed course of instruction will not, of itself, be sufficient to perfect the officers or men in the knowledge of every movement, and of the use of every arm, but it will disclose to them the basis and the elementary principles upon which every duty depends; and it will enable them to apply at their own firesides, and at their leisure, these principles to all the practical duties of the *soldier*, the *squad*, the *company*, and the *battalion*—they will, under good officers with able instructors, learn at the camp of instruction the various important

duties comprehended in the terms *police* and *discipline*—tending essentially to preserve the health and promote the physical prowess and moral power of the troops, by the regular and methodical attainment of knowledge, and habitual vigilance and promptitude in its application, much of which can be acquired only *in camp* and upon marches, where every principle of military law is strictly enforced.

Each regiment, when encamped for instruction, should be furnished with a capable instructor, whose qualifications should be tested and vouched by the assistant Inspector General, whose duty it should be to visit and inspect each regiment previous to the termination of their course of instruction at their respective encampments. None should be eligible to the appointment of Inspector or assistant Inspector General, who should not have commanded a company in the actual service of the United States for five years, excepting graduates from the Military Academy, who should have commanded a company for at least three years.

Amicus Patriæ.

If a system of instruction is adopted to comprehend the whole Militia, my opinion is that regular encampments should be made twice in each year. They should encamp by divisions; one half of the officers and men at one period, and the other half at another. Not less than three weeks should be devoted to military exercises at each encampment. Officers from the regular army should be detached for the purpose of superintending these exercises, and for this purpose the number of regular officers should be largely increased. The most rigid and punctilious discipline should be maintained. Arms might be furnished, if necessary, in sufficient quantities, to teach the troops the manual exercise; but to teach them the use of the legs would be the great desideratum. It was well said by Marshal Saxe, that the whole secret of the military art lay in the legs. Troops who understand the field evolutions soon learn everything else.

If such a system as this would be onerous, confine the instruction to the officers. But nothing can be done in the matter until, by some means or other, they can be prevailed on to remain longer in the service than they do in this State. Let the commission be made an honorable one, and it will not be often resigned. But this cannot be done under the present system. The officer is conscious that he can do his country no service by retaining his commission, and to get rid of a grievance, he gives it up as soon as he can.

But suppose the instruction to be confined entirely to the officers, which I am inclined to think the most eligible, and at the same time the most practicable plan. I would propose that the State, say the State of Kentucky, should be divided into a certain number of military districts, (not more than six;) that the officers in each district should form a camp for instruction once every year, and for a month each time; that regular officers should be assigned to their instruction; and that the most important branches of the science should be indefatigably inculcated—infantry and artillery tactics particularly. Light pieces of ordnance should be furnished, with a sufficient quantity of powder and ball for practice. Field fortification, at least the elements of it, should be taught. The cavalry discipline might also be easily

incorporated into the course of instruction. There is a difficulty in the way. It is this: would it do to call men from their business and their homes for the term of one month in every year, without any compensation? I think not; but they might be easily compensated, and without throwing the slightest additional burden on the people. Do away the present Militia system, and, in lieu of the fines and penalties now inflicted by the law, let a tax be collected to a small amount, from every man subject to Militia duty, say of one dollar yearly. This would no doubt be cheerfully paid, though a smaller sum would do. Let this tax form a military fund, for the compensation of the officers who have taken upon themselves all the burdens of the Militia service. The compensation should be moderate, say $15 per month to every officer, without any distinction of rank. There is no reason why there should be any distinction in this case. They are not yet in service; they are only at school.

In this manner I have not any doubt, that an army of excellent officers might be formed, not perhaps very theoretical or scientific, but well acquainted with the practical and important part of their duties; and, with tolerable materials, such officers would soon form an army of active and efficient soldiers. But this is only an outline. If any thing was attempted on a similar plan, though I dare not flatter myself that anything will be, there would be but little difficulty in arranging the details where the governing principles were decided on.

Whilst the system of short tours, (three months or six,) is persisted in, I consider it certain that the Militia can never be a formidable body of troops. It is a waste of life to a most alarming and culpable extent. The soldier is ordered out perhaps for ninety days; within that time he has to encounter more from the novelty of a military life, than he would encounter from it in the course of a year afterwards. Camp diet, camp exercises, everything is new to him. He is peculiarly liable too, within that period, to the incursion of camp diseases; but at the end of that term, if he has been attentive, and his instructors have been skillful, he becomes in some degree a soldier. His system also begins to accustom itself to a new mode of life; but just as he begins to be valuable to his country he is discharged, and his place is supplied by another raw recruit, who has to go through the same ordeal, and who, in the same manner, at the end of three months, makes way for his successor.

So much for the risk of life; it is evidently a hazardous game, and the odds are against the player; but, as it concerns the treasure, the loss is clear and unequivocal. The equipments for an army, and all that relates to the *atterail*, must be nearly as costly for an army which serves only three months, as for one that serves twelve. When disbanded at the end of three months, the loss in equipments and stores is incalculably great. Much is lost and much destroyed. The officers of the administrative staff are careless, partly from ignorance and partly from want of ambition. They hope for nothing, they fear nothing. A sense of responsibility, and the apprehension of it, are alike unknown to them. Their term of service is circumscribed to a few days; they can acquire no distinction, and when you close the way to honor upon an officer, you withdraw all his incentives to the performance of his duty.

Besides these obvious disadvantages attending short tours, it cannot be expected that troops of this description can do much, and indeed much is not expected of them (generally, but there have been splendid exceptions to the rule.) The execution of enterprises is delayed or frustrated. A general, knowing that his troops must be discharged before he can accomplish anything of importance, hesitates about undertaking anything, and the most favorable opportunities for action are lost. It should be extended to twelve months at least, and as much further as would meet the approbation of the people. Three years would be a good term, and would insure skill and effectiveness in the troops.

There are reasons why the Americans should be the best troops in the world if properly disciplined. They have more property and more rights to fight for than any other people. Their intellectual endowments are greater, and their moral courage should be exactly in the same ratio. An ingenious French writer, in a work called "Caractere des armees Europeennes," ascribes to the British soldier superior intrepidity, and to the French soldier superior intelligence. Without arrogance we may safely assert that the American soldier is not surpassed in intrepidity by the Briton; and we may say, too, without arrogance, that he surpasses the Frenchman in intelligence. If, then, intelligence and courage will make good soldiers, who should make better than Americans?

What then is wanting? *Military Instruction.*

I shall conclude the subject with a quotation from the celebrated Giubert. He is high authority, I believe, among military men, and the passage I think strikingly applicable to our military and Militia system.

"Si tandisque toutes les autres sciences se perfectionment, celle de la guerre reste dans l'enfance, c'est la faute des gouvernemens, qui n'y attachent pas assez d'importance; qui n'en font pas un objet d'education publique; et qui ne dirigent pas vers cette profession les hommes de genie."

Adj. Gen. Sumner, Mass.

To the general and local knowledge, mental sagacity, and physical strength which the people possess, the moral character must be added as more important than either. The effect of liberal systems of instruction, and that freedom of action which freedom of thought produces, has inspired the American people with a moral feeling and conduct, which added to their other distinguishing qualities, enables them to furnish a better material for an efficient Militia than is elsewhere possessed. Their habits of self-restraint teach them not to want what they have it not in their own power to procure. But though a patient, they are a spirited and enterprising people, and will incur any risk for a desirable object. They are a free people, who justly think their own condition better than that of any other; a proud people "alive to honor, and sensitive to disgrace;" a considerate people, who act more from judgment than from impulse; an educated people, who understand how much they have at stake; an intelligent people, who know how to prize it; a skillful people, who can devise

the means of their own security; and a brave and patriotic people, who will hazard and suffer everything in support of it.

In the American Militia, patriotic and personal motives are united; it therefore possesses not only the entire confidence of the Government in its moral character, but the objects of its employment are interesting to the persons engaged. Our republican institutions are mainly dependent upon it for their preservation and permanency. The sentiments, feelings, and prejudices of the nation are strong in its favor, and, in many places, all the stimulants of ambition, and the incitements of pride, are afforded to its officers and soldiers; and all the objects which are dear to freemen insure their reward. Nevertheless, it is a lamentable truth, that none but abortive attempts have been made for its better adaptation to the purposes either of its original design, or its application to those multiplied uses which have arisen from the vast extension of the national domain, constant addition to the number of States in the Union, and the increasing elevation of this empire in the scale of nations. The value of the institution is admitted, and its defects acknowledged; but, as no remedy is provided, its efforts, in too great a degree, continue to be left to chance.

The subject, as a national one, is no doubt attended with great constitutional and practical embarrassments. These, however, do not lessen its national importance; but on the contrary, show the necessity of great deliberation in its investigation. In the progress of our inquiries, if we find that the local habits and interests of the different sections of the country are a principal source of difficulty; if we find that in such of the old States as have a dense population, the frequent assembling of the trainbands for drill and instruction might be easily accomplished, and in the new, where the inhabitants are sparse, these frequent trainings would be oppressive; we may possibly discover some mode of remedying these difficulties; or learn to content ourselves with the reflection, that, on the Atlantic frontier, where the country is cleared, and the troops will be called to act in large bodies, a higher degree of attainment in military science, and a better knowledge of tactics, will be necessary for protection against invasion, than in the less cultivated parts, where the defiles are numerous, and the country itself furnishes means for the successful operation of those who have a knowledge of its passes, and have gained, by their daily use of the rifle, the best qualification of a Militia force. At least, having ascertained the true causes of the embarrassments, and the obstacles to improvement which local habits and necessities now present, it is apprehended the difficulty of forming general laws suited to the situation and condition of the people in different sections of the Union, or to the wants of the country itself, will be diminished.

The embarrassment, then, which exists to making a perfectly national Militia, arises under the power reserved to the States by the Constitution to provide for officering and training the Militia; while that for organizing, arming and equipping it, and establishing the system of its discipline, is granted to the National Government. This simple enumeration shows these to be dependent powers, and it sufficiently exposes the necessity of the joint co-operation of both Governments for the advancement of the system in practice to the point intended at the time of its adoption. For it is at once apparent that

the power of Congress to organize, arm, and equip, the Militia, and establish its system of discipline, is of no use, unless the officers to command it are provided by the States, and the troops are disciplined according to the system prescribed.

But though the National Government cannot do everything to the accomplishment of this great object, it can do much. It can at least exercise the powers it has, and cease to claim those it has not.

It can conform the organization, and numbers, and rank of the officers of the Militia to the most approved modes, and thus make the rules provided for the exercise and manœuvres of the army, applicable in practice, as they are by statute, to the Militia.

It can provide arms and equipments for both officers and soldiers.

It can establish a system of discipline for the artillery and cavalry, as well as for the infantry.

It can provide and distribute books of instruction to the officers, and thus secure an uniformity in the words of command, of exercise, and manœuvres, throughout the Union; and as the power of Congress to compel the attendance of Militia officers at drills, for instruction, is not generally admitted, if it will furnish instructors to such of the States as choose to avail themselves of the advantage furnished, it need not be questioned that the opportunity will be embraced to the extent of the provision.

It can provide for the appointment of Aides de Camp to the Commander in Chief of the several States, and other necessary officers, and fix the rank of some whose appointment is now provided for.

It can more accurately define the mode of arming the several corps, and make some improvement in the selection of arms to be used.

It can revise the provision for inspecting the troops which is insufficient, and for returning them, which is not only fixed at an inconvenient period for the use of the Government, but is incomplete also in its details.

It can provide rules for the police of the Militia, and add many necessary practical regulations.

It can relieve the elder class of those who are now enrolled, from duty in time of peace; for it certainly cannot be necessary to require so great a proportion of the whole to be enrolled, as was expedient, when the population, upon the same territory, was one third the present number, and our other means of defense incomparably less.

Above all, it can take back to its own exercise the power of exemption, which, under the State authorities, has been used more destructively to the spirit of the Militia than even to its numerical force.

It can also do much, in other ways, to encourage the ambition of its officers and the pride of the soldiers, so indispensable to the preservation of the system in any degree of respectability, and no measure would be more likely to have this tendency, and produce the conviction that the General Government intended to extend its protection to the Militia, than the appointment of a Staff Officer, to represent their interest, and become the official organ of their communications at the seat of the National Government.

One of the most immediate and best effects of these measures will be to inform the public mind, which, not being obliged to reflect on principles that it is not called on to apply, is now too much influenced

by the interested sentiments of those who proclaim a privilege a burden, and make individual hardships national calamities. Thus public opinion, the power with which the laws of all Governments must ultimately accord, and whose effects, on those which are free, are almost immediate, will be enlightened.

Let a change in the Militia system be decreed by public sentiment, (and that it surely will be, when a clear perception of the best modes of effecting it is entertained,) and it matters not whether the powers to accomplish it, belong in whole, or in part, to the State, or the United States; whether they be co-ordinate, dependent or contingent, their exercise will be commanded. Such patronage will make the Militia service respectable and its offices desirable. But the States alone can do nothing. The United States must begin the grand work of Militia reform.

Experience having thus produced the conviction that a Department under the direction of a responsible officer is essential for the regulation of the Militia, the inquiry becomes pertinent, why should not the National Government adopt the means which, under its authority, the several States enjoy for the management of this important interest?

But before this is attempted, lest any one should suppose that there might be a constitutional impediment to the arrangement arising from the power of the States to provide for the appointment of all Militia officers, it becomes necessary to make the previous remark, that the officer for whose appointment legal provision is proposed, would be an officer of the United States, and not a Militia officer. If it were not so, the constitutional obstacle would be paramount. The United States' Adjutant General of the Militia, would be provided for the bureau, and, as he would of course have no command, there would be no more constitutional impediment to the Congressional provision that all the returns of the Militia of the several States should be made to the President through the Adjutant General of the Militia, and that he should prescribe the forms of those returns, than there is, that they should be made through the Secretary of War, and that he should perform that duty as is the case by the existing provision. Now, for the want of an officer who by law is obliged distinctly to attend to Militia concerns, all the duty of the Secretary relating to them is performed ex gratiâ by the Adjutant General of the army.

The President has now no officer to call upon for answers to his inquiries respecting the Militia, except the Secretary of War, who, under the existing organization, possesses no official information other than such as is afforded by the present incomplete abstracts of the Annual Returns of the States and Territories, some of which have not made any for several years. He has no officer subject to his command whom he can assign to any of those various duties, which the importance of the institution requires should be performed by a person properly qualified by intelligence and experience. The paucity of the President's information alone, and the impossibility of his obtaining it under the present system, even if no prospective advantage was likely to be derived from it, affords an important motive for the adoption of the measure proposed. Though the positive advantages are thus shown to be of no small consideration, the prospective are much greater; for, in the light in which the subject is viewed after long

contemplation, this appears to be the best, if not the only mode, by which those improvements can eventually be made in the Militia of the United States, which its capacity admits, and its present condition requires.

Under the Constitution, the Militia must ever be estimated as the bulwark of civil and individual liberty. Directed by public sentiment, it will guard us from the oppression of power; regulated by wisdom, and patronized by the Government, it will secure us from anarchy; officered, trained and supported by the States, it is the guarantee of their sovereignty and union; and properly armed and disciplined, in conjunction with the army and navy, and aided by a regular chain of permanent fortifications, it forms an impenetrable barrier to the invader. It is therefore as essential to the preservation of civil as it is to territorial rights.

But its advantages are not confined to its military and civil uses exclusively. Its moral influence on society and individual character is also deserving of our regard. A disciplined Militia, composed of all classes of citizens, of parents and sons, of masters and apprentices, of guardians and wards, commences its influence on those who, in their progress to maturity, become liable to enrolment at a period of life when parental authority begins to lose its control. It regulates the eccentricities of youth, inculcates subordination to authority, teaches obedience to the laws, and respect for these who are intrusted with their administration. Its associations promote civility, good manners, and friendly intercourse in society. Its exhibitions are public, encouraging cleanliness of person, and eliciting that pride of character which leads to the fear of reproach, and enlivens the desire of distinction. Its employments are active, requiring judgment and decision. Its exercises are manly, giving grace to the person, vigor to the muscle, and energy to the mind. Its duties are scientific, inciting to study, and inducing inquiry. Its objects are patriotic, animating the best feelings of the heart. Its offices, open to all, are the incentives to honorable ambition, affording to those in humble stations, whose merits might otherwise remain unnoticed, opportunities for disclosing those virtues and talents which recommend them for civil preferment, as well as military promotion; and thus it is, this truly republican institution, in connection with our systems of public education and establishments of religious instruction, contributes to produce that just subordination in society which influences all its conduct, and constitutes an orderly community.

Let not, then, this valuable institution fall into disrepute, for the want of the patronage of those who know its merits. In the Militia all have an interest, those who have property to defend, homes to protect, and liberty to secure, as well as those whose lives are risked. It is composed and officered by men drawn from the various classes of society. No means should, therefore, be omitted for its improvement and instruction, and for lightening and equalizing its burdens. Militia laws should be made for the government of practical men, and the provisions of them should be as permanent and certain as the nature of the institution admits. The system of discipline should also be plain and fixed, so that the practice under it should be uniform. It should prescribe the discipline of the soldiers, and the duty of the offi-

cers; contain simple rules for the formation of companies and battalions, and instruction for a few of the most important manœuvres, such as all may comprehend and execute without much study or labor. These they must be taught to perform, before they are brought into the field for actual service. It is not the intent of the Constitution that the Militia should be converted into regulars in time of war, and be kept in service till they have learnt their duty. This would be the most expensive system of defense that could be devised. Our forts are to be garrisoned by the army. The Militia are intended as a reserve, to be called out on sudden emergencies, and discharged again as soon as the occasion which requires them ceases. Hence the necessity of their instruction at home, so that, when they are called for, they may come unhesitatingly into the field, and act with that confidence in one another, and in the skill of their officers, which none but those who are well drilled can ever discover.

Brig. Gen. Swift.

In reply to the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth queries, I do not perceive any good reason why a higher grade than that of Colonel should be commissioned in the Militia in time of peace; a division is then not of necessity embodied, nor is it requisite for any purpose of instruction that a larger body should be assembled at one point, than a brigade or two battalions, which the elder Colonel should be qualified to instruct as well as a General officer, and thus do away with the worse than useless degradation of the qualities of a General, by conferring the place, as is too often the fact, where talents are not commensurate with the functions of the rank. The time and expense consumed in assembling more than two battalions is not compensated by any result of instruction. Every manœuvre of the line can be exhibited by two battalions; and unless the Militia by divisions can be retained in the field for a long period, little or no instruction can be obtained, that could not be acquired more readily by a brigade.

It seems to me enough for the Militia to be assembled by regiments once a year, and when the locality of the population will justify, by brigades, the day following the regimental muster, once a year; by companies four times a year; by company officers at least eight times. The officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, of each regiment, should assemble once a year to be examined by a Regimental Instructor, who should be commissioned by the State authorities to hold his commission during good behavior, and whose duty it should be to furnish every officer, commissioned and non-commissioned, with instruction, and to attend each company once a year. Upon the regimental examination, such officers as are proficient should be reported to the Legislature, and rewarded with some suitable mark of distinction; those who neglect to attend, and those who remain ignorant, should be fined or dismissed. The course of instruction for infantry should embrace a knowledge of the cleaning and repairing of arms, the construction and preservation of ammunition, the school of the soldier, company and battalion, and the common formation and police functions of a camp and a march. These should all be in conformity with the United States' regulations; which as far as my observations extend,

are not yet in general use with the Militia, though they are becoming popular, and it is very desirable that those regulations should be simplified, and rendered applicable to the Militia, and to elementary instruction in schools.

The elementary books which our children read are English, and we have very little instruction given in the country of a peculiarly American character, and, consequently, education is not suited to the genius of the form of Government under which we live. When we consider the simplicity of that social compact which sustains the confederacy, the relation which subsists between its constituent parts; the dependence of one State in the exercise of its will upon the forbearance of another; the welfare of one citizen upon the countenance of his neighbor, it must be admitted that the durability of the confederacy depends in some degree upon the adoption and application of a judicious Militia system, through the means of early instruction. There are various modes by which this end could be gradually obtained. That which appears to me to promise success, would be for each State to endow an Academy for the express purpose of educating and forming teachers in all the requisite branches, the teacher to be located at the head of a school in each county, and, gradually, one in each town and district. Although it may appear visionary to the multitude, yet, by the reflecting, it must be believed, that, if our elementary books and teachers could instruct children of proper age in the principles of the Constitution, and the duty which they owe to the State, as well as that which they owe to their parents and neighbors, the country would, in a reasonable time, see the means of forming among other institutions, an orderly and intelligent Militia, and our legislative bodies becoming better acquainted with that subject, at least, than they are at the present day; for, althongh there be no period of life in which a man may not acquire knowledge, yet, instruction given to youth is received with greater facility, and its impressions remain more durable than that which is attempted in riper years; and an habitual sense of duty, inculcated in early life, is more to be relied upon for good effects, than precept and example can insure, when delayed to manhood.

The habits of camp life, and the various and complicate experience which are the result of campaigns, cannot be expected to be obtained in any other way than by actual service. But the numerous facts with which military history abound, may be made familiar through scholastic instruction. Such information may with propriety be considered superior in usefulness to much that is forced upon the youthful memory. Nor need any fear that a knowledge of such matters may endanger the State. It is an idle notion, derived from design or ignorance, that a knowledge of military subjects may be dangerous to Republics. Knowledge can never be prejudicial in a country like this; on the contrary, it would enable its possessor to avert real dangers. It would, therefore, be a blessing to have our schools enabled to turn out their pupils instructed, in addition to other and usual elementary matters, in the knowledge of the duties of a citizen to support and defend the State; and if the accurate and practical knowledge which campaigns and warfare can alone impart, is not thus to be obtained, still the elementary can be acquired, and, what is of great moment, it would be seen that knowledge of the means of defense would not unfit

a citizen for any and for every other duty which he might owe to his family or to the community.

In relation to commissions and the selecting of officers, it would seem that the genius of our Government requires that the company officers should be selected by the companies. The field and staff officers should be selected and appointed by the highest legislative appointing power.

Col. Timothy Pickering.

The only well disciplined Militia comprehending the whole male population, of ages adapted to military service, since the early periods of the Roman Republic, was in Switzerland. Upwards of a hundred years ago it was efficient. Surrounded by powerful neighbors, and particularly in danger from Austria, a universal Militia, in an entire population not exceeding perhaps one million and a half, was indispensable. They were clad in a simple uniform of gray cloth, and trained every Sunday after attending their religious services in their churches. I remember being struck with one prudent regulation in their system; not to appoint their *general officers* until an invasion or impending war rendered their complete organization indispensable. This reservation would, I have thought, be especially proper in the United States' Militia, from the manner in which officers are appointed and rise in rank.

The United States have nothing to fear from any neighboring power; and already our great population renders a universal training of the citizens, capable of military services, absolutely unnecessary. It would now be an evil, and an evil rapidly increasing.

The constitutional calls for Militia are, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. For the two first objects, no special military training will be requisite. Those who shall resist the execution of the laws, or form insurrections, will be undisciplined citizens. *An organized Militia, acting under the authorities of the General and State Governments*, will be amply sufficient to overcome such resistance, and to suppress any tumultuous assemblies of lawless men, though appearing in arms.

In our large cities and towns, there are already select corps of Militia, well trained, and fit for service. In the largest cities, these corps are regiments and battalions, and in other, companies. In every State in the Union such corps should be formed, proportioned to their population.

And the entire amount of these corps should be equal to three or four times the number composing the standing army. The skill acquired by these select corps, now costs them considerable expense in time and money. At present they consist of volunteers, but they are volunteers, partly because young men seem to have a natural fondness of military exercises; but chiefly, I am inclined to think, because they prefer incurring those expenses of time and money, to training in the common Militia. If, therefore, the worse than useless project of training the whole body of the Militia be abandoned, some encouragement will be requisite to induce even young men to engage, for only two years, in such select corps. Their arms should be furnished from the public arsenals, and a fixed sum allowed for procuring neat uniforms,

to sit easy upon them, and not daubed with gold or silver lace, or plumed with feathers two feet high. In the last week of their two years' service, they should be inspected by proper officers, competent to judge of their proficiency ; and all who shall be found duly acquainted with the prescribed discipline, should be allowed to retain their arms and accoutrements, and be discharged. In this way the effective Militia would eventually be uniformly armed. And, as the arms are to become their own property, they will take good care of them.

At the outset, these select corps may find instructors among such of their fellow citizens as have served in select corps of Militia, or in the regular troops, as officers, sergeants, and corporals, and in some instances, intelligent and discreet privates. Drummers and privates may be drawn from the same sources. Where a competent number of such instructors are not to be found, the deficiencies may, in the first instance, be supplied from the regular troops ; and partially, perhaps, from the Military Academy at West Point. These first disciplined companies and corps will probably furnish instructors for the second set, and so on, in an unlimited succession ; all deficiencies, however, to be supplied from the Standing Army, and West Point Academy.

The instructors drawn from the Standing Army, will, of course, continue to receive their usual pay and emoluments, with such additions as circumstances may require, for their travel and expenses, beyond what their ordinary duties in the regular service would expose them to. So, likewise, those drawn from the Academy, and from the select companies and corps, employed in training the next or any succeeding set, must have adequate compensation.

A portion of the training should consist in firing at marks. In the older settlements of our country, where game has generally disappeared, there will, consequently, be many requiring instruction in loading, taking aim, and firing.

It has been the practice of some of the select, well-trained companies, in Massachusetts, to make an annual excursion, with tents and other equipage requisite to form a regular encampment ; the like encampments may take place at mild and healthy seasons of the year, (varied in the times to suit our varied climates,) with the select companies and corps whose training is the object of this communication, in situations easy of access to provisions, water, fuel and straw. All the necessary expenses of this field-service must be defrayed out of the public treasury, upon proper returns and documents.

In England, the selected Militia are trained for three years, about four weeks in each year. I cannot but think that, in the United States, two years of like training, with capable and diligent instructors, would suffice to give the requisite discipline for efficient service. In the last week of the training, in the second year, all the select companies and corps living within a circuit of ——— miles, should assemble at a convenient place, and there be commanded and exercised by a field officer or field officers, (in proportion to the number of men thus assembled,) selected from the officers of the companies and corps, and whose abilities and practical knowledge shall best entitle them to distinction in the ranks to which they shall be appointed.

To determine the ages within which the men constituting the select corps should be comprised. These may be not under twenty-one, nor,

at present, over thirty years. In future periods, twenty-five years of age may be the limits. To take apprentices, would interfere with the rights of parents and masters, and with the completion of their instruction in their respective trades and employments. Twenty-one years would also give them more mental steadiness, and a firmness of constitution which is not fully matured at an earlier age.

That the burden and benefit may be equal, the quotas of the select corps should be apportioned by Congress to the several States, according to their population, by the same rule as that of Representation in the House of Representatives of the United States. And such State being divided by its Government into convenient districts, the quota of each district may be furnished by volunteers, or by lot. Substitutes may be admitted, but these should always be *new* men; that is, of persons who have not before served in the select corps; otherwise the total number of disciplined men in the country will be diminished.

The competent number of teachers being provided, the men may be assembled by companies to receive instruction. Although it would occasion a little more expense, yet I think it would be expedient to assemble twice in the year—two weeks in the spring, and two weeks in the autumn; instead of four weeks in immediate succession.

Provisions to be supplied in rations of meat and bread, as to the regular troops; but with adequate quantities of vegetables, and other cheap articles to which the Militia are accustomed when at home, *to insure the preservation of their health*. It is for this object, principally, that I would keep them assembled but two weeks at a time.

Tents and the requisite camp equipage, fuel and straw, to be provided, to enable them to live in the field, and cook for themselves. But there would be economy in employing a cook to prepare, in an adjacent house, the provisions for a whole company.

All the minor details may be left to be directed by the Executive of the United States.

It will be understood that the proposition for the formation of select corps of Militia, to three or four times the amount of the regular troops, is intended to constitute, in every State, a disciplined force, around which any portion of the common Militia might be assembled and promptly disciplined, to repel any threatened invasions there or in any neighboring State; while the whole strength of the select corps, increased by the numbers previously disciplined therein, would discourage any attempts (should such be apprehended) of the standing army, to conspire against the Government or the liberties of their country.

But if no plan for select corps of Militia should be adopted, then I would only organize the whole Militia into companies, battalions, and regiments, and designate the regiments to form the respective brigades and divisions; and require them to meet, by *companies only*, one half day in each year, for the inspection of their arms and accoutrements, and to fire at a mark. The Brigadier and Major Generals to be appointed, *pro re nata*, by the Executive of the States respectively. So great, already, is the population of the United States, all persons above the age of thirty-five years, may be excused from serving in the Militia.

William Theobald Wolfe Tone.

This young officer, son of the celebrated Irish rebel, Wolfe Tone, whom we have before quoted, was educated at the Imperial School of Cavalry, St. Germain, served with distinction in Napoleon's army till his downfall, having been wounded several times; and what is more to the purpose, was at one time an Instructor of Cavalry. Upon Napoleon's fall, he emigrated to this country, and held a commission in our army.

The most prominent defects of our Militia, are the want of uniformity in their organization and system of instruction. We believe, that on these points, the necessity of a reform is so generally felt, that there would be no objection 1st. To a law by which its companies, battalions and squadrons, in every State, should be formed on the same model as those of the United States' Army, with whom they must so frequently co-operate. 2d. To the adoption in every State, of uniform courses of instruction for the elementary training of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and their manœuvres and service in the field, shorter and more simple, but based on the same principles as those of that army.

There is no doubt that the establishment of a uniform organization and system of instruction, would be a great step towards rendering our Militia more efficient. But as long as we entertain a natural and republican jealousy of a large standing army, we must depend chiefly upon it for the defense of our country, the protection of our extensive frontiers, and of those fortifications which have been erected at so much expense. To render it really competent to these purposes, and give it the requisite activity and regularity, a great many more alterations would be wanted. These relate chiefly to its composition and the qualifications required from its officers. As long as every citizen from sixteen to forty-five is indiscriminately enlisted in its ranks, and that no rule is established for testing the qualifications of its officers; its discipline, and instruction, on whatever uniform and theoretically good principles they be based, can never be enforced so as to render its services practically useful.

With respect to the Reports, which are not intended to give to the General Government any right of interfering in these matters, but merely to inform it constantly of the real state of the means of defense existing in the country, a special office might be created in the War Department to receive them, and the collection of those documents, in a few years, would not only make us perfectly acquainted with the real value and strength of those means, but afford ample materials for improving them, and collecting the ideas of our best officers with respect to them. But for the further simplification of the whole project, we can see no objection to addressing these reports to the Adjutant General of the United States' Army, as a separate branch of his duties, provided that his office be enlarged, and an additional number of aids and clerks attached to it.

The next point to investigate in forming an active Militia, (its numbers, organization, and theoretical system of instruction being fixed in each district,) should be the mode of raising it and recruiting

its ranks. We think that the General Government, confining itself to assign to each State its quota in infantry, artillery, and cavalry, should leave all further details to the discretion of their several Governments. The best principle on which these could be based, would be to declare every young citizen from sixteen or eighteen to twenty-four or twenty-eight years of age, or any period which may appear more suitable, liable to take his chance for serving in these corps during that time, leaving the States at liberty to make the selection, and grant such exceptions or commutations for small fines, to all men of certain professions, such as sailors or clergymen, or of certain religious persuasions, or even to all married men with families, as they might deem proper. To the mass of our citizens, the only consequence of this innovation would be, that, instead of remaining subject to be summoned from their domestic avocations from sixteen to forty-five years of age, they would only take a chance of paying this tribute during six years of their youth; after which, passing into the ranks of the sedentary Militia, they would be freed from any call for distant and active service, and only liable to take arms for the defense of their immediate homes and property.

The next question to be investigated in organizing the active Militia, (viz: the appointment of its officers and qualifications required from them,) is one of the greatest importance and delicacy. It is a most incontrovertible principle in the organization of any kind of military force, that its efficiency depends chiefly on this point: for the best troops, ill commanded, will be inferior to the worst, properly conducted; and the less they are trained, the more essential is it for their leaders to be so. Neither can it be denied, that in several States there exist many abuses relative to these appointments. Nevertheless, such is the just and rational apprehension which the people entertain of increasing the patronage of the General Government, that the privilege of choosing their own officers is one of those of which the States are most naturally jealous, and which we are convinced they will never renounce.

We think therefore that the General Government should neither appoint a single officer in the Militia, nor interfere with the existing customs of the several States on that subject, whether these appointments be made by their Executives, or by a Council of Appointment, or by the election of the Militia: but, by two general rules, which should in our opinion be recommended to their adoption and passed, if possible, into a national law, all the existing abuses might be obviated: the first, declaring that no officer should be promoted, unless he had passed through every inferior grade; the second, appointing a Board of Examiners in every district which might be selected amongst its chief officers, to examine the candidates on every vacancy. Their certificate of his sufficiency and qualifications should be made an indispensable condition for his appointment. By the first of these laws, we mean not to confine the line of promotion to that of seniority; on the contrary, as modified by the second, it would prevent an incapable officer from ever rising beyond the lowest ranks, whilst in appointments to the superior ones, it would secure the election of men of some experience. It is scarcely necessary to add that the officers, even of the volunteer companies of artillery and cavalry, should be

bound by those laws, and subject to those examinations, as well as all others.

We also think that the post of an officer in the active Militia, should be one of some permanency as well as respectability, and that they should not be removed, unless in case of resignation, incapacity, or misconduct. When we consider how much the duties and theoretical knowledge required of them would be simplified by the general adoption of the new systems of instruction, which are accessible, with a little study and attention, to the most moderate capacity, we cannot think that there will be much difficulty in finding in every State, a sufficient number to command the Militia. To disseminate this knowledge must however be a work of some time, but if those regulations are univerally enforced, we believe the improvement will be rapid.

The States may accelerate it very much by encouraging the creation of Military and Mathematical Academies; by the practice of the manual exercise and elementary manœuvres of infantry in their primary schools, and by giving a certain preference in their appointments to places of officers in the active Militia, to those young cadets, who, educated at West Point, have found no room in the narrow ranks of the army.

We hesitate not to affirm, that, if the practice of the manual exercise and elementary movements of infantry was introduced, as a fundamental part of education in our primary schools, this simple innovation, besides affording a pleasant and salutary recreation to our children, would spread more military spirit and habits through our population than all those disorderly trainings.

A few observations relative to the training and service of the active Militia in time of peace and war, will conclude our general view of the reforms which we would deem sufficient to render these corps equal to their duties. We have already observed that the efficiency of the Militia must chiefly depend upon that of its officers, and indicated the means by which, in every State, their theoretical instruction, at least, might be ascertained and tested, and the facility with which it might be promoted by the aid of private military academies. Nor have we the least doubt, that the superior respectability which the Militia would soon assume under the new system, would rouse amongst them a spirit of emulation, increasing every year. But we do not think that the practical exercises of the field should be exclusively confined to them, and to the non-commissioned officers, as has been proposed before now. It is absolutely necessary to train the men occasionally to move together, and the direction and inspection of those exercises is the only way of perfecting the officers themselves in the practical as well as theoretical duties of their rank.

Finally, with respect to the service of the active Militia in time of war, we do not propose to give to the General Government, any new or greater power over it, than it now possesses over the whole Militia. The active as well as sedentary Militia should remain at the sole disposal of their own Governments, until called to the Field by Act of Congress; or in cases of sudden emergency, or during the recess of that Assembly, by Presidential proclamation. But with regard to the time that they should be bound to serve, we are convinced from the experience of all our wars, and testimonies of Washington and

Jackson, that nothing can be so inconvenient and expensive as confining that duty to a term of three months' service. The active Militia, when called to the field in time of war, should be considered as a permanent corps, and although a portion of its men may be dismissed and replaced every winter, when they have performed their six years' duty, none should have a right to leave his ranks during the course of a campaign, even though he had served his full time.

Judge Advocate Sewall.

To Congress is delegated the power of organizing and disciplining the Militia; and it is very desirable that, in exercising the constitutional power, a system should be adopted which shall be uniform, suited to the genius of our Government, and yet efficient enough to bring into full exercise, when required, their great arm of national defense. It will doubtless, at first, be difficult to mature a system which is uniform, and yet, which can at once be carried into full operation in all the States; but not so much so as it was to apply the principles of the Federal Government to the confederacy of States. In the latter case, the differences of condition, both physical and moral, in the different States, and prejudices in favor of long established usages and customs, though urged by an active and persevering opposition, did not present an insurmountable obstacle, nor prevent the adoption of an entire new system of government. Even as the limits of our jurisdiction become more extended, and embrace a greater scope of local differences and prejudices, the easier it seems to be to apply the principles of our Constitution to the well being of the States; each of which, new as well as old, without surrendering any of the rights incident to the State sovereignties, cheerfully submit to all the regulations of the General Government; and, in the formation of their own Constitution, and in the enactment of many of their laws, are guided by the general principles of the Federal Constitution, and accommodate themselves to the laws enacted by Congress under the provisions of that instrument. Somewhat like this, I hope, may be the effect of a system established for the organization, training, and disciplining our Militia.

The Militia, if trained at all, is trained for actual service; and, whenever it shall be called into the field, it must expect to submit to all those rules of subordination and discipline which are so necessary to give unity to action, and success to operation. If, therefore, in time of peace it is found difficult to apply to the Militia all the regulations adopted for the government of the army, it may still be practicable to make those regulations the basis of a system of organization and discipline, and so far as they applied at all to have them closely adhered to. The minutiæ of some parts of the drill may, perhaps, be dispensed with on the part of the Militia, but when exigencies shall call for the performance of the complete duty of the soldier, the whole system may be brought into operation. Let the divisions and subdivisions of the Militia correspond with those of the Army. Have the same number of officers for each corps, with a corresponding grade. Let the several corps be distinct, and take their relative rank by corps and not by commission, as is the case in the Militia of some, if not all the States.

Adopt for the use of the Militia the same system of field exercise, and the same drill, that is used in the army, dispensing perhaps with the duties of the camp, and the more fatiguing part of the drill, which might not be so genial to the feeling of citizens in time of peace.

General Ebenezer Huntington, Conn.

An Officer of the Revolution, for a time on Washington's Staff.

You mention that in some States, it is not unfrequent to accept commissions, and then resign, merely accepting the appointment to avoid service. The observation applies to every State, I presume, in a greater or less degree, and must always be expected, where the profession of arms is so little encouraged as in the United States, and where the honor of serving his country is held in so cheap estimation. The length of time which an officer ought to serve, to entitle him to an honorable discharge, is difficult to ascertain; but I think if an officer was obliged to do duty in the ranks, who should not serve four years in the commission or grade from which he wished a discharge, it would be the means of bringing forward a class of men, better calculated to do the public justice, than permitting so easy an evasion of military duty.

Brig. Gen. Cocke.

To hold out such inducements to the intelligent and respectable as to make them seek commissions, while at the same time no objectionable burthens are imposed on the one hand, or advantages too enviable are granted on the other, constitute the most formidable difficulties to be overcome. It is deemed essential, however, as the first step, to raise the value and respectability of a Militia commission in the public opinion. This can never take place until those who hold commissions are really and truly qualified for the high and important functions which appertain to their respective grades; and to accomplish this end, two measures seem necessary; First, more competent instructors must be employed in the place of our present Brigade Inspectors; and secondly, more time must be taken than is at present required by law for training the officers. It may be safely assumed, that higher qualifications in our military instructors cannot be procured without some enhancement of pay; and if the demands upon the time of the officers were to be considered, they would also require compensation. I have thus been brought to the conclusion, that there can be no substantial improvement in the organization of the Militia without some additional drafts upon the treasury. The participation of the State in this increased expense, would consist of the addition to the salaries necessary to command the time and talents of scientific military instructors, in place of the twenty-two Brigade Inspectors now acting under the old inefficient system, and the pay and rations for a few days in the year of the platoon officers, while actually engaged in the service of receiving instruction. It is evident, from the little demand for, and low state of military science at present in our country, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to procure the necessary number of qualified instructors to carry this system at once into full operation;

but this evil could soon be removed by that co-operation of the General Government with the States, which has been so wisely provided by the Constitution in relation to the Militia.

In forming this corps of officers, there are many reasons in favor of issuing no higher commission than that of Captain. It would be recommended by economy, as it would probably be found indispensable to give pay and rations during the period of training. But as the course of instruction would embrace the whole routine of the duty of field officers, the community would obtain, at the price of the pay and rations of platoon officers, all the qualifications necessary for the commandants of battalions and regiments, whenever a state of war might require them in the field.

The economy of this arrangement, however important, bears no comparison with the advantages resulting in another way. By leaving the higher appointments vacant until the exigencies of war demanded the best talents and choice spirits of the land, of every profession and occupation, every class in society would find the course of honorable ambition in the service of the country open before them, and experience has shown that, although a well regulated system of military schools may be confidently relied upon to make subalterns, the Author of Nature makes Generals; and that times and events draw them forth from every walk in life.

Brigade Inspector Mankin, Md.

In the formation of a general Militia system, there are two measures which I think eminently calculated to impart to it a tone of efficiency. These are: the inspection, annually, of every regiment in the different States by an United States' officer, and the union of the United States' troops, where convenient, with the Militia, in their general parades. The latter measure would kindle a spirit of emulation in the breasts of the Militia, which would lead to the most beneficial results, and would moreover, accustom the regular troops and Militia to act in unison. The advantages, resulting from the adoption of the former measure, would be immense. The officers of the Militia would prepare, beforehand, for the anticipated inspection; they would spare no pains to perfect their military knowledge—no exertions to bring their men to the highest possible state of discipline. The regular Militia would rise to higher ground, and the best spirit of the country would be found to animate its ranks. The advantages resulting, in time of war, from the personal acquaintances which would be thus formed between the United States' and Militia officers, from the perfect knowledge of the one, of the strength and character of the other, from that harmony and unity of spirit and design thus infused into both, must be obvious to all.

Gov. Joseph Bloomfield, New Jersey.

Permit me here to ask, what objections can be made to class *minors* between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one?

These youths to put on their frocks, or other regimentals, and be exercised in their several *towns*, two hours before sunset, on the last

Saturday in April, May, June, July, August and September, under officers above the age of twenty-one.

Great complaints are made in New Jersey by parents and masters having their children and apprentices put in requisition; in many cases, inability to equip, pay fines, &c., which operates as a heavy tax on poor parents, and particularly on mechanics, who have from five to twenty apprentices. I wish to see such a corps well disciplined in their non-age.

There was some objection made to the enrolling of minors when this business of classification, between twenty-one and twenty-six, was before Congress, in 1806. Yet I have never heard of a constitutional objection against that part of the present Militia law of the United States, which directs the enrolment of those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years. And why not enrol *minors* of sixteen, as well as those of eighteen, &c. If it is unconstitutional in any of the States to enrol minors, what becomes of those between eighteen and twenty-one? If the objection arises from the constitution of any of the States, on account of the appointment of the officers to command minors, this can be accommodated in those States, by incorporating the *minor* with the *senior* class, and let the *seniors* exclusively *elect* the officers to command both classes.

I think no exemptions ought to be made from Militia duty, but by Act of Congress, and that such list of exemptions ought not to embrace so large a class of citizens as at present. By so many exemptions, the Militia duty is rendered less popular, and the exempts are frequently those very characters who would make the best officers. Every man whose public duty will permit him to do military duty, and is under forty years of age, I could wish to see become a citizen soldier, whilst the defense of our country is intrusted to the Militia. If you will consent to embody those citizens from sixteen to eighteen, I firmly believe you may enlarge your companies to one hundred, without extending their limits, and I can see no inconvenience resulting from such an enlargement; it will excite more emulation among the officers.

What are your objections against classing the Militia, so that the burthen of active duty shall fall on men between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five years? Answer. Doubts are entertained whether this would not infringe the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, sec. 8, page 16, "reserving to the States, respectively, the *appointment* of the officers, and the authority of training the Militia," &c. And the article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, "a well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Although I sincerely wish this reservation and amendment were striken out of the Constitution of the United States, *yet whilst they remain, no good, energetic, general, uniform, national system of organization of the Militia of the United States can be effected.*

State of Kentucky.

Resolved by the General Assembly for the State of Kentucky:—

That, whereas the subject of our national Militia, at all times important, seems, from the aspect of our foreign relations, to be peculiarly

so at the present time ; and experience having shown that the present system has great defects, producing much inconvenience without many of those benefits which a better arrangement would ensure ; and the Legislature of this State being impressed with a belief that an adequate remedy for the evil rests in the hands of the General Government alone, which has a constitutional power to provide for the *organization, arming and disciplining* our national force ; this Legislature, in behalf of their constituents, with every deference to the wisdom of those whose power and duty it is to act finally on the subject, will proceed to suggest their ideas on some of the inconveniences which attend the present Militia system, together with the mode in which they might be obviated, with a view of their being submitted to the competent authority.

1. Although a well organized Militia is the greatest safeguard of a free people, because the soldiers being the citizens, their military interest is to secure their civil rights ; yet the safeguard can only be available, in proportion to the capacity of the Militia to act with effect.

2. This capacity seems to be composed of numbers, organization, discipline, and arms ; which latter may include camp equipage and the necessary munitions of war.

3. Number is but one ingredient of military capacity, because a small number, well armed and disciplined, will defeat a larger one, which is inferior in these two respects.

4. Organization seems to be the means by which any given number of troops may be disposed of, so as to act ; and the more perfect this is, with so much more facility can that number be brought into action to the extent of its force, upon any emergency.

5. The extent of the force of a given number of troops, when brought into action, will be, in the general, in proportion to its discipline and armature ; these two, therefore, seem to compose the hand that is to execute ; and the more perfect they are when in action, in that proportion will the force of any given number of men be greater ; and as it is seen that the perfection of this force, the reverse of that of a standing army, turns to the advantage of the State against her enemies, without threatening the rights of her citizens ; the object, then, which highly interests every portion of the Union, seems evidently to be to so organize the national force, that it can be used with the greatest facility and effect, for legitimate purposes, while the soldier shall be still so far a citizen, as to have an interest in respecting the rights of the latter, which are, in fact, his own ; so as never to cause an abuse or diversion of that force, from its true end.

If therefore every individual in the United States, capable of bearing arms, were to be so organized, disciplined, armed and accoutred, as to act when required, it would certainly present the spectacle of a perfect Militia of the whole, which no age or country ever witnessed, and, most probably, in a country or government like ours, never will be seen. And, if a general draft were to be made—and we ought to calculate on the effect of this—to be equal, it must be impartial ; and how many who would have neither arms, accoutrements, or discipline, would be thus designated ?—men who might be useful at home, but who would scarcely find employment for our enemies, even if armed ; and whose rout and slaughter would only serve to mark our calamity,

and spread dismay amongst our friends; and experience has proved that substitutes are seldom worth anything. But does not the circumstance of a general draft show forcibly the defect of our Militia organization? How much time is lost in mustering all the Militia in the United States? How much will it require to hunt up arms, and to get those of a proper description? The latter, we much suspect, could not be easily procured. Thus it has happened, as it is thence to be inferred, will again happen, that the season for action has passed away in preparation, giving, in many cases, advantages to the enemy not easily regained.

But it is seen from experience that habits of discipline are most effectually acquired in youth. The youth, too, of every country, seem to be, from their vigor and alertness, best calculated for military service; their very ardor itself, seems to be the guarantee of successful enterprise; and certainly they can be spared for this service, with much less inconvenience to the avocations of civil life, than the heads of families; and these pursuits must still be attended to, or the very sinews of war will be dried up or broken.

The remedy, therefore, which this Legislature would beg leave to submit for the consideration of Congress, is to class the Militia between certain ages, and, without intending the slightest disrespect to the wisdom of that Honorable body, they would, by way of example, submit, that the Militia might be divided into three classes: The first, to be composed of all capable of bearing arms, and not exempted by law, between fifteen and twenty-one years of age; the second, between twenty-one and twenty-seven years of age; the third, between twenty-seven and forty-five years of age. The principal object of the first class would be to acquire a knowledge of tactics and discipline; of the second, which might be denominated the effective one, to be completely armed and equipped to march whenever required; of the third, to form a reserve, and which need not be compelled to attend musters, unless when they were called upon to render actual service.

It is not deemed proper to enter into a detail of measures for keeping the middle or effective class properly armed and equipped; that it should be so, is evident. The progress of all capable of bearing arms, through the several classes, would promise a greater perfection in discipline, than can be effected under the present plan; all would, in fact, have thus passed through a school, in which it would have been taught, and, perhaps, more than a million of dollars be annually saved to the community in the labor of those excused from uselessly attending musters. But the greatest advantage which would result from it, would be the keeping an effective, disposable, and competent military force, at all times ready for service, without the danger and inconvenience resulting from a standing army. These ideas are submitted merely with the view that the attention of the National Legislature should be called to the subject, and it appears that none can be of higher moment.

Review of a Memoir by Maj. Gen. Macomb.

The proper period of receiving instruction is youth, and, as every pains is taken to educate our youth in the rudiments of their language, in arithmetic, and in dancing, and gymnastic exercises, it appears to

us, that the military exercises should also form a part of early education, and thus avoid the trouble and loss of time which is occasioned by the present mode of attempting to drill the Militia, after they have arrived at manhood. We would then suggest a plan for instructing the Militia, by teaching our young lads at schools, and in the colleges, the military exercises, and make it a national and general object. Suppose, for instance, that the teachers of schools should be licensed in each State by the proper authorities; that such of the teachers as would instruct their pupils in the military art, as far as the *School of the Company*, should be compensated at a certain rate per boy, say one dollar per annum, to be paid by the General Government, on the certificate of the Inspector of the district or brigade within which the school might be situated, who should make a report to the Adjutant General of the State, of the number of boys at the schools within his district or brigade, to be laid before the Governor of the State, for the information of the Legislature; and also a similar return to the War Department, for the use of Congress; and that each college in the Union should be endowed by Congress with a professor of the military art, in the higher branches. The plan is not so difficult as one would at first suppose, for it would be only necessary, in each school, to instruct three or four of the most intelligent and best behaved boys, in the first instance, who might be made the Captains and Lieutenants of the company, who would, after being well grounded in their duty, as set forth in the military regulations, instruct the other boys of the school. The officers and non-commissioned officers should be selected for their exemplary conduct, and it should be considered a great distinction to enjoy the offices. They should be furnished with wooden arms; they should be carefully taught how to stand firm, march, and wheel, and go through the manual exercises.

Every morning they should assemble on the parade ground before the school; the roll should be called in conformity with the regulations; after which they should march into school, and deposit their arms. Each Wednesday and Saturday afternoon should be exclusively devoted to the drill, when the school should appear in some neat, simple uniform. On particular days there should be, under the direction of the Brigade Major, a general muster of all the schools in his district, when they should be incorporated and formed into battalions, and manœuvred as such under his particular care. This would afford an opportunity of comparing the state of discipline in the several schools or companies. The general and field officers of the Militia should attend and review the battalions, and publish in orders, through the Brigade Major, their opinion of the appearance, skill and advancement in their military exercises, of each school. Take for example, the District of Columbia; suppose that every school therein formed a company, each company in a neat uniform, say a blue nankeen jacket and white pantaloons, black hat and white feather; and each with a flag to designate the company, should march up from their respective school houses, and assemble on the President's Square, and there, under the direction of the Inspector of the Militia, to be formed into battalions and brigades. The young gentlemen of the colleges, who had advanced to the evolutions of the battalion and line, to take command of the battalions and brigades, and to perform the duty of adjutants, field and general officers.

The objections which will be urged against this plan will be, that it will have a tendency to make the nation military, and thus give a propensity to war, which may lead us into difficulties, and perhaps furnish some designing character the means of usurping the reins of Government, and thus destroy our republican institutions; but we cannot conceive that fear to be well grounded. Have we not always been endeavoring to make our Militia effective, to arm and discipline them? Are not the People enlightened and well acquainted with the nature of our institutions, and will they voluntarily sell themselves to a tyrant or usurper? No: the thing is preposterous. Only educate the youth with care, and they will, when they grow up, know how to value the rights and privileges of an American citizen; and, while they have arms in their hands, and know how to use them, will be more likely to maintain those rights and privileges than barter them for the smiles of an usurper, however dignified in assumed titles, or powerful by the support of traitors and unprincipled adherents.

Report of General, afterwards President Harrison.

The great difficulty to be encountered is the *application* of a system of discipline or military instruction to a great population scattered over an immense territory. The accomplishment of this object, at once, is esidently not within the power of the Government. To instruct the present Militia of the country, to any useful extent, would require a larger portion of their time than they can possibly spare from the duty of providing for their families, unless they are liberally paid; to pay them would absorb all the resources of the nation. The alternative appears to be to direct the efforts of the Government to instruct such a portion of the Militia as their means will allow, and which would produce the most beneficial result upon the whole mass; leaving to the effects of another system the gradual introduction of those military acquirements which, in a republican Government, it is so essential for every citizen to possess. Acting upon this principle, and believing that the instruction which it is in the power of the Government to give would be more usefully bestowed upon the whole of the officers and sergeants of the Militia, than upon any particular class, the sections of the bill which relate to this part of the subject have been adopted by the committee.

Mr. Harrison, from the Committee upon the improvement in the organization and discipline of the Militia, made the following Report:

That having had the subject under their consideration, and finding that a bill containing a system of organization and discipline, reported at the last session, was before the House, they have nothing further to offer on the particular points contained in the bill. But as it is their opinion that, if the bill should be adopted, it will be advancing but a single step towards the attainment of the important object of rendering the Militia, in all cases, a substitute for a standing army, they have directed their attention towards some ulterior measure by which it might be effected. They have been enabled to devise none better than that which is contained in the report made to this House on the 17th

January, 1817 ; and they beg that the following extract therefrom may form a part of their report :

Although it may be considered that, by presenting a bill for the organization and classification of the Militia, and the exposition of their motives which accompany it, the committee have performed the task assigned them by the resolution under which they acted, they have, nevertheless, believed it to be their duty to submit some further views, the result of their deliberations upon this important subject.

This course may be more excusable, as the committee have no hesitation in acknowledging that the plan embraced by the bill is a mere expedient—a choice of difficulties—a system which, although it will place the Militia upon a much better footing than they have before stood on, yet is not likely to produce that great desideratum,—that indispensable requisite in a Government constituted like ours—the diffusion of a military spirit and military information throughout the great mass of the people.

The part of the subject which still remains to be discussed will be best understood by dividing it into two distinct propositions :

1. Is it desirable that the whole male population of the United States, of the proper age, should be trained to the use of arms, so as to supersede, under any circumstances, the necessity of a standing army ?

2. Is it practicable ?

The solicitude which has been manifested by the great men who have successively filled the office of Chief Magistrate of the United States, for the adoption of a system of military discipline for the Militia, which would produce the effect contemplated by the first proposition, sufficiently manifests their sense of its importance. The subject was often and warmly recommended by the Father of his country, and, at an early period of his administration, a plan for the purpose was proposed by the Secretary of War, and, being corrected agreeably to his suggestions, was submitted to the National Legislature. It is believed that objections to the expense and supposed difficulty of executing this plan, and to its object, was the cause of its being rejected. Is the opinion which prevailed at that period, that an energetic national Militia was to be regarded as the capital security of a free republic, less apparent at the present ? Has anything since occurred, either in the history of our own or of any other country to show that a standing " army, forming a distinct class in the community," is the proper defense of a Government constructed like ours ? Do the events of the late war show that discipline is not necessary for the Militia ? or does the present aspect of the political world afford so much security as to justify the indifference which prevails in providing an effectual national defense ?

It is impossible that any American can recur to many of the events, and particularly to the concluding scenes of the late war, without feeling that elevation of mind which a recollection of his country's glory is calculated to produce. There are, however, others, and not a few, that are eminently calculated to show that an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure can be distinctly traced to the want of discipline in the Militia. The glorious success which, in several instances, crowned their efforts, was the result of uncommon valor, or of valor united with the advantage of a position suited to their peculiar charac-

ter. The greater part of the American Militia, accustomed from their early youth to the use of fire arms, are doubtless more formidable than any other troops in the world, in the defense of a line or rampart. Victories in the field are gained by other qualities; by those disciplined evolutions which give harmony and concert to numerous bodies of men, and enable whole armies to move with the activity and address of single combatants. Let our Militia be instructed, and America would be equal to a contest with the rest of the world united. The improvements which have been made in the art of war since the commencement of the French revolution, give greater advantages to invading and disciplined armies, acting against those of a contrary character, than they before possessed. This arises from their increased activity, produced by the great multiplication of their light troops; the celerity of movement given to the artillery; and, above all, to the improvements in the staff, placing the subsistence of large armies upon a footing of security beyond what was formerly supposed to be possible. An improvement in tactics, which gives advantages to the professed soldier who fights for conquest, over the citizen who bears arms only in the defense of his country, is perhaps to be regretted, and no alternative is left to the latter but to perfect himself in the same arts and discipline. It is believed that there is no instance on record of a republic, whose citizens had been trained to the use of arms, having been conquered by a nation possessing a different form of Government. Small republics have been overthrown by those which were more powerful; as Saguntum destroyed by Carthage, and Numantia by Rome; but it has been observed of those Governments, that "their walls and towers became their funeral piles, leaving nothing to their conquerors but their ashes."

The committee cannot conceive that any aspect, however pacific it may be, which the Governments of Europe may for the present have assumed towards this country, should be used as an argument to *procrastinate even for a day*, any measure calculated to render their future hostility abortive. It cannot be believed that any real friendship can exist in the breasts of the Sovereigns of that continent, for a Government which has been founded upon principles so opposite to theirs, and which, by the happiness it diffuses, affords an eternal satire and reproach upon their conduct. Whatever security, then, may be derived from their policy, none can certainly be expected from their forbearance, whenever, from a change of circumstances, they may think it proper to change their policy. The liberties of America must, then, be preserved as they were won—by the arms, the discipline, and the valor of her free-born sons.

But the defense of our country against a foreign enemy, does not constitute the only (perhaps not the chief) motive of military improvements to the extent contemplated by the proposition we are considering. The safety of a republic depends as much upon the equality in the use of arms amongst its citizens, as upon the equality of rights; nothing can be more dangerous in such a Government than to have a knowledge of the military art confined to a part of the people, for sooner or later that part will govern.

The effects of discipline possessed by a few, to control numbers without, is to be seen in all the despotic Governments of modern, as well as ancient times.

Another important consideration, urging the diffusion of a military spirit amongst our citizens is, the counterpoise it will afford to that inordinate desire of wealth, which seems to have pervaded the whole nation, bringing with it habits of luxury, manners and principles, highly unfavorable to our republican institutions.

The first effect of this state of society is the substitution of a standing army for a national Militia. Upon this subject, the committee beg leave to make a quotation from the report of General Knox, corrected by President Washington. ' It is,' says the patriotic Secretary, ' the introduction of vice and corruption of manners into the mass of the people that renders a standing army necessary. It is when public spirit is despised, and avarice, indolence and effeminacy of manners predominate, and prevent the establishment of institutions which would elevate the minds of the youth in the paths of virtue and honor, that a standing army is formed and riveted forever.' So true is the principle here contended for, that it is believed there is no instance in history, of a nation losing its liberties where the military spirit of the people did not decline in the same proportion that the corruption of manners advanced. Nor was any free Government ever overturned by an internal convulsion, until the destruction of that spirit had been first produced in the *body of the people.* It was not until the amusements of the theatre, the baths, and the public gardens had superseded the exercises of the Campus Martius, that a Roman army dared to revolt against its country, and with the power of the sword to substitute for its free institutions the arbitrary will of a dictator; eighty years before the successful usurpation of Cæsar, the revolt of an army could have produced no such consequence.

But the habits of the people had been changed ; no longer in every Roman citizen was to be found a trained and practiced soldier ; the higher tactics were cultivated, indeed, with zeal and success by a martial nobility. No period had been more prolific of great generals. At none had the discipline of the legions been so perfect ; but they were no longer filled by citizens taking their routine of service. The military had become a distinct profession, composed of men, who, in the habits of war and pillage, had forgotten the sacred obligations attached to their character as citizens, and who were ever as ready, upon the suggestion of their leader, to turn their arms against their country, as the enemy whom they were raised to oppose.

As in every age, then, and in every country, the same cause will produce the same effects ; the palladium of American liberty must be the diffusion of military discipline and a military spirit through the whole body of the people.

But secondly. Is the object attainable ? That it is not attainable by any of the systems which have heretofore been in use in the United States, is very evident from the little success which has attended them. The late war repeatedly exhibited the melancholy fact of large corps of Militia going to the field of battle, without understanding a single elementary principle, and without being able to perform a single evolution. Yet Militia laws exist, and have existed, in all the States since the war of the revolution, which set apart, with great precision, a number of days in each year for the purposes of training and discipline. But from this plan no good fruit has ever been produced. It

was an error, indeed, common to all Militia systems in use in the United States, that the periods for training were too short and too distant from each other to produce much benefit.

To remedy this defect, camps of discipline have been recommended. One of the reasons which governed the committee in rejecting that part of the Secretary of War's recommendation has been explained above; but if that objection could be overcome, the committee are far from thinking that the object could at all be accomplished in that way. There is another more formidable obstacle to success; more formidable, because it arises from the nature of our Government, and the constitution of the human character. The sentiments and habits of a free country necessarily produces amongst the citizens a superior restlessness under restraint than is to be met with in the subjects of a monarchy. This spirit frequently manifests itself even in a career of military services, where the high interests involved (and in which they largely partake) and the evident necessity of discipline, might be supposed able to correct it. There can scarcely be a restraint more vexatious and disgusting to a *grown man*, than the initiatory lessons of the military art. Military discipline consists in the observance of a number of minute particulars which, to the noviciate in arms, have no apparent object, but which form the links of a beautiful and connected system. It is believed that to this cause is to be attributed the little progress which has been made in training the Militia of the United States; nor is there much prospect that any change of system could, with regard to the *present Militia*, produce the result at which we aim.

In searching for landmarks to guide us to our object, it will be in vain that we direct our attention to the modern nations of Europe; from them we can borrow nothing to aid our purpose; Governments formed upon artificial distinctions in society, which estimate their security by the inability of their subjects to resist oppression, can furnish a free people with no guides in organizing a system of defense which shall be purely national. We are, however, not without resource.

The ancient republics, from which we have drawn many of the choicest maxims upon which to found our civil institutions, will furnish also a most perfect model for our system of national defense. The whole secret of ancient military glory; the foundation of that wonderful combination of military skill and exalted valor which enabled the petty republic of Athens to resist the mighty torrent of Persian invasion, which formed the walls of Sparta, and conducted the Roman legions (influenced, indeed, by unhallowed motives) to the conquest of the world, will be found in the military education of their youth. The victories of Marathon and Platea, of Cynocephele and Pydna, were the practical results of the exercises of the Campus Martius and Gymnasia. It is *on a foundation of this kind, and of this kind only, that an energetic national Militia* can be established.

'An examination into the employments and obligations of individuals comprising the society,' says General Knox, 'will evince the impossibility of diffusing an adequate knowledge of the art of war by any other means than a course of discipline during the period of non-age; the time necessary to acquire this important knowledge cannot be afforded at any other period of life with so little injury to the public or private interests.' Nothing is more true than what is here advanced; and

yet it is most singular that the amiable and patriotic Secretary should have founded his plan upon a course of instruction, to commence within the limits of non-age, indeed, but at so advanced a period of it, that all the objections which could be made to disciplining the Militia at a more advanced age will apply equally to it, with the addition of others which are more cogent, and which are supposed to be inherent in the system itself. Of his advanced corps, composed of the youth of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years of age, those of eighteen and nineteen are to be drawn out for thirty days in each year, and those of twenty for ten days, to be instructed in camps of discipline. It has been strongly urged against this plan, that the separation of the youth, at that critical age, from the superintending vigilance of their parents and guardians, would be a very dangerous step, and that the loss of time from the pursuit of their professions and occupations would prove to them a most serious evil.

Whatever force there may be in these objections, the committee are fully persuaded that the improvement to be derived from the execution of this plan would not compensate for the expense and loss of time it would occasion. The perfection of discipline, as it regards the soldier, is the grace, the precision, and address with which he performs certain evolutions. To arrive at this perfection, long continued practice is essential.

And since it must be evident that the time necessary for this purpose cannot be taken from the avocations of our citizens, after they have arrived at the age of manhood, the only alternative is to devise a system of military instruction which shall be engrafted on and form a part of the ordinary education of our youth.

The great man who conducted the war of our Revolution, was continually compelled to conform his conduct to the circumstances growing out of the experimental lessons just mentioned. What was the secret of his conduct? Must it be told? It may, and without exciting a blush or uneasy sensation in any of his surviving companions in arms. He had an army of men, but he had few officers or soldiers in that army. Both were to be formed, which could not be effected in a single campaign, or while his regiments were continually returning home, and, like the waves of the sea, each in their turn lost in the abyss, and succeeded by new ones. It was not till after he was furnished with a less fluctuating and more stable kind of force, that he could commence, with a prospect of advantage, military instructions, or enforce the ordinances of discipline; and, even then, he felt that *time and instructors* were required to render his labors useful, and enable his army to meet the enemy upon any thing like *equal terms*. Are we to profit by, or is this experience to be lost to our country?

Admitting however, that Militia officers, during the few months the law permits their corps to be retained in *actual service*, could render their men, by incessant instruction, capable of fulfilling the object of their destination; yet, as that advantage is but momentary, as these borrowed instruments must be quickly returned to the depot which furnished them, as new ones must be resorted to, and successively instructed, what can be expected from such a system, but perpetual incoherence between the means and the end, and certain shipwreck to the best connected and combined military projects. This, to be sure,

is the old story—it cannot, however, be too often repeated, because it can never be refuted.

In 1826, Major General Macomb wrote a "Memoir on the Organization of the Army, with a view to its giving effect to Militia when called into active service;" and in 1832, in a Report to the Secretary of War, he elaborates his scheme, which, by composing the Army of non-commissioned officers, would render it capable of the greatest expansion when war broke out. Many officers might be supplied the Militia from such an Army in time of war, and many instructors in time of peace.

I would propose that the ages of the boys should be not less than twelve nor more than thirteen years, and that the term of enlistment until they should, respectively, have attained the age of twenty-five years. At such a tender age the boys might be instructed in the art of reading and writing the English language correctly; and as they advance, they should be taught the principles of mathematics, as far as to enable them to apply them to all common calculations, and to practical geometry, for civil and military purposes. I would also propose that they should be instructed in all the various handicrafts, which might be useful to the service in their capacity as soldiers, and which might enable them, after leaving the service, to provide for themselves a decent support. In a word, I would cause them to be instructed after the manner of the cadets at West Point, only beginning at the very rudiments of instruction in everything to be taught. They should be neatly and well dressed as soldiers, drilled every day in military exercises, and made to perform all the duties of soldiers and non-commissioned officers. For which purpose I would propose that one of the forts, best situated, should be made the school; and, after the experiment is fully tested, if successful, that other schools should be established at other suitable places. Let there be enlisted five hundred boys, of the age above mentioned, and for the term specified; these boys to receive, for the first three years, three dollars a month, with suitable clothing and rations; then for two years, the full pay of a soldier; after that, to be promoted to be corporals, and when eighteen years of age to be formed into companies; the most expert soldiers and the best in regard to conduct to be made sergeants. Then send all except two companies to relieve such companies as are in other garrisons, so as to relieve a whole garrison at a time, that there may be none of the old soldiers at any of the posts occupied by the schooled soldiers.

In order to give encouragement to those who have attained the rank of corporal, they should, after serving three years as corporals, be promoted to the rank of sergeants, so that eventually the whole army would be composed of non-commissioned officers, who should perform the duties of privates and non-commissioned officers in rotation, except two in each company, selected from the most deserving, to be sergeant major and quartermaster sergeant, &c. &c.

The advantages expected from the establishment of these schools, are 1. To render the rank and file of the army more respectable. 2. To insure good officers and non-commissioned officers for a large army, whenever it may be necessary to augment the military establishment. 3. To disseminate practical military knowledge more generally throughout the republic; and, finally, to banish vice, and prevent desertion in the army. Besides the advantages to the regular forces, men thus educated for military purposes, would, on retiring to their homes, be found to be a great acquisition to the Militia of their respective States.

The following passages from a letter to a gentleman of Boston, written by General Dufour on the Swiss system, furnish us with hints to be regarded in devising ours. General Dufour, the Commander in Chief of the Swiss army, Head of their Military School, educated at the Polytechnic School, Paris, serving under Napoleon, author of works on Fortifications, Artillery, Tactics, &c., re-organized the Federal Army, and instituted some of these provisions of the most successful Militia system in the world.

Is there a regular inspection of the Cantonal Militia by the federal officers?

"Yes. Every year a certain number of Cantons are submitted to the federal inspection as well of the 'materiel' as of the 'personnel.' A certain number of federal Colonels are in turn appointed for this purpose."

Under what penalty is military service obligatory?

"There is none positive and determined by law, but the Cantons are bound to hold their contingents always full and ready, and if they do not, the federal authority can oblige them to do so. The Cantons are free to select in what concerns themselves the means of holding their effective force always ready. In general, no passport, nor leave of absence for a short time is given to a young man who has not yet completed his military instruction. It is difficult to obtain during the time in which a man belongs to the contingent, and it is never granted when the Militia is placed upon a war footing; that is to say, when it is held ready to move in case of danger."

Can a substitute be sent?

"This is sometimes done, but in general the military laws of the Cantons, (which differ one from another, and are in harmony only upon essential and fundamental points,) do not permit substitutes."

How are infractions of discipline punished in time of peace?

"By the police courts, and by punishments called 'disciplinary.' Confinement in the police hall, fines, and imprisonment for a short time."

Who drills the recruits, and how often is this done?

"The military authorities of the Cantons. The frequency of the drill varies according to the Canton which is bound to furnish well drilled troops without being held to a specific course of instruction.

We rely upon the federal inspection to ascertain whether the proper degree of excellence has been attained. If a Canton falls below the standard, the federal military authority has the right to send instructors to it, and to submit it to obligatory exercises during the necessary time."

Is it customary to put the Militia in camp? How many times a year? How many men at a time?

"At Geneva this is done only once, on entering into the contingent for the first instruction which lasts six weeks. The number not over three hundred men. But in the other Cantons, and also in Geneva after the first encampment, the Militia are put into barracks by battalion and for some few days only. When the first instruction is given, the recruits are held in barrack during the necessary time, some weeks, more or less, according to the Canton. Besides this, there are Federal Camps, every year, to which the Cantons are summoned in their turn. Troops to the number of three or four thousand are here camped under canvass for a fortnight. There are besides what we call 'federal musters,' a little larger in number, four or five thousand, where the troops are cantoned in the villages, and devote themselves for several days to the great movements and manœuvres of war. These federal musters are principally intended for the instruction of the commanders and officers of the staff."

"In matters of discipline, every individual connected with the army, in whatever capacity, is, either in case of war, or of the simple federal musters, placed under a military code which is not wanting in a certain degree of vigor. This is willingly submitted to, although each Canton has its peculiar laws of discipline for the troops simply in the service of the Cantons."

A little Treatise on Rifle-Clubs, by 'Russell of the Times,' contains some sensible hints which apply to our Militia.

"As far as one can judge of the present movement, there is as yet a decided tendency to favor 'Clubs' or 'Associations,' instead of 'Corps' or 'Companies.' This tendency is unfavorable to real efficiency, and to utility in case of need. Why should not earnest, straightforward men, who really mean to fight for their country, if there be occasion, try to attain the greatest efficiency in the art of fighting? Why should they fear any approach to the discipline and subordination of military bodies? There is no element of military life in a club. The genius of a club is equality among its members. The genius of a military body is subordination, which is the opposite of equality in the sense in which I am speaking. Sooner than have no movement at all, let us take clubs as the *foyers*, where our ardor in learning the use of arms is to glow freely and fervidly; but if we would secure great, permanent, indubitable results, let us have companies, battalions, corps of a military character."

I quote from the last Annual Report of the Massachusetts Rifle Club, including a portion of an article in the London

Times, after the annual Wimbledon Meeting;—expatiating upon the precision attained by the competitors, the extent to which the target practice prevails, and the important advantages derived therefrom.

"The Volunteer movement and the Marksman movement instead of dying away as a mere transient fashion, have taken firm hold of our youth, and have almost turned the heads of some of our grey-beards. An English lad is now hardly an equal among his associates, and a man in the eyes of his sweetheart, unless he can handle his rifle. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of this new fact; no one can tell what may be the effect of the ever-changing modifications of continental power. But it cannot but be a certain good if an enemy should always know that this Island is inhabited by an armed population, of which every adult male is armed with a rifle, with which he can at five hundred yards put ten conical balls every five minutes into a space six feet by four."

The Report continues—

"Again we have in the late Report of General Charles Hay, Inspector General of Musketry in England,—the statement that during the year there were trained at the two schools of Hythe and Fleetwood, *three hundred and sixty-three officers*, and *fifteen hundred and fifty-three non-commissioned officers and privates*, and *thirty-five volunteers* of all ranks,—also that the improvement in firing had been so marked that *thirteen thousand nine hundred and forty-five men* have been recommended for extra pay as marksmen in the army, whilst *nearly one fourth of the whole army* have fired in the first class." "These are facts which it would seem well for us to consider carefully."

Report of Brigadier General De Peyster.

The same laws which govern, the same spirit of discipline which animates the regular army, are applicable and essential to the Militia, modified in some degree, but still not so much modified as to change their inherent qualities, and the moment the latter assume their uniform and arms, they should be subject to the United States' Army regulations, that is, if they are organized for protection, defense and police. If it is for mere display and amusement, which many of our legislators deem is their only object, then they should be discouraged as prejudicial to the spirit of our institutions, and denied the support of the Government. During the periods of drill, the English Militiaman is placed on almost the same footing as the Regular Soldier, and insubordination and disorder, mutiny and desertion, repressed and chastised by penalties and punishments, not only of extreme severity, but involving the deepest disgrace.

Nothing sustains a military organization more than an inflexible system of punishment and just conferring of reward. All offenses should be tried by courts martial, composed of officers detailed from

other districts than that to which the accused belongs. These courts might be organized on principles similar to those provided by the regulations of the French National Guard. There, the punishments, in cases of disobedience or infractions of the regulations, are applied in a company, by a council of discipline, composed of a captain, as president, a lieutenant or sub-lieutenant, a sergeant, a corporal, and a private. Military crimes and misdemeanors should be punished by fine, imprisonment for aggravated offenses in irons, degradation, cashiering, and future inability to hold a warrant or commission. The decisions of the Court should be enforced promptly and vigoronsly, by, or only at the expense of the State. Discipline cannot be effectually maintained where promotion is dependent on the will of those in inferior positions, whose irregularities will be checked, and prejudices suffer by the elevation of rigid, spirited and talented officers. We find, that abroad, competency is the test of official appointment. Arrived at by what means? By instruction in military schools, examinations of candidates, and service. Officers, both of the army and of the National Guards itself, in France, declare that whatever discipline and reliability existed in that institution, were in a great measure destroyed by conceding the election of officers. The café and the wine shop now exercise their pernicious influence, where formerly ability and character were considered sufficient recommendations.

According to our present system, the Staff Departments of this State, are such only in name, and the entire want of experience and definite jurisdiction, renders Militia Staff officers much more ornamental than useful. In fact they are worse than useless, for while the State thus nominally possesses a complete organization, actually in cases of difficulty she would have to get rid of the majority of those holding Staff commissions, of whom nine-tenths have never performed the slightest duty connected with their indispensable offices, which they would be called upon to fulfill at once on being ordered into the field. And here it is impossible to pass over the crowning folly of our present Militia organizations, the engineer department, the most scientific corps of the whole army, for which none are eligible in the United States' regular army but those who have graduated with all the honors at West Point.

It would be amusing to see the State sappers and miners undertaking to perform their duties of construction or destruction under the supervision of their own officers.

"A good staff," says Jomini, "is indispensable to the constitution of an army."—"It has the advantage of being more durable than the genius of a single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it may safely be affirmed that it constitutes for an army the best of all safeguards." "A well appointed staff is to an army what a skillful minister is to a monarch. It seconds the views of the Chief even though it be in condition to direct all things itself; it prevents the commission of faults, even though the Commanding General be wanting in experience, by furnishing him good counsels." "The staff is the eye of the army; through it a leader watches,—has an insight into what is passing around him, and the want of a good staff is often the cause of great misfortunes." In the Swiss system, service alone authorizes promotions in the Federal Staff to and including the rank

of Captain. To the superior grades, however, nominations can be made at will from all officers of an immediately inferior grade, provided they have served *at least* two years therein.

The excellence of the English infantry is to be attributed to the superiority of its non-commissioned officers, who, as a body, excel those of every other nation, for their soldierly qualities and capabilities. See how admirably this essential principle for the transformation of citizens into soldiers is engrafted on the English Militia System, in the maintenance of Nuclei, Cadres or Staff Corps, composed of non-commissioned officers and drummers in each district, always under pay, and consequently in actual service, subject to the Articles of War. Another cause of their excellence, is the subjecting them, when *embodied*, or only called out for exercise, to the Mutiny Act, Articles of War, and Army Regulations, and, by strict discipline and severe training, making them *soldiers*, and not mere popinjays, fit only for parade and self-glorification. In fact, during the periods of drill, the English Militiaman is placed on almost the same footing as the regular soldier, and insubordination and disorder, mutiny and desertion, repressed and chastised by penalties and punishments, not only of extreme severity, but involving the deepest disgrace. Without efficient officers and instructors, it is impossible to create an available Militia.

Besides the Adjutant General and Inspector General, there should be as many Assistant Adjutant Generals and Inspecting officers as there are division districts in a State. The latter should never be assigned to the district in which they reside, but their annual tour of inspection should be designated by the chief of their department. Ties of neighborhood, intimacy, interest, relationship, &c., would not sway an officer in a strange district. The office of Major and Brigadier General should be abolished, except in time of war, insurrection or invasion. (English and Swiss Militia Laws, and in effect the Laws relating to the National Guard, &c., of every European Government.)

Another cause of the decadence of our Militia is the substitution of display for service. At present the Corps seldom, if ever, practice any evolutions except those connected with Reviews and Inspections—evolutions useless in the field. To form square, ploy and deploy, &c., seems never to enter their heads. Any one who has traveled abroad, must have been struck with the constant drill and exercises every foreign army is daily subjected to. No promenades through the streets, except to and from the parade ground, but hard work, and plenty of it. Target practice is one of the indispensable requirements of the Swiss Military Regulations. It is also one of the favorite amusements of the people.

Every class of volunteers or drafted men, should be assigned to appropriate services, with whose details it is in some degree acquainted. Thus Sweden incorporates the inhabitants of her coasts as seamen; Austria, those bordering on navigable rivers as pontoniers, gunboatmen and coastguards. In France, Prussia, and Switzerland, those National Guards are chosen as firemen, artillerymen, cavalry and riflemen, who possess in the highest degree the tastes, qualities, and information, requisite for each particular service; and in the first, there are companies of drilled sailors recruited along the coast. By this method the instructor finds his labor lightened by the aptitude of his

pupils. Besides this, Switzerland claims the service of every one of her citizens, sound in mind and body, each one with his peculiar talent, discharging a duty analogous to his proper avocation, and aiding in the completion of the National Army. Thus clergymen become chaplains ; physicians and apothecaries fill the medical staff; professed nurses, *infirmiers* and *economes ;* lawyers, judge advocates, &c. &c. Each Swiss, while yet a boy, commences on the play ground his military duties ; every Canton keeps up a cadet corps, composed of youths from ten to fifteen years of age, uniformed, armed and furnished with muskets, bayonets and equipments of appropriate size. The best instructors teach them the Manual, and carry them through the School of the Platoon and Battalion. Batteries of two-pounders, with corresponding field trains, are surprisingly managed by diminutive artillerists. Infantry and artillery manœuvres, even the most difficult, are executed with the precision of veterans ; no punishments are necessary to compel attention and maintain the most soldierly bearing and skill.

I extract from the Army and Navy Journal an admirable letter on the " Military System of Switzerland," and portions of an article on the " Discipline and Care of Troops."

The Military System of Switzerland.

To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal :

Sir :—Perhaps it is an undertaking too bold for an officer belonging to a very little and peaceable country, which has no standing army at all, but only what others call contemptuously militia forces, and therefore himself being in service a very little part of his life, to venture some words to promote the military interests of your country —a country best acquainted by immediate experience with all that belongs to warfare on the most extensive scale, and rich in men distinguished in every science and art concerning this part of human activity. This undertaking is the bolder as the writer of these lines is but very little acquainted with your language and your civil and military institutions. Very weighty motives, nevertheless, are leading him to this boldness. They are: the sympathy existing between your country and ours, the opinion of men of the highest competency upon our military institutions, and an opinion put forth in your own paper as to the deficiencies of your military system in general and your recruiting system in particular. My country is Switzerland. No need to speak a word more concerning the sympathies between the countries. Your military system is considered and openly acknowledged as the best one for free countries by men like Garibaldi —by him, by the Italian General Allemandi, by one of Garibaldi's officers, W. Rustow, who is considered even by his most decided adversaries to be, nevertheless, the most spirited living German writer on military subjects ; by the Polish General Klapka. A hero of freedom and independence, as well known in America as in Poland and Switzerland—Kosciuszko—began to introduce a similar system in his country ; in the war against the Moscovites just expiring, the Poles again followed this system ; in Germany, the nation calling for more

civil freedom, at the same time call for the Swiss military system; and even a considerable number of officers of the standing armies of Germany have united to promote this movement by association and through discussion in the public press; and they are gaining ground daily. It is, in fact, the system which for five centuries and a half has sheltered our freedom and independence against such powerful and dangerous enemies and neighbors as Austria and France; the little confederation of free states between the two greatest despotic and military empires of Europe.

Your paper, if I am well informed, some months ago (April), put forth an opinion on reforming your recruiting system, which in its principles does not fall very far from what we have had for centuries. It was suggested that every voter should be bound to do military service, or to pay a certain tax as a compensation for his exemption from it; that this force should be considered and employed as a "reserve" to your Army, which also would be organized on a much larger footing than formerly. (This is the short indication which the *Allgemeine Militär Zeitung* of Darmstadt gives of the contents of one of your leading articles.) Without examining the opinions on your militia, your volunteer forces, and your standing Army by some of our own more distinguished countrymen, who have seen them when engaged on the field of battle (Fogliardi and Lecomte), or the opinions of the very large number of our countrymen and relations fighting or living amongst them, I venture simply to trace by a very few lines the principles of our system and the manner of carrying them out in former more warlike and brilliant, and in later, more peaceable and comfortable times.

The principle first pronounced by our Federal Constitution and our law, and carried out in our country much more strictly and rigidly than in any other, at least in the civilized part of the world, is (Article 18): "Every Swiss is bound to contribute to the military defense of the country (*Jeder Schweizer ist wehrpflichtig*). Exceptions are only allowed by a special Federal law. The substitution of another man to the place of him who is bound to military service is prohibited by the law (*Die Stellvertretung für den Militärdienst ist untersagt*)." We consider it as a duty of every citizen to carry himself the weapons for securing and maintaining freedom and independence, for the execution of the constitution and laws, and do not allow him to put another in his place, or, except in cases of bodily incapacity, to acquit himself of it by the payment of money. This incapacity must be proved by a strict medical trial, and in this case the "military tax," as we call it, (the tax to be paid instead of personal military service), is fixed according to the income and other personal circumstances. The same is the case with the very little number of men whom their position in government, court of laws, administration, or in their families (only son of a widow, &c.), according to the above-mentioned Federal law, frees from personal military service.

Another principle carried out by our laws and their execution, is to employ every man for military service according to his natural taste and civil profession. The shooter and sportsman in the corps of sharpshooters; the landowner for the horse; the civil engineer as military engineer; the carpenter in the corps of sappers (pioneers); the

lockmaker, cartwright, &c., in the artillery ; the merchantman in the victualing or paymaster's department, &c.

And a third very important principle, appearing in almost every word and step for military things, is : Reduce drilling, clothing, equipping of our men only to things strictly necessary in warfare and the best for war, and employ the drilling time to the utmost advantage.

These are the leading principles of our military organization, which we consider the ground stone of interior freedom and exterior independence of Switzerland.

FRANZ VON ERLACH,
Lieut.-Col. Swiss Federal Staff of Artillery.

BERNE, Switzerland, Sept. 8, 1864.

The Discipline and Care of Troops.

"*L' habitude de la discipline donne à une armée l' esprit militaire.*"—VIAL.

Far be it from us to say that our Armies have not done wonders. We only maintain that these wonders have come, in large part, from the intelligence and character of the privates ; and add, that this intelligence and character has often been squandered, to some purpose no doubt, but squandered as that man wastes his fortune, who, from disinclination to regularity and method, obtains all his ends simply by a lavish expenditure of money. Which is to say, the great need of our Army from the first was instruction. Had the brigadiers instructed the colonels, and had these, while retailing what they learned to the officers under them, set themselves to the work of forming such non-commissioned officers as could have been made from our volunteers, the Army would have trebled its value ; the war would perhaps be now at an end, and many a poor fellow who lies on the bloody field, or has returned an invalid or cripple, would be filling his place in society, and adding the full influence of a good soldier toward the future well-being of his country.

The old Romans bear witness that the value of strategy does not compare with the worth of first-rate troops led by men who to commen sense join a knowledge of tactics and discipline. Strategy always rests on *ifs*, but good troops, under God's favor, have little to do with hypothetical syllogisms.

Under the term Military Discipline may be included every systematic means for insuring obedience and order in all things among soldiers : it goes hand in hand with the care of troops, of which it is the indispensable condition. When the command consists of only fifteen, twenty, or even twenty-five, this discipline may partake very much of the character of direct moral suasion, and still be very searching and very complete. Beyond these numbers it may still be exercised, and with great aggregate effect, by leaders who possess from nature a peculiar talent for creating enthusiasm and influencing the general will ; but, although the aggregate effect be great, it is then far from searching or complete. What is accomplished is done only at a wasteful use of lives and money, while everything is precarious, depending on the life and health of one person, and not less on the prevailing humors of his troops. In such a case, men who can not be inflamed with the spirit of their chief, are useless as subordinate officers ; and

among the soldiers, while the willing take more than their share of work and suffering, the indolent and unwilling have always a great chance of escape from the trials and hazards of war.

The discipline of which we now speak is *an art*. It has its rules and well-considered measures ; and these can be learned and exercised by any one who possesses the only absolutely necessary qualifications —a moderate degree of intelligence and (at least when administering its laws) power to govern himself.

In old regiments and armies, where for years the fresh elements taken in to keep up their strength have been received under a long established government, and at once surrounded by old subjects, the new private or officer learns, he hardly knows how. Beside the regular instruction always given him, there is an atmosphere, the very breathing of which seems to enlighten him to understand, and dispose him to obey. The rules of discipline are, in such situations, to a great measure traditional ; at least they are so in their details ; and it might puzzle even an officer, fully imbued with their spirit, to state, in precise and definite words, what they were.

Volunteers labor not only under the difficulty of having no traditions and no atmosphere of military spirit surrounding them, but they have no years in which to produce either. They are called out for *instant service*, and if there be any means to better fit them for it, such as putting traditional customs into expressed rules, or suggesting measures which may in some degree supply the place of the military atmosphere, until it shall, perchance, have formed itself, these means will obviously conduce much to raising their value as soldiers.

With this object in view, it will be appropriate first to inquire, What are the military ends aimed at ? They may be enumerated as follows : —1. To secure unhesitating obedience. 2. To enable the officer commanding to know with certainty that the men under him actually have the ammunition and rations which they are supposed to have. 3. To secure these, as also the arms, equipments, tools, dress, and (if mounted) the horses and horse equipments in the most perfect order, in which, under the circumstances, it is possible that attention and *intelligent* care on the part of the men can keep them. 4. To preserve the health of the men. 5. To oblige the officers to exercise their authority without partiality, and with firmness and justice. 6. To create that feeling of *esprit de corps*, which long experience has proved to be the most potent of all moral influences on soldierly efficiency. 7. To enable all officers to state, at a moment's notice, the situation of their command as to numbers and efficient strength, as to rations, ammunition, and armament ; and to furnish a return of articles needed from any of the Departments in order to fully provide them, as directed by existing orders, or the general customs of the service. 8. To maintain such accountability for Government property as may prevent its waste, and insure its being applied to the proper uses.

These ends attained, the condition of the command and its behavior in action will still depend much on the individual character of the officers and men ; but in a body of several hundred men, however paradoxical the assertion, the fact is that the efforts of individual character are vastly more impaired by lack of discipline, than the results of discipline by defects of character. That is to say, if in one regiment

discipline be one hundred and individual bravery fifty, while in another bravery be one hundred and discipline fifty; the first mentioned will, in every case and on every occasion, carry off the laurels of the day. What is more, its individual bravery will soon rise, not only to par with the other, but above it; beside, there will be a growth of confidence among the soldiers in each other and in the successful working of their fire and their charges, which will tell more and more in every successive engagement.

Non-commissioned Officers.—That which forms the machinery of discipline is the *cadre* of the regiment, The cadre (or framework) is now the accepted French term for *the officers and non-commissioned officers of any command.* It is our purpose, first, to speak of the latter, who constitute three-quarters of this framework.

The quality of its non-commissioned officers presents always the true touchstone to the actual *present* worth of a regiment. They it is who act directly on the men, they are the immediate artisans who form the soldiers. And, whether themselves a recent result from the labors of capable officers, or the product of time in a service-worn battalion, *good* non-commissioned officers are, in camp, on the march, or on the battlefield, at once the glory and the strength of an army. They are not merely a lower kind of officer, as a captain is lower than a colonel, but their authority is as peculiar in its kind as it is indispensable in its effects. They are not always, in military age, but are always, as to position, the patriarchs of their little families, and, so far as consistent with securing unhesitating obedience, their authority should rest on moral suasion and their own good example. Although supported on every occasion by the authority of the officers, or, when that cannot be appealed to, by reversionary power of punishment in themselves, yet they should be regarded by the soldier more as elder brothers than as commanders over them. *In camp* they are at all times the eyes and hands of their immediate officer; they *ocularly* inspect every military action of the men, and by instructing the ignorant and warning the thoughtless or willful, prevent many an offense, for which the officer's only remedy must have been punishment. The well-disposed scarcely feel their influence, except as counsellors and friends, while the ill-disposed and indifferent find in the eyes always fixed upon them a constant check to those selfish practices which interfere with the comfort and efficiency, and, finally, endanger the safety of others. *On the march*, they encourage the weary, report for indulgence those who are worn out, and urge on the lazy, presenting to the reviewing eye of the officer ranks at proper distances and a column ready at any moment to form for battle and meet the enemy. *In battle*, they constitute the points which guide the movements of the men, and a slight word from their well-known voices, or a tap on the shoulder, will often bring to himself the man who might else have attempted to leave the ranks. While the corporals in front set an example of steadiness, the sergeants in the rear watch all the motions of their men, observing that they are not loading too many cartridges, that they take aim, and see something to fire at. In short, though good officers in small numbers are indispensable, good non-commissioned officers, in pretty large numbers, are even more so. Many a fine regiment has, at least temporarily, been ruined

by promoting its sergeants, when, either it did not contain the material for supplying their places, or (as sometimes happens) these new officers, good as they had been in their former posts, lacked the ability to form others on their own model.

Volunteer regiments almost always contain abundant material for making the best of non-commissioned officers; and it must be the first object of a commander who strives to bring his troops to perfection, to bring forward men apparently qualified, as he discovers them, and to have others numbered to supply their places at once, in case of accident, or to be promoted to them so soon as incapacity in any form shows itself.

In the course of this article, forms for reports * will be given, calculated to bring the daily efficiency of the non-commissioned officers and officers clearly before the regimental commander, *provided occasional but thorough and unexpected inspections of a few men or a squad are made* in order to secure their correctness.

Such reports punctually insisted on, will go far toward the desired end; still the colonel who expects to form a good cadre, has much more to do. Instruction of his officers by questioning and lectures on all subjects relating to their arm two or three times a week, is indispensable, both for the sake of the officers and also of the non-commissioned officers, who are in their turn to be instructed by the former. Half an hour, or even twenty minutes, will do wonders on these occasions. If the colonel be not already himself master of the subject, and have no brigadier to make him so, with what previous preparation he can find time for, it should be done. It is in vain for an officer so closely under the examination of his men, finally, to conceal any want of knowledge; and it will be better in all respects that it be first discovered in the lecture-room than in action. Beside these things, however, the colonel should keep a *conduct-book* of all the non-commissioned officers of his regiment; he should occasionally call them together for examination, instruction and drill, by himself; and again, while he shows no favor, except to military good conduct, and reduces to the ranks most promptly, whether for any decided dereliction of duty, or for a certain amount of demerit marks given for little short-comings, he, as the highest in the regiment, should set an example to the officers and men, by treating every soldier wearing chevrons with marked respect.

In connection with the subject of forming good cadres, it may be remarked that, beside ignorance of their duties, two great obstacles impede the efficiency of officers and non-commissioned officers of volunteer regiments as regards the enforcement of discipline. 1st. *Home associations.* They are embarrassed by their former relations with the men. They dislike to report them or find fault. In short, they look to a future accountability on returning to their native place. 2d. Very many of them cannot *command.* It is alway expostulation or threatening, "Please go," or "If you don't, I'll knock you down." The *spirit* of the former of these should never, and of the latter only under the most urgent circumstances, be exhibited in military orders of any kind.

* Omitted, but to be found in the "Army and Navy Journal," Oct. 22, 1864.

The remedy for the embarrassment consequent on former relations is simple and efficient, to wit: holding officers and non-commissioned officers to strict accountability,* and following every exhibition of its influence by the arrest or other punishment of the officer; and (whenever the fault does not readily yield) by reducing the non-commissioned officer to the ranks and making trial of another in his place. These means, if they be unflinchingly carried out, and be joined to a practice of bestowing blame for faults in an inferior upon the superior who permits them, are an infallible cure. They present the superior with a perfect and not to be rejected excuse, even with friends of friends at home, for exercising his authority, and give him also a most potent personal motive. The power of giving "commands" will be acquired more slowly, but all the minor etiquette of military life goes toward forming it; and if there be those above whose example shows self-control, earnestness in duty, and a consideration for the rights and feelings of others, the tone and habit are soon caught from them.

We have devoted so much space to the subject of *good* non-commissioned officers, because their existence is a *sine qua non* to the *good* discipline and *proper* care of a regiment. In concluding this part of our subject, we will quote from the late work of M. Vial, Professor at the Imperial Practical School of the General Staff in France, and perhaps the best *summary* of military art which has yet appeared:—

"In the infantry, an elementary group of eight or twelve men is formed, at the head of which is put a corporal; this is called a squad. Two squads form a half section of sixteen or twenty-five men under a sergeant.† Two half sections form a section commanded by a lieutenant, etcetera. The assemblage of these chiefs form the *cadres* of the Army. On the goodness of the *cadres* depends the value of the troops." Speaking of French regiments which have three battalions, he says: "Each regiment may form two *war* battalions by emptying the cadres of the 3d battalion into those of the two first." The cadres of the 3d battalion remain at home as a depot for receiving and instructing recruits. "This was done at the commencement of the

* It seems to us that the difference between the discipline of civil and military life may be said to be just the absence of non-commissioned officers in the former. Every duty is there allowed to be performed with a certain looseness. A general accountability to the principal superior answers every purpose. No doubt this impairs the aggregate productive power of society, but production is not society's chief object; the observance of little points is not a matter of life and death, and, also, such laxity is one condition of its reasonable freedom. This, however, is not the situation of an army; efficiency is its grand object, the neglect of small things may readily bring destruction, and the freedom (for the time being) of its constituents is in no way one of the elements of its prosperous existence. In the "bosses" to gangs of workmen we see some approach in civil life to the institution of non-commissioned officers, but "bossing" a squad will not answer army purposes.

† In the French infantry, a "*peloton*" is our company, a "section" our platoon, eight or six companies make a battalion, and two or three battalions a regiment. In their cavalry, six or eight men form a squad, whose non-commissioned officer is called a "*brigadier*," two such squads form a section, and he is then called a "*marechal des logis*." In their artillery, the detachment of a piece is the unit, and its non-commissioned officer called likewise "*marechal des logis*," the corporals "*brigadiers*."

Crimean War. Or two companies from each battalion may be thus emptied and their cadres remain. This was done for the war in Italy, and was adopted in 1860 as the permanent method.* When a reorganization of the Army becomes necessary, as in 1813–14, after the sad campaigns in Russia and Germany, the first battalions and first squadrons of each regiment are left in the field after transferring to them all the men fit for duty, then the *cadres* which remain are directed to the interior, there to receive and instruct recruits. Each one when filled up and the men drilled, returns to the Army."

Says Dufour, General-in-Chief of the Swiss Army, when it, in 1848, suppressed the rebellion of the "separate league" cantons, so similar to the rebellion of our seceding States, and author of a most excellent work, "Principles of Strategy and Grand Tactics," lately translated by Captain Craighill, U. S. A.: "The officers and non-commissioned officers constitute what is called the *cadre*. When this cadre is good, the company, even when composed of very raw soldiers, always does well whenever it comes into service; if the cadre be badly constituted the opposite result has place."

"Public opinion is for us the best means of discipline," says Vial, speaking of the French army. It is equally true of the American, but, like good cadres, a healthful public opinion is for volunteers (or any entirely new regiments) a thing *to be* formed. Such opinion goes hand in hand with a good cadre, but strange as it may seem a somewhat ungrateful means may also largely contribute to it. New soldiers are no critics, if the word mean, as its etymology imports, judges in military matters; and the offenses which are pardonable or unpardonable in military life, are decided to be such by a so different standard from what would be applied to them in civil society, that it is long ere new soldiers can understand its justice. Not until personal experience in the consequences of what seem trivial faults, committed by themselves or others, has taught them the reason why, do those lately from civil life fully appreciate the necessity for shooting the man who sleeps at his post, or severely punishing the sentry who halts for friendly conversation while on his beat. Until they attain this experience, punishment is necessary with many thoughtless though not badly disposed men, not as retribution for a sin, but to make them think before committing the offense, and to impress them with the light in which it is viewed in military life, so that they may learn to contemn it in their fellows.

Much has been said of the advantages of a West Point education. If it is supposed to include any extensive reading of military works, the mistake is great. Four years, commencing commonly at sixteen, a large part of which is devoted to mathematics and their kindred sciences, gives little time for such reading. The possession of a thor-

* One may ask whether among the myriads of points in which we have copied the French Army it would not have been well to include this. It may not be so, but every volunteer can answer for himself, as to what chance the cadre of a company kept in the birthplace of his regiment, and changed when advisable, would have had for keeping up the interest manifested when it first left home, and for maintaining the ranks filled with those who, after a few weeks' quiet drill, went to join comrades in whom they already felt an interest. Until this has been proved, we think the *volunteer* system has had no fair trial in our country.

ough knowledge of elementary mathematics is common also to many civilians. The two real advantages are, first, habits acquired in early life, which give an appreciation of discipline as to its essentials, the importance of its minutiæ, a faith in its effects, and an acquaintance with the word MUST; second, the study of those parts of the science of arms which constitute its A B C, at a like early period. This study resembles the A B C of the primer. A revolting drudgery to many minds, it is best gone through with before life is fairly entered upon. When begun later, it will likely be more or less shirked, and the want of a thorough basis will give a superficial character to after practice. Were the cadets to enter at twenty-five, their military education would lose one-half its value. Still, the medicine can be swallowed, and would be, by a great part of our volunteer officers, with a little pressure from their superiors; but, as we have said before, a great and crying evil has, from the beginning, been the want of instructors. The Army should from the first have been a great military school. There might have been at least one officer, thoroughly acquainted with military art, assigned to each brigade headquarters, not for command, but as a sort of professor to whom all the field officers should go to ask for explanations of their text books.

We have confined our illustrations to a regiment of infantry, but the *spirit* of the discipline and care of troops is the same for all arms; an additional column or two for horses, &c., would fit the tables for cavalry and artillery.

We cannot conclude without quoting the remark of a legal friend: "The great deficiency of the American character in a military view is, so far as I understand the case, *a dislike to accountability*. They dislike being accountable in their own persons, and continually shrink from exacting sharp accountability from others." How many passages in our present war have already illustrated this? How often is the country satisfied with a verdict of "accidentally mismanaged by somebody not mentioned?" Whereas, the essential organism of military affairs is, that everything belongs to the responsibility of some definite person, and that when things go wrong the appropriate person is called to account. What the punishment shall be depends on circumstances, but the case should always be traced and the responsibility exposed. Those who commute or remove the punishment, take, then, in their turn, the responsibility to their superiors or to the Nation for the effect of such laxity in discipline on the efficiency of the Army, and the extra number of lives necessary to terminate the war.

I subjoin a few passages on the qualifications of "officers," and the danger of their appointment by election. Oliver Wolcott, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, and one of the most zealous patriots of Connecticut, writes to his son, then Secretary of War to John Adams:

"I hope at least that no officer will be appointed by popular election, which is not otherwise than according to the quantity of grog given."

John Adams says:

"Envy, among the multitude, of men of learning, and a wish to exclude them from the public councils, and from military command, is indicated by the election of illiterate, awkward, illbred men for general and field officers. If this is the effect of popular elections, it is but a poor panegyric upon such elections." "An officer ought to be a gentleman of letters and general knowledge, a man of address and knowledge of the world. He should carry with him authority and command."

The patient and long suffering Washington remonstrates against selecting officers for their popularity.

"Gentlemen of character and liberal sentiments needed, nomination to depend on this rather than upon the men they can enlist. While the only merit is the number of men he can enlist, while those men consider and treat him as an equal, and in the character of an officer regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together in one herd, no order nor discipline can prevail." "In your appointments, I recommend you to guard against the officers and soldiers being too nearly on a level. Degrees of rank are transferred from civil life to the army. The proper criterion is whether the candidate has a just pretension to the character of a gentleman, a proper sense of honor, and a character to lose."

The brave young General Montgomery, who fell at Quebec, writes:

"I wish some method could be fallen upon of engaging *gentlemen* to serve. A point of honor and more knowledge of the world to be found in that class of men, would greatly reform discipline and render the troops much more tractable."

That thorough-going democrat, Elbridge Gerry, expresses himself thus strongly:

"A list of officers made by the Commander in Chief to be sent to their States by one of their members of Congress, who is to impress upon them the necessity of appointing gentlemen of education to military offices as a measure absolutely essential for saving the country."

I add a few extracts from an article in the Atlantic Monthly on "Regular and Volunteer Officers," by Col. T. W. Higginson, one of the most ardent lovers of liberty.

"The relation between officer and soldier is something so difficult in kind from anything which civil life has to offer, that it has proved almost impossible to transfer methods or maxims from the one to the other.

If a regiment is merely a caucus, and the colonel the chairman,—or merely a fire-company, and the colonel the foreman,—or merely a prayer-meeting, and the colonel the moderator,—or merely a bar-room, and the colonel the landlord,—then the failure of the whole thing is a foregone conclusion. War is not the highest of human pursuits, certainly; but an army comes very near to being the completest of human organizations, and he alone succeeds in it who readily accepts its inevitable laws and applies them. An army is an aristocracy, on a three years' lease, supposing that the period of enlistment. *No mortal skill can make military power effective on democratic principles.* A democratic people can perhaps carry on a war longer and better than any other; because no other can so well comprehend the object, raise the means, or bear the sacrifices. But these sacrifices include the surrender, for the time being, of the essential principle of the Government. Personal independence in the soldier, like personal liberty in the civilian, must be waived for the preservation of the nation."

"The first essential for military authority lies in the power of command,— a power which it is useless to analyze, for it is felt instinctively, and it is seen in its results. It is hardly too much to say, that, in military service, if one has this power, all else becomes secondary; and it is perfectly safe to say that without it all other gifts are useless. Now for the exercise of power there is no preparation like power, and nowhere is this preparation to be found in this community, except in regular army-training. Nothing but great personal qualities can give a man by nature what is easily acquired by young men of very average ability who are systematically trained to command." "The weak point of our volunteer service invariably lies here, that the soldier, in nine cases out of ten, utterly detests being commanded, while the officer, in his turn, equally shrinks from commanding. War, to both, is an episode in life, not a profession, and therefore military subordination, which needs for its efficiency to be fixed and absolute, is, by common consent, reduced to a minimum." "Hence the discipline of our soldiers has been generally that of a town-meeting or of an engine-company, rather than that of an army; and it shows the extraordinary quality of the individual men, that so much has been accomplished with such a formidable defect in the organization."

On the subject of examinations of officers, I insert a letter of Major General Casey, from the Army and Navy Journal.

Dear Sir:—In conversation with you a few days since, I promised to elaborate somewhat the ideas which I expressed with regard to the appointment of officers for colored troops.

Military men whose opinions are worth having will agree in this, that to have good and efficient troops, it is indispensable that we should have good officers. The material for soldiers which the loyal States have furnished during this rebellion, I have no hesitation in saying, is the best that the world has ever seen. Such men deserve to have officers to command them who have been educated to the military profession. But few men are really fit to command men who have not had such an education. In default of this, as a sufficient number of

such men cannot be found in the country, the number has to be made up from the best available material. In order to ascertain whether or not the aspirant possesses the proper knowledge and capacity for command, it is necessary that he should be examined by a board of competent officers. This fact, that the life and death of the men of the regiment is so intimately connected with the competence of its officers, is not sufficiently appreciated by the community.

The board for the examination of officers for colored troops, over which I preside, consider three things as indispensable before recommending an officer, viz: Good moral character, physical capacity, true loyalty to the country.

A person possessing these indispensable qualifications is now submitted to an examination as to his knowledge of tactics and capacity for command.

The following grades are entertained:—

	1*st Class.*	2*d Class.*	3*d Class.*
Colonel	.....	.....	.....
Lieutenant-Colonel	.....	.....	.....
Major	.....	.....	.....
Captain	.....	.....	.....
First-Lieutenant	.....	.....	.....
Second-Lieutenant	.....	.....	.....

and the recommendation for appointment made according to the applicant's merit.

We have endeavored, to the best of our ability, to make this recommendation without partiality, favor, or affection. We consider alone, in making our awards, the ability of the person to serve his country, in the duties appertaining to the office. If, in the opinion of the Board, the person is not possessed of sufficient knowledge or capacity to fill either of the above-named offices to the advantage of his country, he is rejected, notwithstanding any influence he may be able to bring to bear in his case. Let it be remembered that *zeal alone* is not sufficient; but what we require for a good officer is zeal, combined with knowledge. No ordinary man can fill the office of colonel of a regiment. To acquire that knowledge of tactics which would fit him to command his regiment as it ought to be in all situations, requires much study and practice, and it is by no means easy. He should, besides, possess good administrative qualities, in order that affairs should run smoothly in the regiment, and the officers and privates be as contented and happy as the circumstances admit.

Nor can too much trouble be taken properly to prepare persons to fill the responsible position of officers. Each State should have its Military Academy. In the meantime, much good can be done by instituting a school for the instruction of persons (especially those who have had some experience in the service,) who may have the requisite capacity and zeal to serve their country with advantage. Eschew all humbuggery, and mere pretension, and let merit be the test of advancement. Let it be impressed deeply on the conscience of every man of influence or authority that when he places in command an incompetent officer, he is guilty of *manslaughter*.

The country has lost millions of treasure, and thousands of lives, by

the incompetence of officers. We have many enemies on this earth, besides the Southern rebels. The fate of free institutions, not only in our own country, but in other lands—the destinies of millions unborn—depend upon our ability to maintain this contest to a successful issue, against all our enemies, both foreign and domestic.

The system of examination instituted by this Board, in my opinion, should be extended to the white, as well as colored troops.

Many of those who have been unsuccessful in the examination before the Board, have, no doubt, in some cases, felt aggrieved, as also their friends. We have established a system for examination of officers, the good effects of which are already apparent in the organization of the colored regiments in the front.

In the performance of the responsible and not always agreeable duties, as presiding over this Board, I have always endeavored to be guarded by a conscientious regard for the good of the country, and I have every confidence that a just and intelligent public will award to us the just measure of their approbation.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Major-General U. S. Vols.

I have now presented the most authoritative testimony as to the defects in our old system, and as to the measures necessary to remedy those defects and to establish an efficient Militia. As one, if not the chief obstacle in the way of reform, has been the divided authority of the Congress and the State Governments, I refer once more to the clause in the Constitution defining the powers of Congress over the Militia, before attempting to digest the propositions for its improvement.

"Congress shall have power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

A comparison of the comments upon the old system, and of the remedies suggested for its defects, leads me to the following conclusions:

1. That the Militia must be reduced to a reasonable number.
2. That they must be uniformly organized.
3. That arms and equipments must be furnished.
4. That a system of Tactics should be framed expressly for the Militia, and books distributed.
5. That a General Militia Staff should be created, consisting of an assistant to each branch of the Regular Army Staff.

6. That Congress should decide upon the exemptions from military service.

7. That officers elected should not be commissioned until pronounced upon by a board of officers, who shall examine into their qualifications; that their fidelity and success should be tested by inspections; that they should be obliged to hold their commissions a specified term before eligible for promotion, and before allowed to resign. That no commission above that of Colonel should be issued in time of peace, unless required by State Constitutions.

8. That the Militia under arms should be subject to a rigid code.

9. That competent instructors should be appointed to instruct the commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

10. That the active Militia should be compensated for service.

11. That rudimentary instruction in Tactics should form part of the course in every public school.

That the unreasonable number of the Militia was the primary cause of the failure of the system, is self evident, and all authorities concur in this opinion. The only question is, by what mode and to what extent shall that number be reduced.

The simplest plan, and one free from constitutional scruples, is for Congress to fix upon the number deemed adequate for present exigencies; to ascertain by the Census, or by returns from the States, between what ages this number is included; and to pass an Act, limiting the military age in accordance. There are two objections to this mode, conclusive objections. First, to reconcile the citizens to serve in the Militia for a few years in time of peace,—such service to render them efficient involving a serious interruption to their necessary pursuits,—you must reduce the number so interrupted, to the minimum absolutely needed to secure safety to life and property in event of riots or any sudden emergency, leaving a reserve force to be called out in event of invasion, or insurrection, or any more permanent disturbance of the peace. But this scheme would deprive the Federal or State Government of any further support, by the enrollment of none but the active Militia, and we should have to await the assembling of Congress, the passage of an Act extending the period of service, the slow process of a new enrollment

and a new organization, before the Militia could be increased. Another objection to this mode of reducing the number would be the unequal distribution of the Militia.

In some of the Western States where the male population, and the younger portion of the male population, bears the greatest ratio to the whole, and where they are exclusively employed at home, and where, moreover, from the nature of their pursuits, the people are more scattered and military meetings more onerous,—the number would be in excess of their needs in time of peace, and unreasonably oppressive ;—while, on the other hand, in the Atlantic States, where the proportion of males to females, of young men to old men, is the smallest, and where a considerable fraction of this small number are engaged in maritime pursuits, the force would be inadequate to suppress riots in our cities, or to meet sudden danger, more imminent on the sea board than elsewhere.

It seems to me that the most practicable and equitable mode of reduction, would be for Congress, leaving the enrollment as it stands, and fixing upon the fraction they consider adequate, to enact that one tenth, or one eighth, or whatever portion, *shall be trained*, leaving the selection of ages, between eighteen and forty-five, to the discretion of the States, and leaving it also optional with them to increase the number if their circumstances render it desirable.

By demanding active service of a fraction of the male population between eighteen and forty-five, you distribute the burden more equitably and more in accordance with the needs of the States, than by exacting it of the same aggregate number, commencing at eighteen and ending at the age which would include such number. By leaving it discretionary with the States to demand service of any between eighteen and forty-five, you enable them to contract the military districts, (and thus avoid one of the objections which have been urged against a classified Militia,) and to distribute the force more in proportion to their local needs. Some of the densely populated States, with large cities, might avail of the liberty to train a larger number than required by Congress. And by this mode of reducing the number of active Militia, you do not deprive yourself of the services of the larger number left on the roll when any possible circumstances render a larger force necessary. But is a classification of,

or selection from the Militia within the power of Congress? It seems to me the power to provide for the organizing and disciplining the Militia implies the power to define, in some way, the number to be organized and disciplined, and to distribute that number among the States in the mode Congress decide upon as the most equitable. We have high authority for the constitutionality of such an act;—Hamilton, General Knox, (or rather Washington,) and Madison, having severally advised the classification of the Militia. They surely would not have urged a measure they deemed unconstitutional, however desirable it might have seemed to them.

Congress must arrange the Militia into divisions, brigades, regiments. General Gaihes and other military writers recommend that the organization of the Militia should conform to that of the army. At all events it should be uniform throughout the States, as to rank of officers, numbers of rank and file, numbers of companies in a regiment, &c., &c.

The Militia being organized, the next duty of Congress is to arm and equip them; a measure now possible if the Militia be reduced to 4 or 500,000, although down to the second year of this war, the supply was utterly inadequate. The old Militia could not be fully armed, and the want of uniformity in the weapons they had, was one of the many impediments in the way of their improvement.

The experience of this war will have indicated the needed correction of our System of Tactics. There must be many officers of our regular or volunteer army competent to compile a simple, concise system, adapted to the wants of the Militia, containing all the essential instruction in tactics, camp discipline, &c., and omitting all they need not attempt. Congress can print and distribute these books of Tactics among the States, so as to establish an uniform system of drill and discipline.

I insert a few opinions on the judicious training of a Militia. Sir Charles Napier, a master soldier, says to British volunteers:

1. To face right and left by word of command.
2. To march in line and column.
3. To extend and close files as light infantry, with 'supports.'
4. To change front in extended and in close order.
5. To relieve the skirmishers.
6. To form solid squares and 'rallying squares.'
7. To form an advanced guard.

"These seven things are all that you require; do not let any one persuade you to learn more." "Let the target practice be constant. Also habituate your corps to take long marches of from fifteen to twenty miles, with arms and ammunition on; and also in running, or what is called 'double quick time.' These must be arrived at by gradually increasing from small distances. No single man, much less a body of men, can make these exertions without training. Also subscribe for premiums to those who are the best shots."

Louis Napoleon, in an 'Essay on the Swiss System,' says—

"In the exercise of the Prussian Landwehr, the commanding officers seek rather to give the soldiers an exact idea of war, than to train them to methodical manœuvres. As to the infantry, the object would be to train them as sharp-shooters, to the passage of defiles and rivers, to the attack and defense of villages and advanced posts, to surprises, to protection of convoys, rather than to exact and precise evolutions."

Military Training.

A writer in the Army and Navy Journal, on "Military Training," questions the practical use of too great precision of movement laboriously inculcated on recruits, as more likely to throw them into confusion in the field, where some of the conditions will be changed.

The commonly received idea of military training extends no further than the daily monotonous routine of squad, company, and battalion drill, the excellence of which has for its measure the mathematical precision with which each movement is executed. This precision is only acquired after a long course of the most assiduous teaching, and cannot be kept up without constant and laborious practice. When it is considered that the object of all this labor is to fit the soldier for duty on the field of battle, and enable him to perform his part, without confusion, in such changes of position or formation as may be expedient for the purposes of attack or defense, it becomes a serious question whether this absolute precision of movement which is so imposing and admirable on the parade ground, is essential to efficiency in the field; or, to go further—whether the system of training which aims at mathematical precision of movement, so far from being necessary, or even advantageous, is not in its tendency absolutely injurious to practical efficiency.

It will be readily understood how an apparent perfection may be really an imperfection, when it is considered that the condition of troops on the field of battle does not admit of the preservation of perfect unbroken order, nor of perfect mathematical precision of movement. Is it not likely that troops so taught will when first placed in circumstances requiring a departure from their preconceived ideas, be apt to consider all deviations from the precision of parade as evidences of mismanagement and failure? The more perfect the parade

training has been, the greater will be the influence of this idea of their incapacity for acting together with effect, under conditions which had never been anticipated in their previous experience. It is not unlikely that a highly-drilled battalion, which a long course of assiduous training in the art of parade evolutions had rendered the model for an army, might when first brought in conflict with an enemy, be found more difficult to manage than an undrilled levy, having no other training than such practical lessons in united action as could be acquired during a few months of actual warfare.

Campaigning experience soon teaches the soldier that unity of action is not incompatible with broken ranks and a very considerable looseness of movement. But this knowledge is acquired in the field, and does not constitute any of the lessons which both officers and men have spent so much time in learning on the parade ground.

It seems to me that in order that troops may be fitted in their training for the actual operations for which they are destined, the method of executing battalion movements on the parade ground should be so modified, as to be made to resemble, as nearly as possible, the manner in which the usual conditions of war render it necessary that these movements must be executed in the field. This will not only accustom the soldier to those irregularities and deviations from uniformity which must occur during field service, but will divest the process of teaching troops field exercises and evolutions of the laborious character it now has. After recruits have been drilled to act together, and have been taught the few and simple methods by which all possible changes of position and all useful changes of formation may be effected, very little time, compared with what is now required, need be devoted to the practice of these methods.

The modifications which should be made in the present system of drill, in order to facilitate the management of troops when they are required to move loosely, and with the order of their formation more or less deranged, cannot be particularized here; but a few of the expedients which may be made use of may serve as suggestions for the development of a system of drill more consonant with the requirements of the service.

The equalizing of companies when practicing battalion movements should be avoided, particularly where double-column movements and the formation of squares constitute the exercise. The latter being required on the field of battle, after the troops have been for some time under fire and many casualties have taken place, the manœuvre has to be executed under circumstances which render the symmetrical formation of the parade ground impracticable: consequently, it is very essential that the formation of squares should always be practiced with companies of unequal strength.

Changes of front and other manœuvres should be practiced by successive as well as simultaneous movements of companies, from a caution passed from company to company, without a general word of command being given.

To enable the captains of companies to properly superintend the movements and correct the errors of their men, to make the necessary changes in the order of the formation of their companies, for the passage of obstacles, and to see that the commands are properly exe-

cuted, it is essential that they should be permitted to use their own discretion in changing their places and going to whatever point may appear most convenient for the proper government of their companies. This is an improvement which has for some time been strongly urged by many officers of the British army, for introduction into that service.

Battalions should be practiced at deploying with intervals between the companies. The line should then be marched to the front, the men of each company opening out on the march to fill the intervals. At the command "halt," they should close on their right files. This will teach the soldier that a certain degree of looseness and irregularity of movement has no tendency to create confusion, and is entirely compatible with the necessary rapidity and perfect accuracy of formation.

In the manœuvres practiced and the discipline enforced, it would be well to bear in mind the advice of General Gaines:—

"Every measure of military preparation in peace, not strictly applicable to a state of war, should be held as radically wrong, useless or mischievous."

Modified Infantry Tactics.

According to the Army and Navy Journal, General Morris seems to have compiled the very work needed. It has already been adopted by one division of the New York Militia.

At the opening of the great conflict, the majority of our soldiers had not only to make war, but to learn how to make war. Moreover, the conditions under which they were compelled to fight necessitated entirely new adaptations of the existing rules and discipline of warfare. While in a state of peace the tight, constraining uniform, the heavy padded saddle, the large, costly tent, the short-range musket, and the complicated, fatiguing, tedious and imposing rectilinear system of tactics were regarded as sufficiently good, being in imitation of European customs, and our own experience in the field not having suggested useful changes. But the theatre of our present war, covering a vast extent of country containing forests, swamps and mountains, our campaigns differ widely in many respects from those of thickly-settled Europe. Our troops are compelled to take long marches, and frequently to manœuvre and form lines of battle in dense woods, where the only practicable method is to march battalions and subdivisions by their *flanks*, and where simultaneous movements are impossible. Battalion and higher commanders have consequently been forced to adopt "flank movements." A distinguished corps commander at one time remarked, while conversing on this subject: "Here we are in the field with virtually *no* tactics."

General Morris, desiring to increase the efficiency of his command, reduced these movements to a system, which he published under the

title of "Field Tactics for Infantry." The work was well received by officers of high rank, and many of them requested the General to make the system complete, by adding the Schools of the Soldier and Company. This he has accordingly done. First discarding everything in the old systems which was not of *use in the field*, he then modified those movements retained, so as to substitute the march of subdivisions by their *flank* instead of by their front, and also to prescribe in all cases, the *shortest* paths, instead of the square work of former days. Besides this, he has added some few movements to make the system complete, and has reduced the work to two volumes containing only about five hundred pages.

At the time "Hardee's Tactics" were prepared from French translations, it was thought that the short rifle would become the general arm for infantry. The manual of arms was consequently made to suit it. The arm in almost universal use at present is the rifled musket. General Morris has revised the manual of arms so as to be applicable for this piece. He has simplified the School of the Company, and has omitted much which he regarded as superfluous. The column by company having ceased to be employed, except on occasions of ceremony, many movements have been discarded which were formerly prescribed for that formation. He has taken care to reject what has been found by experience to be superfluous commands, and has omitted such portions of commands as seemed unnecessary. The "fixed pivot" in wheels has been abolished. In the Schools of the Battalion and the Brigade, in order that their object may be more easily understood by the student, the movements and evolutions have been so arranged, when practicable, that each leads to the one succeeding.

The habitual march of infantry being in a column of fours—formed by facing the battalion in line, to the right or left—many of the movements are prescribed from a column so marching, in order to avoid the unnecessary delay of intermediate intricate movements; and also not to arrest the march of the column still on the road. The tabular form used by General Le Louterel of the French Army, and successfully employed by Captain Coppee in his admirable abridgment of infantry tactics, is adopted in the brigade evolutions, to distinguish the commands of the general and of the colonels, and the order in which those of the latter follow those of the former. It is an arrangement which has been found valuable also, as an aid for the memory.

Although this system has been prepared for troops in the field where woods and swamps abound and columns have to march along narrow roads, it is equally applicable for open country.

The chief objects which General Morris has sought to attain are *celerity*, *simplicity*, and the *least fatigue to the men.*

General Morris is well fitted for the important task of preparing a system of tactics. He has received a thorough military education at West Point, has served in the field throughout the entire war, has commanded the company, the battalion, the brigade, and the division of infantry; and has had under his command, at various times, troops of all the arms in service.

The typography of the book is original and admirable; and every movement is illustrated by simple diagrams.

One lesson taught by this war, is the necessity of learning the care and use of arms; and the wonderful results of moderate practice under the Hythe system, prove the importance of adopting that practice as part of the drill to increase the efficiency of infantry. To quote once more from Russell's "Rifle Clubs."

"Mr. Whitworth's experiments show how certain a man in possession of these attributes (a firm hand and a cool eye), should be of killing another at the distance of three quarters of a mile, provided there is no great amount of wind to divert the course of the bullet." "There is no reason indeed (except the natural results of human nervousness on the part of a man when shot at) to prevent a battalion, with a front of 400 rank and file, killing every one of an opposing body of the same strength at 500 yards' distance by one discharge; but that is a degree of perfection which is not likely to be speedily attained in legitimate homicide."

To accomplish and maintain the organization, arming, and discipline of the Militia, a Federal Militia Staff is needed, and should consist of an assistant attached to each branch of the General Army Staff, devoted exclusively to the Militia. The Adjutant General would furnish and transmit to the State Adjutant Generals all orders, regulations, blanks, &c., correspond with them on all matters of interest; he would receive their returns and reports, keep a record of the Militia, its numbers and state of discipline, and report from time to time to the Secretary of War. The Ordnance General would furnish the States with arms and equipments, would inspect their arsenals and report upon their condition when necessary.

The Inspector General would inspect the Militia as often as possible, and his reports (through the Adjutant General) would convey to the Federal Government reliable information as to the efficiency of the Militia, and as to the neglect of any State to train its quota according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. A judicious and experienced officer in this position could do more to encourage and stimulate the Militia, to direct their efforts, to ascertain and point out their defects, to discover and bring to punishment unworthy or unfit officers,—in short, to organize and discipline the Militia on an uniform plan, and to raise the standard of excellence, than could be effected by any other means. General Scott, General Gaines, and other competent military authorities, advise the formation of this general Militia Staff, as a means of providing the Federal Government with necessary

information, of making the States accountable, for rendering the Militia efficient.

Congress can establish and thereby diminish the list of exemptions, which have been unreasonably extended by the States, so as to absolve many of the very persons whose service is most important. The example of Switzerland is to be followed in this respect, to find for each citizen appropriate service as far as possible; the most devout clergymen to perform the duties of Chaplains, the most learned lawyers to be appointed Judge Advocates, the most skillful surgeons to give their services, the most upright merchants to act as Paymasters, the most efficient business men to be Quartermasters and Commissaries, the most skilled mechanics to be Artificers, the best educated engineers to fill their places in the Staffs, and so on;—but no able bodied man of proper age exempt, and the limit of age for rank and file not to apply to officers. Another article from the Swiss system must be adopted to bring home to every citizen the personal duty of Militia service; that is, to allow *no substitutes*. And to enforce this personal responsibility still further, General Knox's or Washington's recommendation that a certificate of Militia service "shall be required as an indispensable qualification for exercising any of the rights of a free citizen, until after the age of —— years"— should be followed, if the Militia is an indispensable institution.

When Congress has provided arms and equipments, and books of instruction; when it has organized the Militia, by arranging and subdividing it; when under this power, or under that of providing for its discipline, it has fixed upon the number to be trained, and by the establishment of a general Militia Staff it has provided means to perfect its organization and discipline;—when it has declared who shall be exempt from liability to service;— its authority over the Militia is ended, unless indeed it has the power under the head of discipline, to subject the Militia when under arms to penalties and punishments for neglect or disobedience. Congress has express power to govern the Militia when in Federal service; but when assembled for drill, or in camps by order of the State Commander in Chief, they must be subject to the military code of the State.

To the States is reserved the appointment of officers, and the

authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, and without their faithful discharge of these duties, all reforms enacted by Congress will be nullified.

That *good officers make good soldiers*, says General Scott, is a maxim which has the support of universal experience. It seems from the testimony of Washington, John Adams, Oliver Wolcott, Elbridge Gerry, Generals Montgomery, Knox, Swift, Brigadier De Peyster, Wolfe Tone, and some others,—that not only our Militia officers, but also many of our Army officers, during the Revolution, were unfit for their position, and that their inferiority was one cause of the inefficiency of the Army and of the downfall of the Militia; and some of these writers attribute this inferiority to the fact of their election. One of the first articles of the Swiss Military System is "*that the Militia is under no circumstances a deliberative body.*" Election implies discussion and probability of a re-election if the electors become dissatisfied. The officer is elected by his men to *lead* and not to *command* them; it is a proof of his *influence*, but not a guarantee of his *authority*. On the contrary, it entails a dependence upon the good will of his command, incompatible with absolute authority, subversive of military discipline. We are wont to speak of our civil officers as the *servants* of the people, their electors. Napoleon declared no army could be successful, if composed of *baionettes raisonnantes;* and one of the members of our Federal War Committee confessed to the writer, that this war had made him an unwilling convert to the truth of this statement. One of our officers, of all men least likely to arrive at such a conclusion, unless forced upon him by inexorable facts, has given us as the result of his experience, that "*no mortal skill can make military power effective on democratic principles.*" "Personal independence in the soldier, like personal liberty in the civilian, must be waived for the preservation of the nation." "The weak point of our volunteer service invariably lies here, that the soldier, in nine cases out of ten, utterly detests being commanded, while the officer, in his turn, equally shrinks from commanding."

Reflect upon the manifold requirements of an officer, administrative, judicial, executive;—the preservation of health, the promotion of comfort, the exaction of discipline, the judicious

allotments of rewards and punishments, the cheerful endurance of hardship, the silent, prompt submission to orders however unreasonable, the faithful supervision and accurate and punctual rendering of all orders and returns, the orderly preservation of all documents ;—these are some of the duties of an officer to himself and to those intrusted to his care, besides his more conspicuous and obvious duties as a skillful tactician and a courageous leader, and the list is comprehensive enough to show that only long training or a rare combination of virtues and talents will qualify a man for the position.

The objections to the election of officers are twofold ; first, the unnatural relation it creates between the commander and the commanded ; second, the risk of the promotion of unworthy or unqualified candidates. The first objection is to an inherent defect in the system,—the second objection rests upon the belief that election would be superseded by some more infallible mode of selection, which might not after all be adopted even if it could be proposed, and I do not therefore discuss it. As the privilege of the election of officers is guaranteed by the Constitution of Massachusetts, and by public opinion of all the States, I have dwelt on this subject only to point out the tendency of this mode of appointment to impair the authority of the officer, and the probability that by this as by any other practicable mode, inefficient officers will be introduced ;—in order that, knowing the dangers, we may take every means to guard against them.

The first measure to be adopted by the State Governments against incompetency, is the appointment of a Board of Officers of character and experience, such as may be found in every State at the present time, to examine rigidly every officer elect, and pronounce upon his fitness for the position, their decision to be final.

The second measure is an acquiescence of the State Governments for the sake of uniformity and efficiency, in a system of inspection under the direction of a Federal Inspector General of Militia, the State Inspector General to be appointed by the State Executive, with the approval of the Federal Chief, and to carry into execution a Federal System devised for the United States Militia. A rigid inspection annually, or at shorter

intervals, by a discreet and discerning officer, whether of the Regular or the Volunteer Army, would do more to test the qualifications of officers than any examination beforehand which might be got through with successfully by an intelligent candidate, though he lack some of the first essentials of an officer. The Reports of the State Inspector General would enable the State Commander in Chief to distinguish between the martinet and the sloven, between the faithful and the impostor, between those who had *a faculty* for military command, and those who had none ; and he should have the power to act upon the information peremptorily.

The third measure to strengthen the hands of the officer, would be to subject the Militia when under arms to a more rigid penal code, to the Army regulations, except that no punishment is to extend to life or limb unless when in actual State or Federal service. To call men from their necessary avocations, under the pretense of teaching them the duties of a soldier, without enforcing strict obedience by due penalties and punishments ;—heavy fines, sentence by court martial publicly announced, imprisonment, deprivation of civil rights ;—punishments that will inflict disgrace in proportion to the offense, —is worse than useless ;—it exposes officers to insult, deprives them of the power of fulfilling their duties, it exasperates the respectable men disposed to perform this important service, it imposes a burden on the country without any compensation. I have given extracts to show that in other countries the Militia are subjected to severe discipline.

A fourth measure of great importance to be taken by the State Governments is to retain officers tested by examinations and inspections for a sufficient length of time in the position to which they have been elevated before their promotion or their resignation is granted ; except when ill health or change of abode makes continuance in office impossible. Applications for a discharge should be severely scrutinized, the ill health certified to by a reputable medical authority, the officer removing from one part of the State to another should be held to Militia service in the district to which he transfers himself. The greater permanency of a commission would render it more acceptable to men of character, and the higher grades would be only attainable to men fitted to fill them.

Another measure has been advocated by many officers of experience, whose opinions have been already quoted, and has the sanction of the Swiss system;—namely, to grant no commissions above that of Colonel; but where Brigades or Divisions are manœuvred, to place them for the time under the command of one of the Colonels, selected by seniority, or by rotation, or for especial excellence, thus leaving the higher grades to be earned when war shall have given a sufficient opportunity to prove the ability which could hardly be developed in time of peace. The Constitution of Massachusetts would not admit of this reform, but it seems a most desirable one in States where the election of Generals is not prescribed.

Thus, tested by examinations and inspections, supported by a severe penal code, confirmed by a long apprenticeship; and, if possible, although allowed to rise only to the high and responsible rank of Commander of a Regiment, yet granted the occasional privilege of manœuvering a Brigade or Division; our officers selected from a better composed Militia than existed under the system of State exemptions and insignificant fines, and volunteers absorbing all that was left of the educated and the ambitious; would at least be respectable.

At the present moment, or after the close of this war, experienced officers may be induced to accept commissions in the Militia, and would be readily elected. But under ordinary circumstances, both officers and men would need instruction in tactics and discipline in camp; and different schemes have been proposed for bestowing this instruction, some writers advocating instruction to officers and men, others confining it to the officers commissioned and non-commissioned. In the English Militia and Volunteers, instruction in drill is imparted by non-commissioned officers, old army sergeants, kept in constant pay; and we could easily adopt this mode now, the State availing of the services of disabled volunteers who could thus earn a pension. After a long peace, it might be necessary for the States to make application to the Federal Government for instructors; commissioned officers to instruct the officers of the Militia in tactics, in the police and discipline of camps, in the care of their men on the march, in the principles of field fortifications, &c. &c., as well as non-commissioned officers to drill recruits in the school of

the soldier and the company. And upon application, it would be the duty of the Federal Government to furnish such instructors.

The proportion of the different arms, Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, should be left to the discretion of the States, local circumstances dictating the forms of service most needed and best adapted to the habits of the people.

In a Report made by Brigadier General Bernard, and Major (since Brigadier General) Totten, of our Engineer Corps, in 1826; they advise a larger proportion of Foot and Horse Artillery in our seaboard States, the former to prepare themselves to man the fortifications in event of a sudden danger, by practice at the great guns, the latter suited to repel any minor attack, or to frustrate an attempt to land along the shore. General McClellan, in the preface to his "Report on Military Systems," concurs in this advice.

As the State Commander in Chief is generally a civilian, it is of great importance that the officers of his Staff should be either graduates of West Point, or officers who have been in active service. Above all, the Inspector General should be selected for his thorough military training, as well as for his keenness and discretion; for the creation and maintenance of a truly efficient Militia depends upon the independence, fidelity and ability with which this officer performs his duty. Fortunately, there are many such officers partially disabled by wounds, whose services in the field have fitted and have entitled them to such an appointment.

As the arms and equipments—by which I intended those articles appertaining to the arms, cartridge box, cap pouch, bayonet sheath, &c., called more properly accoutrements—are to be provided by the Federal Government; the States ought to furnish uniforms and other equipments upon such conditions as will best insure their safe keeping. The active Militia ought also to be compensated to a certain degree for the time occupied in drills and camp duties, the State providing such compensation.

These are all the measures to be taken by the Federal or State Governments to create a Militia at once,—but as General Harrison observes, in his admirable report,—if these should be adopted, "it will be advancing but a single step towards the attainment of the important object." He adverts to the most formidable

obstacle to success; the greater restlessness of Americans under restraint than is to be met with in the subjects of a monarchy, and he attributes the little progress made in training the Militia to the disgust and vexation experienced by full grown men in being subjected to the observance for the first time of the minute particulars necessary to be observed in the initiatory lessons of the military art, particulars which have no apparent object, but which form the links of a beautiful and connected system. He concludes, with General Knox, that the only foundation of an energetic Militia, is the military education of the youth of the country.

Not only the veteran Gen. Knox, and Gen. Harrison whose long experience as an officer qualified him to speak with understanding; but also General Swift, who was connected with the West Point Academy, as Superintendent and in other capacities; Wolfe Tone, who had not only served with distinction under Napoleon, but had also been an Instructor of Cavalry in the Grand Army; as well as several writers of less authority; have strongly urged the military education of boys at school and college. They contend that the rudiments of all learning are more readily acquired in youth and more indelibly impressed, and this is especially true where the training is physical as well as mental; that the time necessary to learn the manual and a few simple manœuvres of the company and the battalion cannot well be spared by busy men nor better spent by school boys; that the "habitual sense of duty inculcated in early life is more to be relied upon for good effects, than precepts and example can ensure when delayed till manhood;" that being brought up to consider the military service as a national duty, upon the faithful discharge of which their privileges as citizens depend, and having mastered the rudiments of drill so indescribably irksome to full grown men, these youths will take their turn in the Militia as a matter of course, and attain a greater degree of efficiency than is possible to those who defer instruction to a later age.

This important subject attracted the attention of the Legislature of Massachusetts, and was by them referred to the State Board of Education, a Committee of whom, consisting of His Excellency Governor Andrew, Hon. Emory Washburn, ex-Governor of Massachusetts, and Hon. Joseph White, the Secretary

of the Board; made a Report, January, 1864, setting forth the importance and the practicability of introducing military instruction as a part of the course in our Public Schools, of which excellent Report I subjoin extracts.

In respect to that branch of the Resolve which relates to the organization of the scholars in the Public Schools throughout the Commonwealth for the purposes of military drill, the committee are unanimous that it is greatly desirable, and also possible to an extent which might not appear at first view.

First. It is believed to be highly desirable as a means of physical culture and training.

It is a fact which must be acknowledged by all, that, with all the excellencies of our systems of public instruction, there has been a marked neglect of anything like a systematic training of the physical powers. The growth of the intellectual nature has been stimulated and fostered, while the bodily powers have been left without care, until the effects upon both were becoming everywhere apparent to the observing. Happily the note of warning has been raised, and the public mind turned to the vital importance of returning in our processes of education to the precepts and practices of the wisest educators of all ages, and of cultivating with equal care both mind and body, and thus securing a higher and nobler manhood. Now, it is believed that no other system of physical training affords superior advantages for this end than the military drill.

It gives an erect attitude, an expanded chest, an elastic, vigorous, and manly carriage, and above all, the most perfect command of the will over all the bodily powers. Moreover, it forms habits of obedience the most prompt and exact, and thus greatly aids in giving to the moral nature its rightful and just control. The statements already given by Mr. Williams and the school committee of Brookline are explicit and satisfactory on this point.

Second. It is desirable as a cheap and efficacious method of diffusing a practical military education. In respect to the pressing need of such an education, as a resource in times of imminent peril from domestic as well as foreign foes, the events through which our nation has been passing for the last two years and a half, speak with a voice too plain to be misunderstood, and too potent to be longer disregarded. We have been startled from a false security, which we fondly dreamed would last forever, and taught at a terrible cost the lesson, which the Father of his country and his compatriots had learned in field and camp, and enunciated so earnestly, that "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."

The lesson is indeed a sad one, but more sad will be the failure to heed it. The millennium has not come, as some of us have dreamed. The glad day when the "sword shall be beaten into the ploughshare, and the spear into the pruning-hook," has not yet dawned upon the nations. Still, as in the dreary past, if men would sit unmolested under their "own vine and fig-tree," they must be prepared to guard and defend them; still, if nations would maintain an independent position in the earth, they must be prepared to do it, if need be, by the

bayonet. Let us, then, give good heed to the lesson. Avoiding past mistakes, let us guard well against future ones.

From these and similar considerations, we are deeply impressed with the importance of taking immediate steps to diffuse through the community, as widely as possible, the largest practicable amount of knowledge pertaining to the use of arms and to military discipline. And the practical question is, How can this be done best and cheapest?

The experiment at Brookline, and similar ones in several academies and private schools with like results, seem to the committee, to indicate that we must look to the Public Schools as furnishing the best as well as the cheapest instrumentalities for securing this end.

The Public Schools are maintained at the public expense, in order to prepare youth for the duties of citizenship. One of these duties is to aid in the defense of the Government whenever and however assailed. Surely, then, there is no incongruity, no want of reason, in introducing into the schools such studies and modes of discipline as shall prepare for the discharge of this, equally with the other duties which the citizen owes to the State.

But can this be done without detriment to progress in other branches? Can it be done without loss of time? The committee are satisfied that it can, and that thereby a large amount of practical knowledge and discipline in military affairs may be attained; and, at the same time, a very great saving of time and labor be effected, which, under a system of adult training, would be withdrawn from the productive industry of the community.

If, then, the introduction of the military drill into the Public Schools has been made to appear desirable, both as a system of physical training, and as a simple and cheap method of diffusing military knowledge throughout the community, the only point remaining for consideration is whether it can be *generally* introduced, and without serious expense to the towns.

On this point, there can remain no doubt in respect to the cities, and the larger and more compactly settled towns; especially those which maintain a High School or Grammar Schools throughout the year. Brookline is a fair type of this class of towns, in respect to facilities afforded for such an experiment.

With respect to the remaining towns, the facilities are less obvious. Their large extent of territory, the comparative sparseness of the population, and above all, their unfortunate subdivision into small school districts, with short schools, and rapidly changing teachers, most of whom are females, would seem, at first sight, to present insuperable obstacles in the way of success; but, on further examination, we think it will be found that these obstacles may be readily overcome. There will be no serious difficulty in uniting in one company the boys of contiguous school districts, and in arranging such times and places for drill as shall be convenient for all. There will be returned soldiers and officers in each town, competent and ready to give instruction in the manual of arms and company drill, either gratuitously or for a reasonable consideration; and the arms should be supplied by the Commonwealth, inasmuch as the instruction given is for the common benefit. As a fitting close to this imperfect discussion, the following paragraphs are given from the very interesting Report made by the

Secretary of the Board of Agriculture of his visit to Europe in 1862, showing that Switzerland—the only country on that continent having political institutions like our own—has already adopted, and successfully maintains a system of military instruction in her Public Schools, similar to that herein suggested. He says :—

"This branch of the studies of the young is regarded as of the most vital importance to the safety and the stability of the republic. Theirs is a government of the people, and the sacrifices they make to educate themselves in the art of war, show how jealously they guard their liberties by being always prepared to defend them."

"The amount and thoroughness of military instruction in the schools vary somewhat in the different cantons, though in all the cantonal schools military instruction is given. In Berne, for example, the cantonal schools rank somewhat like the grammar and higher-grade Public Schools in Boston, or the large towns generally in Massachusetts. They are open to all boys upon examination. All the boys in these schools are organized with military corps, and officered from their own class, but provided by Government with special military instructors, and furnished with small muskets, rifles or carbines, suitable to the strength and age of the boys; or, if organized into artillery corps, they are supplied with small side arms and field pieces, which they can wield without difficulty."

"For these arms arsenals are provided by the Government, and custodians are appointed to keep them safely and in good condition when not in actual use. The military instructors are officers of the federal military organization, educated men, who have seen service, and who are *au fait* in the theory and art of war. The time devoted to military studies and training in the manual exercises varies with the season and in the various cantons. During the summer about three half-days in the week is the average time. There is also an occasional general muster, when all turn out together and occupy a spacious parade-ground. Then the whole population of parents and friends, as well as the cantonal authorities, turn out for a holiday, to witness the nascent valor and heroism of the republic."

"It should be added, that all these cantonal cadets wear a simple and modest stripe for a uniform, and one or two bright buttons, which cost almost nothing, but give the wearers a soldierly pride and love for this branch of their studies."

In view of all the facts bearing upon the matter referred to them, the committee respectfully suggest that the Board recommend to the honorable Legislature the passage of an Act embracing in substance the following features :—

1. That authority be given to the cities and towns of the Commonwealth, to introduce military instruction and drill as a part of the school exercises in said towns and cities, and to make the needful expenditures for the same.

2. Whenever any town or city council shall authorize such military instruction and drill, it shall be the duty of the school committee of said city or town to organize the scholars of one or more schools or school districts, between the ages of twelve and eighteen years, with the consent of their parents and guardians, into convenient companies; to procure instructors, and make all necessary rules and orders respecting the manner of organization, modes of drill, and the times and places for the same.

3. It shall be the duty of the quartermaster to provide suitable arms and equipments for such companies upon the requisition of the select-

men or mayor and aldermen of such town or city; provided satisfactory security be given to him by such selectmen or mayor and aldermen, in behalf of said town or city, for the proper use, safe keeping, and return of said arms and equipments, whenever said company or companies shall have been disbanded.

As reference is made to the success of the experiment in the town of Brookline, I insert a passage from the Report of the founder of the 'Brookline Rifles' to the School Committee.

The advantage gained by this course of instruction, is, in my opinion, very great. The school system in the town of Brookline, I consider, is all that the citizens could desire, if the physical education of the pupil is properly attended to. Our drill is an aid to the parent in this respect. The boys in the older class can already be selected from their playmates by the improvement of their forms. Habits of prompt, instant, and unconditional obedience, are also more successfully inculcated by this system of instruction than by any other with which we are acquainted.

A perfect knowledge of the duties of a soldier can be taught to the boys during the time of their attendance at the public schools; thus obviating the necessity of this acquisition after the time of the pupil has become more valuable.

A proper system of military instruction in the schools of our Commonwealth, would furnish us with the most perfect Militia in the world; and I have very little doubt that the good sense of the people will soon arrange such a system in all the schools in the State. Meanwhile, gentlemen, I have the pleasure of congratulating you on having been the first to adopt a course which I believe will soon be universally followed.

With the earnest recommendation on my part, that the military instruction of the boys of the town should be continued through the ensuing year,

I remain, gentlemen, very respectfully,

MOSES B. WILLIAMS,
Chairman Military Committee.

About the same time, His Excellency, Governor Andrew, thus presented the subject anew to the Legislature in a message accompanying the report of an Informal Commission upon the military training of the people of Massachusetts.

I venture to observe that I think it possible to secure efficiency, without sacrificing economy, and that broad and generous methods will be found most economical as well as most enduring. They must be rooted, therefore, in our system of popular education. And the education of the Militia for the performance of its duties, must include the education of our youth for their fulfillment, when the youth shall have become men and shall form the Militia of the State.

Just so much as may be accomplished by our youth at school, will be spared from their Militia training after they have become adults. Rudimentary military instruction, tuition and practice in the manual, the school of the soldier, the school of the company, and so on, may be introduced into our day schools and academies, or may be imparted to and enjoyed by boys, disconnected from their literary education, with manifest advantages.

I cannot doubt that many hours, monthly, may thus be rescued from unmeaning play, many from weariness and mental dullness, and many be added, by the cheerful impulse of bodily health and mental tone, to the really successful exertions of the young student. I believe we can have brighter scholars, better boys, healthier and manlier sons, steadier and more dutiful young citizens by the process. And in the process we shall be preparing them to begin their Militia life, already well grounded and well disciplined in much knowledge which they would acquire less easily in later life, and for the acquisition of which in later life they would have less convenient time. Besides, military drill is a part of the best gymnastics which can be provided for the youth at school.

This proposition not only commends itself to the reason, it is not only sanctioned by the authority of wise and experienced generals, statesmen and promoters of education; the soundness of the theory has been tested by experiment. We have quoted the report of Mr. Williams, showing how successful was the attempt, on a small scale, in a New England village. Brigadier De Peyster, and Secretary Flint, report upon its success in Switzerland, where it is believed to be the essential foundation for the best Militia system that ever existed.

The plan of introducing drill into schools, has been tried extensively in England within the past few years. The subject in all its bearings is so fully considered, and its practicability and many good effects so completely demonstrated, in a Report made to the Governor of Massachusetts, by Mr. James Freeman Clarke, I cannot do a better service than by inserting it entire.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, BOSTON,
February 13, 1864.

To the Honorable the Senate:—

I had the honor, on the twentieth of January, to communicate to the General Court the Report of an Informal Commission concerning "the military instruction and training of the people of Massachusetts." I had hoped to transmit therewith some account of the reports made to the Royal Educational Commission of Great Britain on physical training in connection with the introduction of military drill and instruction into the schools for youth.

But having been unable, by reason of the pressure of other duties, to give to this subject the personal attention I desired to bestow, I requested a gentleman interested in the cause of education, to prepare a Report thereon, presenting the substance of the inquiries made, the experience had, and the results reached, so far as results have yet been attainable, and I respectfully furnish his Report for the information of the Legislature.

I regard the subject and the various questions, direct and collateral, which it involves, as of great and lasting importance to the Commonwealth. I trust that it may be examined with full deliberation, and that all means of inquiry and all the avenues of information may be thoroughly exhausted and explored. The subject affects our educational system and its prosperity; the physical and intellectual development of our people; and their capacity to maintain, without undue expenditure of the time of our adult men, a competent and efficient Militia.

JOHN A. ANDREW.

REPORT.

JAMAICA PLAIN, January 26th, 1864.

To His Excellency JOHN A. ANDREW, *Governor of Massachusetts.*

MY DEAR SIR:—In your note of January 22d, you request me to prepare "a brief and informal Report on the subject of the physical training of children, the modifications of our school regulations, needed for that end, and especially the value and success, when tried, of military instruction, drill and exercises, on the health, studies, bodily and mental aptitudes, &c., &c., of the young." I am happy to comply with this request; and in doing so I shall often refer to certain parliamentary blue books, containing Reports to the Royal Educational Commission, from Edwin Chadwick, Esq., on "Half-time teaching in Schools, Military Drill and Physical Training." These Reports contain a large amount of valuable evidence from distinguished teachers in different parts of Great Britain, and from other intelligent persons, illustrating the advantages of the military drill on the physical, mental and moral health of the pupils.

Before introducing into our school system so important a change as that of a military drill as a regular gymnastic exercise, it is proper to obtain all the light which can be found in the experience of other nations. The English Government have felt themselves called upon, during some years past, to prepare the nation for a possible invasion. Since steam has bridged the Channel, England no longer feels safe behind her wooden bulwarks. Many changes have come since the day when the presence of her Channel Fleet was sufficient to render impracticable the great Napoleon's carefully arranged plan for her invasion. Accordingly, not only by rifle clubs among the men, but by the introduction of the military drill among the children in the schools, the English Government have, within the last ten years, helped to create a military force, perhaps sufficient for the defense of territory. The evidence and results of this are to be found in the parliamentary Reports, from which I shall now proceed to make extracts.

The points to be considered are (1.) Is the military drill in schools *desirable*, and why? (2.) Is the military drill in schools *practicable*, and how?

I. Is the Military Drill in Schools Desirable.

Experience shows that it has these advantages—

(1.) It is desirable for the children as a system of physical and moral gymnastics.

We are just beginning to comprehend that education implies the healthy development of body as well as mind, and that the mind cannot be healthy unless it resides in a healthy body. Bodily gymnastics have been introduced into our schools to some extent; and so far as they have been tried, it has been found that they were as useful for the mind as for the body. The brain of the child cannot be confined to close study for any length of time without producing nervousness and irritability, if not worse results. Too protracted attention to books induces physical disease in children, which would be wholly obviated by frequent intermissions of study for bodily exercise. It is evidently the dictate of nature that children should not be kept still for too long a time. God has made little children full of nerves in order that they may be tempted to perpetual motion, and so grow up, physically and mentally. We run in the face of Providence when we keep a little child sitting still for an hour at a time. The faculty of concentrated attention in little children is small. The general opinion of the best observers at present is, that children twelve years old and younger ought not to study books more than eighteen hours a week, or three hours a day during six days. The rest of the time should be given to exercise, to object lessons, or to play.

Now, if any gymnastic exercise is to be introduced into our schools for the sake of the health and improvement of the children, it would seem that the military drill has advantages over all others. For it exercises all parts of the body; the arms and chest by the use of the musket, and its different positions; the lower limbs, in marching; the lungs, by the movements. It moreover, teaches orderly movements and combined movements; gives erectness and grace to the form; and finally, gives power over the whole body. The testimony which we adduce will go to show that wherever introduced into English schools it has had the universal approval of teachers and observers. The power of study has been increased; the discipline and order of the school has been improved, and the whole tone elevated.

We adduce the following evidence to these results from Mr. Chadwick's Parliamentary Report, above referred to:—

Special Effects of the Military Drill on the Discipline of Schools, and on the Condition and Progress of Pupils.

Queen Elizabeth's Free Grammar School, Southwark.

I have much pleasure in complying with the request that I would report upon the effects produced by the introduction of military drill into this establishment. About five years ago the Court of Governors, (principally at

the suggestion of one of their number, who seems most remarkably to have anticipated the present movement, and who has greatly aided us by his private liberality,) introduced a system of drill which has undergone gradual development, and is still receiving continual extension.

The two schools, (Grammar and English,) consist of nearly 550 boys, all of whom now receive instruction daily in ordinary marching drill, (with such evolutions as our limited space allows,) broad and small sword exercise, and complete rifle drill, with the exception of firing and measurement of distances. The training is given by an intelligent and active half-pay sergeant of marines and an assistant, who reside in the two lodges of the establishment. I will follow Mr. Chadwick's three divisions.

1. *Sanitary.*—Our attendance register shows better numbers and fewer absentees from those various diseases and ailments which usually affect the children of the lower orders residing in crowded parts of large towns, than that of any other school which I know. This I attribute, in great measure, to the regular exercise thus obtained. As an old Westminster boy myself, I remember with gratitude the good effects produced by the boating, cricket, foot-ball and rockets which we there enjoyed; but, with that one exception, (add, perhaps, Charterhouse,) the London schools are miserably deficient in proper play-grounds; hence, the additional importance of the regular and enforced exercise supplied by drill.

2. *Moral.*—Very much is gained, both for the character and appearance of the boys individually, and still more for the general discipline of the school. They assemble in a far more orderly manner, being called, and their different movements regulated, by the sound of the bugle. They then march into school and are dismissed in the same way. Much confusion is thus avoided, and great fatigue is saved to the masters in directing the movements of the boys in the school-room. Again, instead of the helter-skelter run through the streets to church, we hear the regular march; and the half-saucy nod with which a superior used to be met is now changed for the respectful salute. I quite agree with Mr. Chadwick, that much of what is comprised in the word *discipline*, viz: duty, self-restraint, order, punctuality and obedience to command, is really secured by the introduction of drill; and it is difficult to overrate the importance of such an adjunct in a locality like the present, where the school is open to all classes, and the parents themselves exercise little or no control over their children, thus failing to give us that moral support which, emanating from home, does so much to promote the discipline of public schools generally.

3. *Economic.*—Our own drill is too recent, and the volunteer system too young, for us yet to be able to say what assistance our school will render by presenting youths ready trained on leaving us; but I may say that several of our "old boys" have joined the local rifle corps, and that more than one has already gained promotion.

I would only add, that to make it effective and popular with boys, drill should be treated like any other recognized branch of study; examiners should be appointed and prizes given to the most deserving. A military referee would be also very valuable to advise with the head master on matters with regard to which, the latter, from want of training, is incompetent to decide, and therefore obliged to rely too much on the judgment of his inferior, the drill-master.

ANDREW JOHNSON, M. A., *Head Master.*

19 March, 1860.

W. W. SANDELL, Esq., one of the Governors of the Foundation Grammar School, of the parish of St. Olave's, Southwark, states that the military drill has been introduced into that school about three years.

The school contains about 50 boys, day scholars, chiefly the children of respectable inhabitants, who intend them for trading and commercial pursuits exclusively.

The schoolmasters uniformly report that the drill has had a highly beneficial influence on the order and discipline of the scholars, and indirectly on the progress of their tuition. It has entirely changed for the better their whole personal action and bearing and behavior. The beneficial change it has wrought is quite marked to every one. In all ways it has been beneficial with reference to their civil condition; it makes them other creatures. The drill has been also introduced recently into a school of the Coopers' Company, of which he is one of the Court, and into the Blue Coat School, of which he is one of the governors, and the reports to them are similarly favorable as to its beneficial influence on the civil condition of the scholars. So satisfied is he of this, that if there were space he would extend the exercises still further. He agrees in what has been said of the beneficial effects of the drill, and the expediency of its general application as a training for civil occupation, apart from the consideration of national defenses. At the same time he concurs in the view of the importance of the drill to families of the trading and commercial classes, as qualifying them to meet better whatever personal dangers may befall them, in emigration or in foreign travel, in civil life in our times.

Naval and Military Drill systematized as Gymnastic Exercise, as Parts of any National System of Education, by Edwin Chadwick, Esq., C. B.

That for occupation of the time taken from book instruction, systematized drill should be introduced, on these several grounds :—

1. *Sanitary.*—That the drill is good (and for defective constitutions requisite) for correction of congenital bodily defects and taints, with which the young of a very large proportion of the population, especially the young of the poorer town populations, are affected; and that for these purposes the climbing of masts, and other operations of the naval drill, and swimming, are valuable additions to the gymnastic exercises of the military drill, and when properly taught are greatly liked by boys.

2. *Moral.*—That the systematized drill gives an early initiation to all that is implied in the term discipline, viz. :—

Duty,	Self-restraint,
Order,	Punctuality,
Obedience to Command,	Patience.

3. *Economical.*—That it is proved, when properly conducted, by suppling the joints, rendering the action prompt as well as easy, by giving promptitude in concurrent and punctual action with others, to add, at a trifling expense, to the efficiency and productive value of the pupils as laborers or as foremen in after life.

On the second chief topic, as regards the interest of the nation : that the general introduction of the drill is called for, and will be of the same use as it was of old in the parochial training to the use of the bow, and on practical evidence of officers engaged in the drill, it is proved :

1. That the military and naval drill is more effectively and permanently taught in the infantile and juvenile stages than in the adolescent or adult stages.

2. That at school it may be taught most economically, as not interfering with productive labor, and that thirty or forty boys may be taught the naval and military drill at one penny farthing per week per head as cheaply as one man, and the whole juvenile population may be drilled completely, in the juvenile stage, as economically as the small part of it now taught imperfectly on recruiting or in the adult stage; and that, for teaching the drill, the services of retired drill-sergeants and naval as well as military officers and pensioners may be had economically in every part of the country.

That the middle and higher class schools should have, in addition to the foot drill, the cavalry drill, which the parents of that class of pupils may afford.

That the drill, when made generally prevalent, (without superseding,) will eventually accomplish, in a wider and better manner, the objects of volunteer corps and of yeomanry, which, as interrupting productive occupations now becoming more absorbing, is highly expensive, rendering all volunteer forces dependent on fitful zeal and, eventually, comparatively ineffective; that the juvenile drill, if made general, will accomplish better the objects even of the militia; that the juvenile drill will abate diffidence in military efficiency, and will spread a wide predisposition to a better order of recruitment for the public service, will tend to the improvement of the ranks of the regular force, whether naval or military, and will produce an immensely stronger and cheaper defensive force than by the means at present in use or in public view.

And finally, that the means of producing this defensive force, instead of being an expense, will be a gain to the productive power and value of the labor of the country.

Mr. William Smith, Superintendent of the Surrey District School.

You have had experience of the effect of the military drill on the mental and bodily training of young children in this establishment? Yes; but the effect of the military drill was most shown by the effect of its discontinuance.

In what way was it shown? In 1857, the drill-master was dismissed by the guardians with a view of reducing the expenditure. The immediate effect of the discontinuance of the drill, was to make the school quite another place. I am sure that within six months we lost about £200, in the extra wear and tear of clothing, torn and damaged in mischievous acts and wild plays, in the breakage of utensils from mischief, and damage done to the different buildings, the breakage of windows, the pulling up of gratings, and the spoiling of walls. A spirit of insubordination prevailed amongst the boys during the whole of the time of the cessation of the drill. In the workshop they were insubordinate, and I was constantly called upon by the industrial teachers, the master shoemaker, and the master tailor, to coerce boys who were quite impudent, and who would not obey readily. The moral tone of the school seemed to have fled from the boys, and their whole behavior was altered, as displayed in the dormitories as well as in the yards.

During this time were the religious services and exercises and the internal discipline of the school maintained as before? They were maintained as before; the business of the school was kept up as before, but the order was by no means as good. I was not only called in to correct the boys in the workshop but in the school, and I was under the disagreeable necessity of reverting to corporal punishment, and of dismissing one incorrigible boy entirely. The chaplain joined with me and the school-masters in urging the restoration of the drill.

The drill having been restored, has order been restored? Yes, excellent order.

The present chaplain of the school, the Reverend Charles G. Vignoles, who was present, expressed his entire concurrence in the description given of the disorganization produced by the discontinuance of the military drill, which was illustrated by entries in his own reports.

Mr. Edwin Simpson, Head Master of the Swinton Industrial Schools, Manchester.

Would you, from your experience, recommend the military drill as part of a general system of education; and why?

Decidedly. In these schools the drill is practiced daily, with the best effect upon the general order and discipline of the establishment. The advantages of any system which will insure prompt obedience to a command,

will not only arouse, but keep the attention continually on the *qui vive*, and which will secure regularity and good order in the inevitable changes of place and posture during school-hours, are obvious. The military drill is equally important, however, as a gymnastic exercise, calculated to develop the muscular system, quicken the circulation, and arouse those physical energies which, in young children, are too often allowed to lie dormant. I consider that in our public schools especially, and in our boarding schools, where the children remain for months together, as distinguished from those day schools in which the scholars attend only during school hours, the military drill is a desideratum. In the class of children admitted to these and similar schools, there are very commonly found traces of scrofula and other diseases, both hereditary and acquired; and without, of course, venturing upon the subject as a medical question, I have no doubt whatever that military drill has the effect of mitigating, perhaps of arresting the progress of, diseases of the nature alluded to.

Rev. Isaac Holmes, B. A., Chaplain and Head Master of the Liverpool Industrial Schools, at Kirkdale.

Is this the only school in which the drill has been brought under your experience; whether the naval or the military drill?

The only school.

What, from your experience, is your view of the expediency of introducing either or both as a part of systematized course of gymnastics in popular education? I certainly would recommend both one and the other for the whole management of the children whilst in school, and for its general bearing upon them in after life. We find that it tends considerably to sharpen the intellect, to promote habits of attention and obedience, as well as to improve their physical condition. It is clear to me, that it has a beneficial effect upon them in civil life, as well as being, of course, a good preparation for the service of the country.

Mr. Walter Macleod, Head Master of the Model School, Royal Military Asylum, Chelsea.

But regarding solely the school tuition, you are understood to state that the drill is a valuable auxiliary to it. Yes; it gives better order and discipline, and where you have order and discipline you can do far more in tuition, within a limited time, than you can do where there is a want of discipline.

For the reasons adduced in the above statements, it appears that a military drill introduced into schools as a part of their regular exercises, tends to promote the health of the pupils, the order and discipline of the school, and to give those habits of obedience and self-control which fit men for any place and work in life.

It is moreover, to be remarked that this drill is, in these English schools, by no means confined to the boys. The girls go through the same exercises, with the exception that they do not use the musket, but supply its place with a cane.

It has also been observed that the advantages of the drill as preparing the way for a Militia system, and giving boys that preparatory training which will make them efficient defenders of their country afterward, if their services should be required, have also been referred to in the evidence already adduced. But on this point we proceed to make further statements.

(2.) The military drill in schools is desirable as a preparation, and the only adequate preparation, for an efficient Militia.

It is evident that if the drill be acquired in youth, and at school, a very large part of the work will have been done which is needed for a well-disciplined Militia. Boys can learn better than men, whose muscles are already stiffened by labor. Boys also learn these movements with pleasure, and therefore easily. There is time for it in childhood, but not afterward, when men are already engaged in business, and when their time is too valuable to be used in preparing themselves for a distant and doubtful necessity. The Militia system of Massachusetts fell into entire neglect and discredit on this account. It will fall into a like neglect again unless, by some such measure as is now proposed, the youth of the land are regularly and systematically exercised in our schools. And since our schools are so numerous, we shall have in this respect a great advantage over any other people. Every boy in the State of Massachusetts will be prepared, if the terrible occasion should again arise, for entering the ranks as a veteran soldier, so far as discipline is concerned. It would give Massachusetts the same military superiority over other States, which may neglect this system, which she has obtained of intellectual superiority over such as have not had her system of common schools in past time.

The evidence given below shows that early training in drill, in the use of the musket, in marching, and in discipline generally, tells at once, as soon as the necessity for becoming a soldier arrives:

Mr. William Baker, the drill-master to the St. Olave's Grammar School, has been a color sergeant of the first division of Royal Marines. He has been twenty-three years in the service, in which he was for nineteen years a non-commissioned officer, and has seen much service. He was recommended from the Duke of York's school, where he had been a drill sergeant for half a year, to drill the pupils of this school.

Whilst he was in the army, and having to drill recruits, he has occasionally met with individuals to each of whom, from his bearing and action, he has said at once, "In what regiment have you been?" The answer was, "In none; I was taught the drill at school." He found the individuals almost ready drilled; they would be more complete for service in a quarter of the time of the previously undrilled. The naval drill, as given at Greenwich, he had observed, was highly effective. He was on board the "Ganges," and the "Conway," when there were many boys came on board, who had been taught the naval drill at the Greenwich Naval Schools; they proved to be ready drilled and as well trained as a man-of-war's man; they were clean and orderly, and, as a class, they were first-rate seamen, and they became petty and warrant officers in greater proportion than others. By the introduction of the naval drill in schools, by being trained to cleanliness and order there, they would be less inclined to the dirt and disorder of the merchant service, and would prefer the Queen's service.

From his own experience in drilling children, he would say that they might be taught to work and practice motions at from five to six years of age; that they may be taught the sword drill at eight years of age; that they may be taught the rifle drill at about ten years of age. He finds that they can handle a light rifle very well at that age. He expects that a prize, given for the best rifle drill, will be gained by a boy of that age against older boys. If there were a proper place, with space, he could practice them in firing, at from thirteen to fourteen years of age.

It is the result of his observation, that the best educated men make the best soldiers in every way; they act the best under command and under difficulties.

In his experience, he finds that the first-class boys at the drill, are the first-class boys in the school. He had said to one of the schoolmasters, "I can tell which of your boys are the sharpest scholars by drilling them, for you will find that those who are the best at the drill, are the best at the book." The head master asked him to recommend him a good boy for a clerk's situation, a very good one, for he was wanted for one of the Governors of the school, to fill a situation that was to begin at £30 a year for the boy. He (the sergeant) recommended one, of whom the head master entirely approved, and asked him (the sergeant) what had led him to think of that boy; to which the answer was, "Why, I looked over my drill book into the list of those in the musket drill; the best boys altogether are the best at the musket drill."

Notes of the evidence of Mr. S. B. Orchard, Drill-Master (under the Education Committee of Privy Council) for the School belonging to St. George, the Martyr, at Micham.

Has been sergeant in the 3d Light Dragoons. Whilst in the army, has had to drill, as recruits, boys who had been in the Duke of York's School, at Chelsea, and at the Royal Hibernian School, where they had been taught the drill. He found that they took the drill in one-third the time that it was usually taken by other recruits who had been previously undrilled, and took it better; that is to say, the horse as well as the foot-drill, although these boys from the Duke of York's and the Hibernian Schools had had no previous horse drill. They got the drill as quickly as educated men, and educated men, he finds, take the drill in one-third the time that uneducated men do.

He finds that he can effect improvements in that bodily condition of young boys which he can only effect with difficulty in old boys, and not at all with men. With boys, for example, he can effect expansions of the chest, which he cannot effect with men. He is confident that the drilled young boys will make better soldiers than those who begin later; that they will be more confident and courageous, as well as more apt, and will make better soldiers abroad and in the field, as well as at home in quarters. He is also confident, from observation, that those who have been drilled early and made supple at every joint, and prompt and efficient in action, would be worth one-fifth more wages than the ordinary undrilled laborers. He states that the teachers of trades express similar opinions in their experience.

[Read at the Military College, Richmond, the above statement, to the cavalry and infantry drill masters of the College. They each expressed their concurrence in the correctness of the evidence as to the effect of the juvenile drill.]

Mr. Dymock, (late corporal of the 17th Lancers,) one of those who teach the cavalry drill of the College, observed, that in his experience men were enlisted in the cavalry, men had been enlisted and sent to the Crimea, whose joints and habits were fixed, whom no drill had taught or could teach the horse drill properly.

The first infantry drill master said he had had experience of boys from the Duke of York's and the Royal Hibernian Schools, and that they made excellent soldiers, and required little or no additional drill, and that they were promoted to be non-commissioned officers in large proportion. From drilling the Militia he found that children of the neighborhood took much of the drill themselves. From his experience in recruiting, he was confident that a better order of men would be got if the children were generally and early taught.

Sergeant GILES, of the Guards, the other drill-master for the foot-drill of the College, states that he had to drill the volunteers for the Rifle Corps, at Richmond. He was surprised to see two of the volunteers fall in and do everything completely at once. On his expressing his surprise, the volunteers recalled themselves to his recollection, and that he had drilled them as boys at a school some time ago. He had had boys from the Duke of York's and the Hibernian Schools, and found them, as a class, better up than those who had been drilled later.

(3.) There is still another reason why the drill in schools is desirable for boys who are to be laborers or mechanics. It is testified by many gentlemen at the head of large establishments, that the drill tends to give aptitude for many kinds of labor.

In fact it is evident that any exercise which goes to develop the frame, to give it vigor and flexibility and promptness, must increase the industrial capacity of the citizen. Probably the drill in schools, in this one way alone, would more than pay for itself in the increased economic and industrial value of the work done in the State.

On this point, also, we adduce the evidence of Mr. Chadwick and his witnesses :—

WILLIAM FAIRBAIRN, Esq., F. R. S., of the firm of Fairbairn & Sons, Mechanical Engineers, Manchester.

What number of mechanics and laborers do you now employ? Nearly 1,000. What is your experience and observation as to the effects observable of the military or the naval drill on the habits and efficiency of laborers as workers? We find that men who have been soldiers or sailors obey orders with greater precision than others, that they are more punctual and more tractable, and require less superintendence or attention than others. We do not meet with men who have been drilled amongst the skilled mechanics, but we find the drilled men amongst the common laborers, as compared with whom they are very superior. We have had for many years, as foreman of our laborers, a man who had been trained as a sailor, who had in fact been a sailor, and we find him extremely handy. His knowledge of the use of tackle in raising heavy weights is extremely convenient, as well as his habits of command over the men; moreover, there is a much less risk of accidents from men who are so trained; they go about their work with more knowledge and skill than the undrilled.

What, from such experience, is your view of the expediency of the military and naval drill, as a part of school exercises and gymnastics, and its effects on the efficiency and value of the scholars as workers in after life? In my view, a greater benefit could not be conferred on the population of the country, than to provide for them a military and naval drill, interspersing with their school instruction systematic gymnastics. It would be, in every way, profitable to them and salutary. Their active bodily training cannot begin too early, and from my own experience as a boy, when it was a favorite game to "play at soldiers," it would be as agreeable as it would be useful to youth in the duties of ordinary civil life.

You have mentioned the avoidance of accidents as one benefit experienced from the employment of drilled men. Are you aware that the total number of deaths registered during the last year from accidents from contusions, stated in the official reports as arising chiefly in the employment of the agency of steam, was above 5,800 in England and Wales alone? I was not aware of such an extent of loss over the whole kingdom, but I was aware that in the Manchester district the average loss of life from boiler explosions alone is, as near as I can recollect, about 120.

Mr. George Sykes, machinist and engineer:—

Was foreman at the manufactory of Sharp, Stewart & Co., Manchester, formerly Sharp Brothers, engine makers. He had nearly 300 men under his direction. Amongst the men there were some who had been soldiers in the line; they were distinguished as most steady men, as keeping everything tidy and orderly, and being prompt and active. "I am quite satisfied that they were worth more money than others in the shop. If I were the employer, I would give two shillings or three shillings a week more than to others to whom one pound a week is paid. I am satisfied, from observation, that the habits begot by the drill would improve workmen to at least that extent. There is much loss of labor by the awkwardness of laborers not pulling together, not lifting together, and not being unanimous. Many accidents are occasioned by awkwardness; three out of four that I have seen have been from awkwardness and stupidity, which was not displayed by the soldiers. As a foreman, I should not have had half the trouble, if all had been drilled and had had the same habits of obedience, and would have 'been told,' as the soldiers."

From your experience of the effects of the drill, if you had a son, and there were an opportunity of getting him into a school where pupils received a good drill, would you be willing to pay extra for it, to improve his qualification as a working man? Yes; if I were paying one shilling a week, which is what is commonly paid for a good private day school, I should be willing to pay one shilling extra for his teaching, in a school where he would be drilled and have a good bodily training, and be well set up. I am sure it would be worth double.

The Count Gasparin, an accomplished statesman of France, the writer of the most able work on agriculture in Europe, in treating of the inconvenience to which agriculturists, small farmers of France, are subject, adverts to the liability of the family stock of labor, that of their sons, being disturbed by the conscription, or of their being taxed to procure substitutes for their sons when drawn to serve in the army. He says, that if the labor of the son can be supplied by a little more activity on the part of the other laboring members of the family, if the labor of that son be not absolutely necessary,—but above all, if it be necessary to go into debt to raise the price of the substitute,—the father of the family cannot be too strongly advised *not* to prevent his son joining the army. "We have," says the count, "experienced such good effects from the adoption of this advice, that we cannot too often repeat it here. The families who have followed it have saved their money, and they have seen the son return more vigorous, more intelligent, more respectful, more capable, having lost his rusticity *(sauvagerie de la campagne)* and become capable of dealing with men with more ease and consideration. Our discharged soldiers are, in general, the best subjects of their villages; it is amongst them that we find our best foremen and our best stewards, whilst their brothers who have remained at home are only common loutish laborers."

II. Practicability of the Plan.

It only remains for me briefly to consider the practicability of this plan. How can we introduce such a system into our schools?

That no insuperable obstacles are in the way is apparent from the evidence already adduced. What has been already successfully done in the schools of England, can be done in those of Massachusetts.

The Legislature may pass a law authorizing the towns to employ teachers of the military drill in their schools. They may encourage

them to do so, by offering arms from the arsenals of the State, to be kept and used and returned, under proper limitations. Further, to encourage still more the general action of the towns, a portion of the expense of this instruction may be refunded to the town each year out of the School Fund.

In every town in Massachusetts it will be easy to find, from among our returned soldiers, a good drill sergeant, to give the instruction.

The expense cannot be very great. The time taken from studies will not be lost, but improved. Wherever there are twenty boys together in a school, over eight years of age, they can be drilled for half an hour, once or twice a week, or every day. It will not be necessary, however, for the drill-master to be with them more than once or twice a week. Monitors may be appointed to carry the classes through their exercises, and to teach them in the absence of the regular instructor.

Upon these points I append a single extract from the report, and sign myself

Your Excellency's sincere friend,

JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.

Nothing can be more convincing than this cumulative testimony, and I trust some State Legislature will try the experiment on a large and liberal scale, providing competent instructors of high character, and all the material necessary,—for I believe this to be the *only* and the *sure* way of reconciling our patriotic but busy and impatient people to the indispensable institution of the Militia, the complement to the Church, the School and the Town;—the one institution needful to complete the formation and preservation of our Republican character.

But there should be no State Academies for the military education of officers. Fancy every State with its Academy, some thirty armies of Militia, each officered by graduates from their State Academies; they would fall to fighting for their *alma maters,* if not for State Rights.

If uniformity of drill is desirable, if a feeling of nationality is to be cherished, our Military Schools should be national. If economy is to be considered, or if we would secure the greatest advantages of instruction, these Schools must be few and large.

The *plant,* as manufacturers call it, is not much greater for a large school than for a small; you must have space for military

exercises, grounds for target practice, barracks, recitation halls, museums, riding halls, stables, libraries; apparatus of all sorts, chemical, astronomical, philosophical, &c., costly models in engineering and drawing, engines of war, pontoons, mortars, heavy ordnance, howitzers, and light field pieces, small arms; you must have horses for cavalry and artillery; you must have a full corps of teachers, &c. &c.,—and why repeat this enormous expense in thirty States, while the outlay for our one National Military College, some $200,000 per annum, although insufficient, is annually complained of in Congress; why repeat this for a number of scholars probably too small to practice the manœuvres to advantage after all.

If it costs the United States $3,500 to educate well each Cadet at West Point, it would probably cost the United States $7,000 to half educate each graduate of these State Academies; that is, taking into view the amount sunk in buildings, libraries, funds to support the professors, apparatus warlike and scientific, multiplied through the land.

If every religious sect that differs from another about some abstruse theological dogma, must have its separate little college for fear of infection, so be it; certainly there can be no potent argument for squandering the nation's substance to make our land a military Babel. That would be an application of *arma cedant togæ*, devoutly to be deplored.

If unscrupulous politicians smuggle blockheads into West Point, so that less than one half can be dragged through the course, establish competitive examinations; if the studies are not comprehensive enough, endow more Professorships;—if the young men are so monastically secluded that they cease to be citizens and lose their sympathy with their fellow men, allow them more frequent intercourse with the world;—if the Academy is too small for our present wants, enlarge it, or devoting it to some especial branches, establish one or two more Academies for other arms;—but let them be National, not State Academies.

Let the States charge themselves with furnishing rudimentary instruction, it cannot be imparted anywhere so well as at the public schools and—colleges also;—but the education of officers should be included among the incidental duties of the Federal Government which is charged with the public defense.

I have endeavored to answer conclusively the questions with which I started. I have striven to prove, by reasoning, and by authority,—

1. That we do want an organized military force.

2. That it must consist of a small standing army, so composed and so officered as to be capable of expansion when war threatens; and principally of Militia.

3. That our Militia never has been effectively organized or disciplined.

4. That if there is a will, there is a way to remedy the defects of the present system, and to create an energetic reliable force of citizen soldiers, a National Militia.

In attempting this, I have been guilty of tedious re-iteration, but the subject is so vitally important and one about which there is so much incredulity, that the truth needs to be established and corroborated. If we are ever going to reform the Militia, the present time is auspicious;—the country is filled with officers and soldiers competent to inaugurate an efficient system successfully, and calamity has made us sensible of our sins of omission.

As Washington despairingly remarked, in one of his many exhortations on this subject, "Time, while it may furnish others, is wearing away some advantages for promoting the object." As the Scottish heroine supplied the missing bolt by thrusting her delicate arm through the staples to protect her sovereign,—so we have thrust forth our tender youth unprepared by instruction, unhardened by service, unstrengthened by discipline;—to be maimed and slaughtered, victims to our guilty neglect. We have been deaf to Moses and the Prophets, shall we not hearken to the voice from the Grave?

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